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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines government reform in Thailand during the 
administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006), one of the largest 
reform programs in the history of the Thai administrative system. Through a case 
study methodology, this study observed the implementation of the Integrated 
Provincial Administrative System (IPAS), which represents the complex reform 
scheme initiated in 2003. While this study employs documentary research on the 
development of Thai politics and public administration in the period before the 
Thaksin administration, the investigator used qualitative interviews to analyze the 
IPAS implementation and process. The informants included provincial governors, 
deputy governors, provincial administrators, and local officers in three provinces 
during the period between November 2004 and March 2005.
This dissertation presents the change and continuity of the political and 
socioeconomic systems in Thailand that led to and shaped the administrative reform 
of Thaksin. It addresses the subject matter of Thai administrative reforms from two 
perspectives. First, the institutional and historical contexts of the reforms with 
regard to the patterns of Thai governments and international organizations provide a 
large picture of the transformation of the Thai administration system. Second, the 
study focuses on the management and tactical aspects of Thaksin’s administrative 
reform to answer questions about choices of reforms, the interaction of reforming 
sub-governments, and potential impacts generated by the changes.
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With an unprecedented large electoral mandate in 2001, the Thaksin 
government of the Thai Rak Thai Party had established a stable administration that 
made possible an overhaul of Thai administrative process and decisive policy 
choices. The changes have two major implications: a rhetorical application of New  
Public Management methods to public administration and a recentralization effort 
under the control of the Prime Minister. These changes shift Thai bureaucracy from 
a predominantly hierarchical structure dominated by the technocrats to untenable 
business-like administrative practices and strengthen the power of central 
government. The findings demonstrate that the management preoccupation of 
reform tactics not only contradicted an alleged reform goal concerning 
administrative power devolution and reversed an established decentralization policy 
for local government, but also politicized groups of senior bureaucrats.
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CHAPTER 1 
PROBLEMS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Research Questions
Government administration today is often the subject of “administrative 
reform" due to general criticism for being too complex, centralized, bureaucratic, and 
incompetent. In formal administrative systems such tendencies are reinforced by 
standard operating procedures driven by politicians and bureaucrats. As a result, 
the reform concept brings a special perspective to bear on administrative change, 
internal leadership, and power relationships among the involved players. Studies in 
this issue show that administrative reform often fails and results in disappointment 
(Aberbach & Rockman, 2000; Caiden, 1999; Peters & Savoie, 1994). However, 
ambiguity and uncertainty do not eliminate strong convictions for administrative 
transformation.
Since a military coup in 1991, public sector reforms have been on the mind 
of Thai politicians and administrative leaders. Each new administration, from Anand 
(1992) to Chuan (1992-1995, 1997-2000) to Banharn (1995-1996) to Chavalit 
(1996-1997) to Thaksin (2001-2004, 2005-2006), has been optimistic about new 
reform initiatives. However, many reforms and reorganizations failed to achieve 
their stated objectives. Among those reforms, some were continuous chains from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the preceding administration, but some were new initiatives with a higher degree of 
comprehensiveness. Before the first Thaksin administration (2001-2004) was 
inaugurated in January 2001, the 1997 constitutional amendment was promulgated 
to improve the state’s political and administrative apparatus. The onset of the Asian 
financial crisis in mid-1997 further demanded a change of leadership to cope with 
the pressing social and economic problems.
Founded in 1998, the Thai Rak Thai Party, with the slogan “Think New, Act 
New,” presented a reformist ideology in the 2001 national election. The party 
became an unprecedented single dominant party in Thailand’s history of elected 
premiership. Thaksin introduced a number of public sector reforms to overhaul the 
Thai administration.
The first major reform dealt with the reorganization of central administration 
and ministerial functions. The reform restructured ministry organizations which 
produced new agencies and simultaneously altered the dynamic of bureaucratic 
power. The second major reform concerned regional administration, turning 
provincial governors into “CEO-Governors." This reform was officially titled the 
“Integrated Provincial Administrative System” (IPAS) while it was generally known 
as the CEO-Governor, referring to Thaksin’s “CEO prime minister” and his private 
sector style of management. These two major reforms were initiated separately, but 
many management tactics and practices were designed to support one another in a 
comprehensive approach.
This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of these recent 
administrative reforms in Thailand. More specifically, it explores the role of the 
Thaksin administration in Thai public sector reforms, in general, and the impact of
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3sub-government reform on Thai public administration in particular. Thematic 
questions in this study can be divided into two levels. At the macro level, it seeks to 
explain the institutional context of Thai administrative reforms. The question is, 
then, to what degree Thailand’s public sector reforms were influenced by the 
international organizations and global economy. Do Thai administrative reforms 
reflect variations in the way administrative reforms are implemented abroad? At the 
micro level, this research analyzes the implications and impacts on Thai public 
administration resulting from reform tactics. The latter investigation asks what 
constraints and distortions may have influenced the extent to which the reform 
strategies have been implemented. How have the values of involved actors shifted 
during the reform processes? How do those actors react to the constraints they 
have encountered? The research seeks to answer these questions by examining 
the reform called the Integrated Provincial Administrative System.
On a methodological level, the study of public sector reform requires an 
appropriate research method. Studying public sector reform in a country with 20 
ministerial functions operated across 75 provinces makes the selection of case and 
observation sites an important issue. The case of the Integrated Provincial 
Administrative System was chosen because it well reflected the reform scheme of 
Thaksin’s administration as well as the continuing pattern of Thai government 
reform.
Using a purposive sample of a limited number of carefully selected provinces 
allowed me to simultaneously provide specific context and complexity on the one 
hand, and generalizability on the other. The goal is to develop qualitative case
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4studies that are both exploratory and explanatory. The details of the research 
method and the selection of observed provinces are demonstrated in Chapter 2.
Plausible Findings
Public sector reform is usually thought of as a means to an end, not an end 
in itself. To be more precise, it is potentially a means to multiple ends though 
unknown effects may occur. A good deal of evidence exists to show that 
management reform can go wrong. It is possible, then, that the IPAS reform under 
Thaksin may fail to produce the claimed benefits or even generate perverse effects 
that render the relevant administrative processes worse than they were previously. 
On the other hand, the reform may partially succeed, establishing the structures and 
processes that made Thai public organizations operate better. Further, we should 
be aware that the administrative reform and reorganization involve politics, not just 
what is managerially possible and efficient. Regardless, the process of 
redistribution of administrative authority and power devolution by the Thaksin 
government is likely to have an impact on the Thai public sector. Discrepancies 
between the original goals and outcomes generated by IPAS implementation are 
likely to exist. This is due to the complex interaction between politics and 
administration in a changing environment. To be adequate, any account of the Thai 
public sector reform initiatives will need to investigate the concepts, applications, 
and implications of those reforms. This study seeks to describe the relationship 
between political executives and technocrats, to analyze how Thaksin’s reform 
initiatives influenced change in political power, and to observe the dynamic of reform
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5implementation, how the reform tactics and strategies have been used, and how the 
norms and values of different key actors influence the outcomes. It examines the 
IPAS provincial government mandate under the unprecedented power of the 
Thaksin administration and seeks to understand the questions of reform heritage 
since the establishment of the elected parliamentary system since 1932. Figure 1 






contributing to NPM-like reform
Elements of Thaksin’s 
government reorganization 
and the IPAS
- Promotion of “New 
Managerialism” in 
government al operation
- Creation of the Office of 
Public Sector Development
- Shift in social policies and 
administrative laws
- Strengthening central and 
regional government
Politicization of bureaucrats, 
contradictions of reform tactics
Centralized political and 
administrative power
Reversed process o f local 
government decentralization plan
Figure 1. Causal Model of Thaksin’s Public Sector Reform
To begin with, the 1997 constitution was the legacy of emerging modernist 
business leaders, politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals who sought to transform 
the Thai state to keep pace with democratic and political changes in the modern 
world (Connors 1999, p. 202). The constitution making reflected a need for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
constitutional reform that emphasized transparency, accountability, decentralization, 
independent authorities, and popular participation in the government process. As a 
long-term strong military-technocrat polity gradually lost its influence and power, 
democratic processes became more firmly entrenched. However, administrative 
instability and the short life of most democratically elected governments became a 
serious problem. As a result, one of the goals of the 1997 reform constitution was to 
achieve stable government through a large political party and revamping 
administrative institutions in accordance with international “Good Governance” 
discourse (Connors, 2003, p. 175). In many respects, this shift in the Thai political 
order and administrative institutions was sketched out in the 1997 constitution.
Besides the contribution of the new constitution, international organizations 
have also played roles in guiding the direction of Thailand’s reforms. Under the 
direct and indirect influence of globally dominant agencies such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations Development 
Program, many governments including Thailand have experienced a number of 
institutional changes (Christensen & Laegreid, 1999; Farazmand, 2002). These 
international organizations have cultivated economic and social values and 
objectives through their policies and a wide range of assistance programs. In part, 
they have sought to implement a market-based macro economic policy agenda, and 
to develop institutions that facilitate free markets. This global economy perspective 
informs later chapters.
In response to the 1997 financial crisis, the Thai government sought to 
restore the confidence of foreign investors through the reform of various public
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
sector agencies (Suwanmala, 1998). International loans were spent on Thai 
financial institution restructuring: liberalization of banking, industrial restructuring, 
and social safety net reform. To a large degree, successive administrations have 
adopted international assistance programs and the package of reform strategies 
that came with that assistance, although not all of them have been implemented.
Before the depreciation of the Thai baht in July 1997, the Chavalit 
administration revealed a “public service reform master plan” that called for reducing 
the size of Thai civil service by one-third by 2001, while adjusting government 
officials’ salary to be more attractive. The Chuan government replaced the Chavalit 
cabinet in November 1997 and proceeded to downsize the public sector. Among 
other reform strategies, the Thai government consciously determined to stress a 
managerial approach to public administration such as results-oriented management, 
performance measures, and the New Public Management (NPM) approach to public 
sector management.
The 1997 constitution embraced a good deal of “agent creation,” the view 
that the public sector should operate with established framework agreements and 
performance measurement and be mission-driven, decentralized, and separated 
from traditional bureaucracy. The constitution provided a charter for creating new 
agencies including the Administrative Court, the Anti-Money Laundering Office, the 
Constitutional Court, the Election Commission, the National Counter Corruption 
Commission, the National Human Right Commission, the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman, and the State Audit Commission. Further, numerous elements of 
public sector improvements such as efficiency, customer orientation, service
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8standards, one-stop service, and performance targets appeared more often in the 
language of Thai administrative reform initiatives.
In the decade before Thaksin took office, successive administrations came 
under profound criticism for a range of reasons including poor capacity for 
governmental management, unsuitable economic policy reform, the public's distrust 
toward the bureaucracy, and low transparency. The reform movement vocally 
proposed to establish a new constitutional framework to solve existing problems. 
The reform pressures rapidly grew during the 1997 financial crisis and ended with 
the promulgation of the new constitution in late 1997.
With a new electoral system under the reformed constitution, the new Thai 
Rak Thai Party received major support to continue governmental reforms, resulting 
in substantive changes to politics and public sector organizations. On the basis of 
its successful populist policy following the Asian financial crisis and the change in 
the 1997 constitution, the Thai Rak Thai government established a centralized 
policy-making system and initiated the IPAS reform as part of Thaksin’s strategies 
for improving public policy implementation. The Thaksin administration launched 
major initiatives for government reform including ministerial reorganization, legal 
process improvements, and a provincial administrative system reform called IPAS 
which is the focus of this study.
Through an investigation of the development of Thai political and economic 
change, this dissertation presents a large picture of the public sector transformation 
that successive Thai governments have experienced. Equally important, this 
dissertation seeks to explain the major implications of the reform tactics and 
strategies used by elected executives and high-level bureaucrats, why these tactics
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9are used, and how they may impact reform outcomes. This dissertation describes 
the impact of IPAS's administrative tactics and strategies implemented at the 
provincial level. It argues that Thaksin's administrative reform is not likely to 
achieve the overarching goals anticipated in the 1997 reform constitution, 
particularly the development of accountability and democratic processes. The 
Thaksin administration once showed remarkable adaptability to popular demands 
and this allowed it to monopolize control over government for an extended period. 
But the shortfalls of the reform implementation show that the reform process 
strengthened incumbents’ political power and reversed the process of power 
decentralization for local government authority.
General Conditions of Administrative Reform
Public administration literature abounds with examinations and reviews of 
various attempts to modernize the management of public organizations in changing 
political, social, and economic contexts. Why are there so many reforms over time? 
What conditions can explain this phenomenon? Kettl (2000, pp. 3-4) argues that 
there are four different political-economic forces that have been in play:
First, political pressure after the end of the Cold War generated widespread 
debates about the role of government, with a focus on devising institutions that were 
more democratic, or rebuilding civil society and reshaping the relationship of the 
government with its citizens. The decline of citizen trust and confidence in public 
institutions allowed political candidates around the world to make a successful
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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campaign on the theme of shrinking the government and reducing its concentrated 
power.
Second, economic problems in the late 1990s, in particular, the Asian 
financial crisis, brought a profound structural adjustment to many Asian nations.
The crisis caused great urgency for government reform in transitional nations like 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, modernizing their economies quickly to address 
the existing problem. Other nations, such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom, 
launched their reforms to escape economic stagnation and renew economic growth. 
The claim that corporate tax and regulatory policies reduced economic growth and 
business competitiveness brought reform strategies such as deregulation and 
privatization to the center of the debate.
Third, the struggle to cope with the radical shift from agriculture to industrial 
society and from industrial toward information-based production pressed 
governments toward administrative reform. Yeatman (1998, pp.138-40) argues that 
over the last 30 years the new social movements, such as women’s groups, 
indigenous peoples, the environmentalists, and the anti-colonialists have all 
contributed to a re-conceptualization of citizenship values and ideas. Many Eastern 
European nations have been working to reconstruct their social, legal, economic, 
and political systems in part in an effort to adjust to the needs of an information- 
based society.
Fourth, global engagement among different institutions requires negotiation 
and partnership, transfusing reforming ideas and tactics between partners. While 
the international institutions, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization have been playing
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big roles in shaping the world community, nongovernmental organizations have also 
become very important in shaping debates on government and the quality of public 
services. Many national governments have devolved power down to the local level 
while at the same time political power has become more concentrated at the level 
above the nation-state and less concentrated in sub-national governments and civil 
society.
On a cultural level, Pollitt & Bouckaert (2000, p. 26) have contended that the 
perception of elites is at the center of reform initiatives. They further explain that 
most of the changes in administrative reforms have been predominantly “top-down,” 
in the sense of having been conceived and executed by executive politicians and/or 
senior civil servants. Ideas and pressures from elsewhere may heavily influence 
these elites persuading them to try to implement reforms in part or in whole. In light 
of these pressures, elites’ perceptions of what reforms are desirable and what 
reforms are actually feasible may not be the same thing.
In addition, tension is common among various elite groups who may support 
or resist change in administrative structure. March & Olsen (1983, pp. 281-96) have 
argued that political trading and bargaining among the key decision makers during 
administrative reform processes rarely sustain the reform intention because of short- 
run changes in political attention. In addition, the reformers are frequently in the 
position of desiring something more than what they actually propose, but censoring 
their own aspirations in the interests of framing a lesser package that stands a 
better chance of being accepted.
March & Olsen (1983) contend that ongoing reform is the nature of political 
life in which different participants act on the basis of different definitions of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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reform situation. In such a case, the ambiguity of administrative reform initiatives 
and implementation processes may accentuate the problems and solutions, giving 
them a “garbage-can” character. That is to say, the assumptions of institution 
rationality which require an exhaustive description when dealing with reform 
preferences, alternatives and predicted consequences do not necessarily control the 
outcome of intended reform.
Reform ideas seldom get translated in a pure form directly into specific 
reforms. Rather, they come from a variety of sources and flow into a larger pool of 
ideas, which is used by political and administrative elites (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000, 
p. 31). In New Zealand, for example, public choice theory, agency theory and 
transaction cost economics were all influentially mixed (Kettl, 2000, p. 9). In 
Australia, North America and the United Kingdom, a variety of generic management 
ideas have been prominent in the face of public sector reforms. In these countries, 
(and other transitional countries) techniques such as Management by Objectives 
(MbO), Total Quality Management (TQM), benchmarking, and Business Process 
Re-engineering (BPR) have been widely adopted within the public sector.
This flux of ideas has been associated with business schools, corporate 
boardrooms, and government seminars. These ideas have been further spread by 
international organizations such as Public Management Service (PUMA/OECD) and 
the World Bank. In the United States, influential management authors such as 
Peter Drucker and Tom Peters and Osborne and Gaebler have influenced the 
practices of federal government reform reflected in the Government Performance 
and Result Act of 1993 and the National Performance Review (NPR) (Kettl, 2000, 
pp. 24-26).
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The conditions and driving forces of government change, arising from 
globalization, fiscal stress, social movements, and elites’ preferences, have brought 
pressures and challenges for administrative reform in general. For Thailand, the 
1997 financial crisis and the needs for political reform triggered the waves of reform 
initiatives. Opportunities for specific reform packages depended on the political 
agenda of the politicians and bureaucrat elites over time. The new government 
under Thaksin (2001-2004, 2005-2006) declared that it would launch a reform 
based on a mid- to long-term plan that aimed at remodeling the government's role 
and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public affairs.
Under the campaign motto of "new-thinking, new-acting,” the Integrated 
Provincial Administrative System (IPAS) was initiated with a focus on decentralizing 
administrative discretion to sub-national levels of government, parallel to the 
previously mandated local government decentralization. This initiative is the result 
of many driving forces, a mixture of theoretical concepts, and is as much a 
management decision as a political one.
International Organizations and Reform Impacts
Have particular structural reforms been vigorously promoted in non-Western 
and developing countries by external agents such as multilateral financial 
institutions and bilateral donors? Have developing countries been forced to take aid 
conditions against their will? Such a coercive model may be overstated; there may 
be considerable freedom and discretion for the recipient countries. The extent of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and mechanisms for policy transfer from international organizations to transitional 
nations warrants examination.
The basic argument on the issue is that the relationship of developing 
countries and their governments with some international organizations represents 
the continuation of a well-established strategy. The following are possible 
explanations of the international organization’s impact on government reforms.
First, there is no surprise that donor organizations have agendas in assisting 
recipient nations, politically or economically. Held and McGrew (1993, p. 272) argue 
that "these organizations are at the centre of a continual conflict over the control and 
direction of global policy," and have acquired "entrenched authority" over the years. 
However, these organizations can only impose policies on the recipient government 
whose officials are receptive.
Second, the link between the donor’s influence and the recipient countries 
clearly appears in reform options, such as decentralization, good governance, and 
free market mechanisms. International organizations may be able to express their 
policy goals through the reforms they promote. Particular reform strategies often 
appear to go hand in hand with particular policy positions. For instance, 
"privatization" and "New Public Management: NPM” are often addressed at 
operational and policy levels (Ikenberry, 1990, p. 89). The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) observed in 1995 that “a new 
paradigm of public management has emerged, aimed at fostering a performance- 
oriented culture in a less centralized public sector” (OECD, 1995, p. 8).
Third, international institutions such as the OECD, the European Union, the 
World Bank, and the IMF have a role to play in the spread of particular
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administrative reforms. This claim is expressed in the OECD's Public Management 
Committee, which produces a series of Public Management Studies. The report on 
“Managing with Market-Type Mechanisms” is clearly intended to facilitate policy 
learning between member countries to blend the advantages of market 
arrangements with the proven virtues of traditional public administration (OECD, 
1993, p. 3). By the same token, as the World Bank and the IMF have tried to 
advance and ensure "best practice" and “good governance,” the imperative for 
aided countries is to tie the aid policies with some kind of political and administrative 
reform.
After the Post-Cold War era, the tension of political ideology has been 
replaced by a new logic of international influence. Instead of deploying loan 
suspension or withdrawal of such aid based on political ideology, the international 
institutions now seek to deploy proactive influence through the instrument of 
administrative conditionality, to ensure the success of the financed projects (Landell- 
Mills & Serageldin, 1992, p. 308). Interestingly, during the 1980s the World Bank 
tried to reduce its policy overlap with the IMF. This effort led to conditioning the 
Bank’s development loans on the IMF’s economic agenda (Mosley & Toye, 1991, 
pp. 29-39). These international institutions advocated “good governance” chiefly as 
a technical instrument to advise borrower countries rather than relying on direct 
pressure based on political principles.
An observer of international management has noted that the 1996 United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/225 generally urged public sector 
improvement throughout the developing countries to develop the capacity and 
effectiveness of their administrative institutions (Caiden, 1999). In this regard, the
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1997 Asian financial crisis created an immense opportunity for Thailand to request a 
loan package from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian 
Development Bank, and assistance from other global organizations for the reform of 
economic and administrative institutions. These organizations usually 
recommended market-type mechanisms and a variety of capacity-building programs 
such as controlling corruption, new agency creation, deregulation, restructuring the 
civil service system, decentralization, contracting-out, and privatization.
McCourt (2001) contends that a pattern of the reduction in the size of the 
public sector emerged because of World Bank and the IMF loan conditions. The 
lender institutions pushed for reducing overall government expenditure with the aim 
of restoring macroeconomic stability and facilitating growth through free-market 
reforms. The debtors usually called for the privatization of public enterprises, the 
contracting out of government services, and the introduction of user fees. To 
reduce public expenditures, recipient countries reduced payroll for the core civil 
service. Other measures dealing with the bureaucracy included competitive salary 
reform and monetary incentives (Polidano, 2001).
It is tempting to assume that transitional nations responded to the implied 
coercion of international institutions when shaping their reform efforts. There is no 
doubt that many developing countries are experimenting with many recommended 
reform strategies. However, there are some important questions to investigate on 
this issue. First, are the recipient countries themselves committed to the 
international institutions’ prescriptions? To what degree are the recommended 
reforms adopted and implemented? Second, are particular reform initiatives specific 
to the countries’ problems or a part of the international quest for a market-driven
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economy? What kind of match is there between a country’s problems and the 
seemingly one size fits all prescriptions of the international institutions?
Rather than a command and obey model, there seems to have been the a 
process of interaction between prescribed reform models and domestic imperatives 
shaping the model to a greater or lesser extent by local conditions. Palmujoki 
(2001, pp. 141-64) demonstrates the relationship between the world financial 
authorities, the IMF and the World Bank, and the ASEAN countries during the Asian 
economic crisis 1997-1998, arguing that the borrowing countries had divergent 
reform acceptance. Generally, the ASEAN countries which were forced to apply for 
IMF aid were particularly reluctant to accept some of the IMF’s loan conditions. 
Some of the countries complained that the IMF’s effort to liberate financial markets 
was the reason for the crisis.
In an extreme case, Malaysia did not request the help from the IMF, but 
presented a retrenched budget following part of the IMF agenda. Malaysia 
represented the crisis as a form of neocolonialism, caused by currency traders and 
supported by international economic regimes and some Western governments. In 
reacting to the crisis, the UMNO (United Malays National Organization) youth wing 
started to demand government reforms and the disclosure of the government’s 
relationship with business. Common (2001, pp. 172-73) argues that Malaysia’s 
reform initiative has a strong New Public Management appearance; however, the 
reality of the reform implementation emphasized the legitimacy and political 
consolidation of the elites.
Of all the Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia suffered the most dramatic 
political consequences from 1997’s economic crisis. Even before the crisis, the
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political and social situation in the country was turbulent. Indonesia was hit by a 
series of riots and social unrest due to national policies of the central government 
and the corruption of local authorities. The Suharto government was forced to apply 
for the IMF’s aid at the end of 1997, but the IMF’s recommendations were not fully 
implemented because of disagreements about loan conditions. Suharto avoided the 
IMF’s conditions, claiming that they would not be compatible with Indonesia’s 
constitution. After his re-election in March of 1998, the Suharto regime’s resistance 
led to unprecedented international pressure for his resignation. The IMF help 
package continued only after Suharto’s government was replaced.
Cheung (1997) argues in a survey of global public sector reforms that 
various national reforms are not homogeneous, although it is true that the globalized 
international environment forms much of the “context” of national policy-making. He 
points out that such reforms may have covered some similar policy and instrumental 
tools being adopted in different circumstances for vastly different reasons and with 
different impacts. That is to say, reforms can be mediated by local politics and 
strategies of the governing elites.
The two different cases above indicate that there are the issues of 
particularity and generality as far as government reform is concerned, leading to the 
second question about local and global factors. Complex matters such as 
government reform involve a contradiction between the universalizing and 
particularizing elements of the governance discourse. Government transformation, 
as a condition of public sector improvement, is recognized as a universally valid 
project. This perception comes from the conviction that failures in public sectors 
have largely been the result of inefficiency and a lack of motivation. Therefore,
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voluntary policy transfer from international institutions is possible because the 
advocacy of administrative reform by those institutions fits well with various local 
particularities.
Regarding recent Thai administrative reforms, Bowornwathana (2004, p.
249) argues that high public officials and political executives appreciated the reform 
program being assisted by international lenders. Administrative reforms provided 
the opportunity for political executives to control the public sector through the 
implementation process in accordance with their perceived agenda.
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Thailand requested full assistance 
from the IMF; as a condition of aid, the country had to adopt “an austerity program” 
geared toward public sector reform. The program included a cut in public spending 
and financial institution reforms. Because these transformations were a condition of 
aid, Bowornwathana (2004) argues that many elements of the Thai public sector 
reform since the Chavalit administration in 1997 were influenced by Western reform 
discourse and that certain applications were not appropriately developed to solve 
problems specific to the Thai public sector. However, Bowarnwathana may have 
overstated the case, because despite the fact that the suggested policies were 
officially endorsed by Thai political executives and senior bureaucrats, the structural 
reform efforts of the Thaksin government seem to be contrary to the 
recommendatins of the international financial institutions. For example, the first 
major ministerial reform initiative under Thaksin led to the structural change of 
functional ministries from 13 to 20 ministries, resulting in the creation of new 
agencies and high bureaucratic positions. The creation of new bureaus pleased 
senior bureaucrats as much as the political executives.
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More generally, although borrowing countries seem to adopt International 
advice and agendas, they might not take the entire reform package. Local context 
and particular administrations may influence which reforms are adopted from among 
those recommended. Also, the reforms recommended by international 
organizations may be simultaneously undertaken with other reforms that are 
unrelated or even contrary to those prescribed by external actors. There can also 
be considerable slippage during implementation, in part because reform is usually 
stated as a set of principles, rather than as a set of details. Implementation may be 
shaped by local context. As Polidano (2001) has observed, the rhetoric of reform 
tends to outpace the real reform process and intended outcomes.
Typology of Government Reform: Types and Forms
The objectives, forms, and types of public sector reforms vary widely among 
the countries around the world. For this reason, it is important to propose a 
continuum to simplify the typology of the reforms. By finding a way to disaggregate 
and compare elements of different reform experiences, one may work toward 
identifying significant and indicative features of generic administrative reforms. One 
approach is to sort administrative reforms into three broad categories, to make 
clearer the nature of the shift in public sector practices. These categories are 1) 
reform guided by a purposive approach (Peters, 2002), 2) reform driven by 
environment dependency (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969), and 3) reform based on 
institutional intricacy (March & Olsen, 1984).
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The first category of administrative reform is influenced by the assumptions 
that the actors involved in administrative reform have particular intentions for the 
proposed reform. This type of reform assumes that certain actors-elites, powerful 
think tanks, or authoritative bureaucrats--have sufficient knowledge or skills to have 
the reform adopted and implemented. They perceive the needs for change and 
choose to reorganize the structure of government or parts of the public sector in 
order to satisfy various needs such as addressing current administrative problems 
or fulfilling campaign promises. The reforms under this category are generally 
rationalistic, with a simple means-ends assumption while assuming correct 
diagnostics of a problem and a match to the proposed reform. The major aspect of 
this reform category is apparently elitist and formal in style.
Peters (2002, pp. 160-66) proposed three sub-categories under “purposive 
models of reform" which he refers to as: 1) administrative as usual, 2) political 
science, and 3) economics. The administrative as usual is the traditional tendency 
of a leader who may see the existing administrative system as an impediment to 
achieving his or her goals and therefore attempts to restructure the government.
The political science approach emphasizes the impacts of overall governmental 
change on society and economy. Many of the reforms in this approach are directed 
toward reducing the size and influence of the government and shifting formerly 
public services to the private sector. The third approach, economics, assumes the 
rationality of the individual bureaucrat in attempting to maximize his or her utility 
through the administrative process. Most of the explanations in this reform category 
link the bureau chief with the size of the bureau’s budget allocation. Therefore,
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reform would be seen as a means to gain a competitive position in the budgetary 
process.
The second major category of public sector is the environment dependency 
approach. This model assumes that governments and administrative systems have 
to transform because of the influential environment conditions. That is to say, public 
sectors adapt to the environment and create new patterns of organizations for the 
fulfillment of collective goals. The external environment, rather than the conscious 
choice of a few or group of individuals, plays a large part in administrative reforms 
and reorganizations. Various approaches under this reform category explain public 
sector transformation in “ex post facto” fashion because they are not specific about 
when and how change in the environment signals administrative reform (Peters,
2002, p. 168).
According to Peters (2002, pp. 168-72), the most familiar of the 
environmentally determined approaches are “contingency theory" and “population 
ecology.” The premise of the contingency approach is that the internal structure of 
organizations will, over time, come to adapt their characteristics of the task 
environment of the organization (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969). The latter model in this 
category, the population ecology approach, attempts to explain the nature of 
ecology in administrative reform through the relationship of the population of 
organizations and the environment in which the organizations operate (Aldrich,
1979; Carroll, 1984). Just as with biological organisms, all organizations experience 
birth and death, and they attempt to survive in their strategic niches either by 
creating new organizations or consolidating similar organizations into a single one.
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The final category of organization reform, the institutional models, assumes 
values and culture of the organization as the principal force of organizational 
change. Rather than viewing organizations as a unified entity directed by politicians 
and bureaucrat elites, the institutional models focus on the collective values, culture, 
and structure of an organization which may facilitate and or hinder adaptation 
(March & Olsen, 1984). This reform perspective tends to emphasize the difficulties 
that may be encountered in attempting to produce any rapid or significant changes 
in public sector performance through reorganization (Peters, 2002, p. 173).
Peters (2002) discusses the intricacy of reform, which may be initiated by a 
rational process, but once it starts the implementation process can become largely 
unpredictable. Groups may support particular reforms because they seem to 
address problems or provide benefits, but also want reforms to serve as symbols of 
their social significance and political influence. When powerful individuals or 
groups prefer reforms that are not designed to address particular problems, 
organizational change can become a “garbage can” where solutions precede and do 
not match problems, which then cannot be solved, and may generate continuing 
pressures for reform. Because of differing goals among different groups of actors 
what is actually adopted and implemented may not be the same as the original 
reform as proposed, and have unintended negative consequences for the 
leadership in power.
In the first approach, where reform is directed by rational officials to 
maximize their goals, when those who implement reforms have a different set of 
interests and goals than the leaders who promulgate them, the result can be a 
classical principal agent problem in which powerful bureaucrats resist the directives
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of their political leaders. Administrative reform in this perspective is a struggle 
between elected politicians and career bureaucrats. Reforms involve attempts to 
introduce mechanisms that reassert control by the principal, the politicians, over the 
agent, the bureaucracy. To this end, the reduction in the size and roles of the 
bureaucracy are introduced through privatization and contracting-out arrangements. 
Jreisat (2001, pp. 541-44) notices that this perspective was applied by OECD 
countries in the 1990s and provided the foundation for Canadian reform efforts.
The second perspective on reform, response to environmental pressures, is 
often associated with the traditional administrative values of efficiency and 
effectiveness. It focuses in part on the ability of the organization to monitor its 
environment and to receive and process public opinion or respond to quickly to 
complaints. Responsiveness is high on the reform agenda in this perspective and 
hence organizing for rapid deployment or redeployment and flexibility count. 
Fostering a culture of learning and developing ways of storing and accessing 
experience are important. Because decentralized organizations are considered 
more sensititve to the environment and more responsive to it, more able to adapt 
quickly without sending information up and down a long hierarchy, decentralization 
is often emphasized.
The third approach focuses on organizational culture and change, and on 
devising incentives so that the goals of organization members will be more similar, 
so they will not push off in different directions or undermine reforms. Emphasis is 
also on implementation and evaluation reforms, a kind of continual monitoring and 
reporting, with goals and milestones carefully laid out and progress measured.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
In sum, the typology of government transformation demonstrates the impact 
of different alternative conceptions of reform on the analysis of organizational 
change. None of these alternative views is necessarily completely right or wrong, 
but each adds a different dimension to the analysis of public sector reform and 
implementation. Some approaches emphasize the power of elected executives and 
political elites and their policy preferences. Others assume the dependence of 
organizations on their environment and hence look for pressures from outside that 
may have shaped the reforms. Some researchers focus on the gaps between stated 
intents and implementation. When these different approaches are combined, the 
result is a rich and textured analysis of complex reforms.
Public Sector Reform Approach: The NPM Discourse
To give an idea of how multiple approaches can help explain a reform or set 
of reforms, consider the loose grouping of reforms called New Public Management. 
Since there were so many countries which had adopted these reforms, and since 
portions of them were pushed by international organizations, for a number of 
transitional countries these reforms seemed to be part of the outside environment to 
which they had to adapt in some way. Initially, they could be viewed as a rational 
response to the economic stagnation experienced by New Zealand, but as other 
countries adopted and implemented selected parts, other factors entered in. 
Adoption or at least endorsement of New Public Management reforms created an 
impression of modernization and efficiency, a certain cachet, or symbolic value, but
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implementation ran into both the internal contradictions among the reform proposals 
and different motives and goals of various actors.
Since the 1980s, many scholars have observed the attempted reforms in 
advanced industrialized countries and developing countries alike (Aucoin, 1990; 
Light, 1997; Lynn, 1997; Olsen & Peters, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). The 
common approach is that those countries have engaged in reforms which have 
been generally directed toward reducing the size and increasing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their core public sectors.
In the early 1990s there was a general opinion about the meaning of New 
Public Management (NPM) as defined by Hood’s article “A public management for 
all seasons?" (Hood, 1991). Hood examined the origins, rise, and acceptance of the 
NPM as well as the arguments of its critics. He described it as a set of 
administrative doctrines which he and others identified as “new." A number of 
scholars conceive these new approaches as a point of view about organization 
design in the public sector, though some see them as the application of new 
institutional economics to public administration. The application of contemporary 
management strategies and tactics in the influential western countries together with 
the roles of international organizations like OECD and the World Bank have made 
the new approaches to government administration expand worldwide (McLaughlin, 
Osborne & Ferlie, 2002, pp. 7-10).
During the 1980s, the Reagan and Thatcher administrations had promoted 
an agenda to make the state smaller and more responsive. The linkage of those 
reforms to NPM strategies can be seen in using “service charges” as a means to 
foster customer orientation and service performance, and in encouraging the
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development of competition. In the United States, the Reinventing Government 
movement (REGO) under Vice President Al Gore also contains norms and 
principles that closely relate to managerial reforms of other countries including 
Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Key initiatives under 
REGO such as “cutting red tape,” “putting customers first,” “empowering employees 
to get results” and “cutting back to basics” fit well into NPM practices.
The term New Public Management (NPM) has emerged to describe such 
reforms. They have in common a particular philosophy, common diagnoses of 
management problems, and a set of management solutions and practices. Ferlie et 
al. (1996) describe four NPM approaches, based on four diagnoses of the problems 
by governments. These models are “The Efficiency Drive,” “Downsizing and 
Decentralization;” “In Search of Excellence;” and" Public Service Orientation." The 
term New Public Management may include all these models and it refers to a large 
category of institutional reform that encompasses devolution, deregulation, market 
reforms, and customer service orientations. These reforms often use tools such as 
the adoption of performance indicators, total quality management, contract systems, 
and deregulation.
Although NPM is perceived as a major paradigm shift, (Kettl, 2000; McCourt 
& Minogue, 2001, Osborne & Plastik, 1997) there is no consensus on the content 
and almost no systematic knowledge about applied NPM strategies. Some critics 
argue that NPM has a weak empirical foundation and consists of a combination of 
ideological and instrumental elements (Aucoin, 1990; Frederickson, 1996; L. Leeuw, 
1996; Lynn, 1998). Some scholars point out the contradictions within NPM. Its 
hybrid theoretical background combines economic organization theory, emphasizing
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centralization and contractualism with management theory emphasizing devolution 
and managerialism (Aucoin, 1990).
Jreisat (2001, p. 542) points out that NPM has been many things to many 
people, and most reform efforts endorsing some of its tenets remain works in 
progress. Even though NPM cultivates economic values and objectives like 
efficiency, it also includes different elements that comprise a mixture of 
management choices for reformers in the public sector (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1995). 
Farazmand (1999) observes that the recent administrative reform in developing 
countries has emphasized market-based principles, contracting out, and policy- 
operation separation, together with a number of institutional changes. These 
reforms show the departure from traditional public administration toward one that 
emphasizes institutional building and bureaucratization for national and economic 
development.
Not only do different countries pick different elements of the reform package 
to implement, there are discrepancies between the initial intention of these reforms 
and the outcomes of implementation. Those management applications which are 
chosen are modified to suit a country’s particular circumstances. A range of 
contingent factors such as political system, state strength, ethnic diversity and 
economic conditions greatly influence what is chosen and how it is modified 
(Common, 2001, Hood, 1996; Peters & Savoie, 1995; Pitt & Smith, 1981). One 
would expect therefore that as Thailand adopts various of the reforms they would 
not necessarily look exactly like reforms in other countries.
Arguably, the transfer of administrative tactics and strategies from countries 
with well-developed bureaucratic apparatus is not a panacea for government reform
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measures, Schick (1998) has noticed that there are important preconditions for 
successfully implementing New Public Management-style reform initiatives, 
especially the introduction of performance-based mechanisms of accountability. 
Schick argues that a sharp dichotomy exists between formal and informal rules of 
the game in developing countries, and the informal often predominates during 
reform implementation. Countries’ administrative cultures are unique and 
distinctive, and in many ways resistant to standard application of public sector 
reforms. Administration in those developing countries has come to appear like 
Riggs’ description of a prismatic administration in which traditional cultural rules are 
fused with modern administrative structures (Riggs, 1966, p. 378).
One of the most important issues in the transferability of NPM reforms to 
developing countries deals with the devolution of power in centralized states. The 
NPM approach generally advocates devolution of authority to lower levels over how 
to accomplish tasks with increased accountability for results to political levels of 
government. The issue of power devolution in administrative structures raises the 
question of what should be strengthened or be relaxed with regard to the central 
controls. From the NPM’s viewpoint, central control as a check on abuse of power 
by government officials affects traditional procedural accountability as much as it 
does NPM-style performance-based contracting (Polidano, 2001, pp. 55-59).
How easily reforms developed in advanced democracies can be applied to 
developing countries also depends on the structures of accountability already in 
place. If, for example, a reform model assumes accountability and reporting to an 
elected parliament, in a country where the bureaucracy is strong and the parliament
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is weak, the reform may either not be selected or be sabotaged during 
implementation.
In Thailand, borrowed administrative innovations have always been adapted 
to fit local conditions and political context in Thai administration. Given the 
differences between Thailand and the countries where the NPM reforms were 
originally created, there is reason to expect that these reforms as well will be 
selected and adjusted to match the local context.
The application of reform strategies in the Thai public sector shares many 
features of NPM, including the introduction of a more contractual, performance- 
based, discretionary style of organizational management. The relationship between 
different levels of organization such as control agencies and operating units has 
shifted to contractual agreements with quantifiable performance measurement. As 
a result, old structures have been replaced with new ones, organizational divisions 
have been merged or transferred, and responsibilities have been changed along 
with the relationships among those agencies. All of these public sector 
transformations have often involved considerable investment of money, time, and 
political discussion.but they have not resulted in the expected or claimed 
administrative outcomes.




With the dramatic change of the public sector during the twentieth century, 
many scholars have questioned the implementation and the result of public sector 
reforms. These reforms included various attempts by different countries to produce 
change in public service provision. Though the theoretical domination associated 
with the politics-administration dichotomy has been on a decline (Simon, 1947; 
Waldo, 1946), the retreat of the separation of politic-administration perspective 
following the 1950s did not alter the institutional nature of government. The search 
for new explanations of public administration caused a good deal of theoretical 
struggle with mixed success to explain governance in relation to bureaucracies, civil 
servants, and the citizen. With the need for public administration theory to account 
for the changes in the role and practices of government during the last decade, it is 
not clear that there is a particular theory to meet this challenge. These phenomena 
can be seen in the worldwide movement to develop alternate methods of carrying 
out policy and providing public service.
These reform movements challenge the traditional roles and responsibilities 
of the state that have been defined by the Weberian model of bureaucracy and
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management, the classical hierarchy of command and control, and the reliance on 
central authority. Although the movements were not centrally planned and varied 
widely across countries, they were characterized by common core elements which 
included adoption of market-based management, performance control techniques, 
an increased reliance on private sector management, and a deliberate effort to 
downsize and decentralize government’s roles. A number of scholars have 
observed this wave of public sector reform world wide (Farazmand, 2002; Kettl, 
2000; Light, 1997; McCourt & Minogue, 2001; Olsen & Peters, 1996; Peters & 
Savoie, 1998; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004b; Schneider & Heredia, 2003).
Though the pattern of public administration has changed, one needs to be 
careful to distinguish principles of new approaches to the public sector that have 
guided practitioners or reformers from those theories which scholars and analysts 
utilize in their attempts to understand the changes in the public sector. Given that 
there are complex socioeconomic and operational conditions involved with public 
sector reform, understanding this phenomenon is an extraordinarily difficult task. 
There has been an argument that the public sector needs to implement new 
approaches to public administration that should secure economical, efficient and 
effective provision of public services. This approach to the public sector is presently 
influential in the practice of public administration and is widely known as the New 
Public Management or the “new managerialism.” Though there are many variations 
of NPM, the majority of these can be described in two models (Kettl, 2000; McCourt 
& Minogue, 2001). These two models are the Westminster model, which originated 
in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and the reinventing 
government model in the United States. In terms of theory, NPM represents a
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serious model of governance. The NPM model of change assumes a rational 
approach, with a clear means-ends connection between a diagnosis of a problem 
and the remedy. It seeks to improve public sector performance through “business­
like” management practices, the devolution of decision power, and the privatization 
of state-owned enterprises. Theoretically, the NPM’s explanatory orientation and its 
prescriptions stem from public-choice theory, emphasizing competition and self- 
interest (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; Politt 2002). The NPM has become part of the 
nature of the modern public sector, despite research on NPM’s implementation that 
indicates that NPM principles may result in only selective, short-term cost reduction, 
and are negatively associated with fairness and equity (Harrow, 2002; Newman, 
2002; Pollitt, 2002; Taylor, 2002).
On the other hand, alternative approaches present an ambitious synthesis of 
the field of public administration with a more holistic explanation of governance 
(Frederickson, 1999; Heinrich & Lynn, 2000; Lynn et. al., 1999; Peters & Pierre, 
1998). According to Frederickson and Smith (2003, p. 245), theory in public 
administration should have a capacity to assemble facts into a coherent narrative 
with explanatory power and provide guidance for practice. Lynn et al. seek to 
establish a logic of governance through a heuristic theory that could be a starting 
point for explaining and improving the nature of public sector as opposed to one that 
is fully developed. In brief, their logic of governance highlights the multilevel nature 
of governance that describes the ends and means of governmental activity and how 
these elements connect. These components include policy domain, type of 
government, cooperative networks, and competitive market forces. Operationally,
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Lynn et al.’s approach reduces their model into a proposal for econometric models 
of government performance or outputs (Lynn et al., 2000, p. 15).
Although Lynn et al.’s concept of governance has attracted scholars, 
Frederickson argues that the general governance model may probably be unable to 
generate conclusions because “governance regimes seem to be shaped by their 
policy domains, and different types of policies lead to different sorts of governance 
problems” (Frederickson & Smith, 2003, p. 214). Frederickson contends that the 
basic problem of public policy is that it is inherently a political process in which 
design, implementation, and administration involve multiple actors with multiple 
objectives. Even as a heuristic theory, Frederickson sees that the attempt to include 
many factors to explain governance may be risky because of the difficulty of 
capturing a loosely defined concept such as management in a heuristic model.
Lynn et al. recognize this problem. However, Lynn et al. never claimed to have a 
fully functional theory of governance; their goal was simply to foster a research 
program that theoretically addressed the governance of public policies and 
contributed to an implementation of administration (Lynn et al., 2000).
Frederickson (1999) refers to the rise of governance debate during the last 
decade as the repositioning of public administration that seeks to replace existing 
public administration frameworks with a new form public sector and a new language. 
Given this, it is unsurprising to find that public administration theory is steadily 
moving away from traditional public administration to nontraditional methods of 
making and implementing public policy. For example, Kettl (2000, pp. 1-2) argues 
that the reform movement of public administration theory and practice is predicated 
on six important issues: 1) productivity, 2) marketization, 3) service orientation, 4)
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decentralization, 5) policy capacity, and 6) public accountability. These elements of 
public sector reform present considerable challenges for the practice and theory of 
public administration, as they depict a shift in the relationship between the public 
and private sectors and their relative roles and responsibilities in providing public 
services (Peters & Pierre, 1998).
The governance and the NPM frameworks share some similar theoretical 
arguments. They both have an assumption that the public sector has become 
inefficient and government is distant from citizens and society because its 
operations were insulated from competition in an open market force (Peters &
Pierre, 2000). Both models seek to use competition to correct the inefficiencies 
inherited from government monopolies over public service production. In contrast to 
traditional models of public administration, the NPM and governance are oriented 
towards the control of output rather than inputs. Essentially, both the NPM and 
governance embrace the concept of steering, which means relaxing traditional 
hierarchical control of the public sector by using new forms of supervision such as 
devolution of authority to lower level bureaucracy, decentralization of decision­
making power, and public service contracts. In the NPM’s perspective, Osborne & 
Gaebler (1992) are generally credited with coining the phrase “steering 
government,” that suggests top-level government officials should set broad policy 
objectives rather than taking the actions that fulfill those objectives.
Although the NPM and governance advocate similar underlying changes in 
public administration, particularly those nontraditional approaches to public sector 
reform, the two models have different intellectual philosophies (Peters & Pierre, 
1998). The NPM approach attempts to inject corporate values into the public sector
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-  it sees no cultural and societal role for the public sector, and makes no distinction 
between the public sector and the private sector concerning a method of 
management operation to fulfill public goals. The NPM’s targets are efficiency and 
customer satisfaction, values anchored in public choice theory. In contrast, 
governance is concerned with the understanding of the process by which public 
policy is created under a democratic society. Although there is an institutional 
component to both the approaches, governance is essentially a theory of politics 
that seeks to explain why government does what it does -  it recognizes a 
relationship between government and the rest of the society. Hence, governance 
does not share the same ideals or ideological goals that seek to bring about a 
market-based institutional change in the public sector that characterizes the NPM.
Peters and Pierre’s (1998) argument about governance as opposed to the 
NPM is a serious attempt to distinguish between the two theoretical frameworks. 
They contend that the theoretical foundation of governance is more encompassing 
than the NPM, which leaves governance in an undefined status as a theory. As a 
theory, governance encompasses the public sector, the private sector, and society 
more broadly in the realm of public policy. In fact, governance is less hostile to the 
traditional model of public administration and is less likely to force the creation of a 
competitive market for public goods and services. Even if this is so, however, 
governance does not anchor to particular points of ideological perspective. These 
distinctions directly address the problem of equating governance with the NPM 
although the overlap between the two is undeniable.
The overlaps, differences, and areas of theoretical vagueness make it 
difficult to explore how NPM and governance have been implemented in real-life
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reforms around the world The models suggest the importance of interactions 
between levels of government, and the importance of politics as well as 
administration, but perhaps understate the importance of environmental threats, or 
external actors, and of changes over time as one reform effort blends into the next 
when administrations change. As a result, using these frameworks to examine the 
Thai public sector reforms requires some invention and adaptation.
Many neutral experts in Thailand have been more interested in technical 
issues dealing with organization development, learned experiences of individual 
public sector reform schemes, enhanced productivity programs and practices, or 
individual privatization programs, rather than the political dynamics and historical 
intricacies involved in the administrative reforms. Further, Thai administrative 
reforms have been scattered and intermittent, unable to sustain the interest of many 
scholars for long.
Initially, studies on the impacts and consequences of government reforms 
were not important in the view of the relatively small group of Thai technocratic 
elites and public administration scholars. The appearance of different public 
improvement projects in various public agencies, without any underlying coherence 
or apparent ideology, made it difficult to implement good and reliable studies. But 
political and administrative reform became increasingly significant in the late 1990s 
when the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1997 reform constitution began to 
generate calls for a comprehensive change in public service provision and methods 
of administration. The need for studies and scholarly interest increased, but the 
reforms were so complicated, multilayered, and responded to so many different
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internal and external pressures and influences that investigating the Thaksin 
administrative reforms required prior development of a framework for understanding.
This research is going to study the issues that have been poorly addressed 
in the literature. This research views the literature on public sector reform with a 
critical perspective. It proposes a framework for understanding Thai government 
reform under the Thaksin administration via a multi-level approach. This framework 
examines and relates both macro and micro issues.
On the macro level the study examines the relationship of external forces 
such as internationalization of the market, the New Public Management reform 
approach with the particular Thai domestic context that provided a plausible reason 
for Thaksin’s administrative reform. The macro level covers the development of 
political and administrative institutions in relation to economic and successive 
administrative regimes. Specifically, the important events in the 1990s such as a 
reform movement, the 1997 financial crisis, and the 1997 reformed constitution are 
discussed. However, this is not to discount the period before the late 1990s when 
one considers the incremental nature of the Thai public sector reform.
At the micro level, this research investigates the design and implementation 
of the Integrated Provincial Administrative System by examining three provinces in 
detail using qualitative methods. Interview was the primary method of data 
gathering. Since an excessive reliance on official literature and government 
publications may have distorted the investigation of the IPAS reform 
implementation, interviews with provincial administration including governors, 
representatives of central ministry, and local government officers were conducted 
during the field research. The provincial observation and interviews were expected
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to capture the context surrounding real reform implementation and actual events, 
which may explain how particular reform tactics function, who is engaged and 
affected in the reform process, and what the responses to reform implementation 
are in different places. The framework offers an appropriate map to examine the 
related issues and research questions raised in Chapter 1.
Research Methodology
Methodological approaches to public sector reform can be divided into two 
groups, comparison studies across countries and individual country studies. Among 
the former group, Olsen and Peters (1996) propose a cultural-institutional 
perspective on reform experiences, drawn from eight democratic countries: 
Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. The assumption is that each country has a unique culture, 
identity, and institutional experience that accounts for potential differences in 
reforms across cases. In developing countries, Heredia and Schneider (2003) 
provide political economy explanations for administrative reforms, based on 
variations in reform schemes across six countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hungary, 
Mexico, and Thailand. Drawing on these countries’ cases, the authors maintain that 
the effects of the global economy are as important as the social and political 
institutions embedded in each society.
Cross-country comparisons are not as common as single-country scenarios 
that use contextual variables to examine administrative reforms. Some studies 
develop individual cases into cross-national comparisons, drawing a broader picture
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of international administrative reform. However, difficulties still remain when 
comparing multiple countries, as the reforms take place in different political, 
economic, and social contexts. Commentators have noted the lack of reliable 
comparative data for general administrative reform studies (Pollitt, 1995; Wright, 
1994), and recent literature has addressed both the impact of specific changes in 
particular countries and general methodological problems in studying administrative 
reform (Farazmand, 2002). This information suggests the importance of 
understanding the socio-economic and political context around the institutional 
structure in which administrative reform takes place.
Despite disagreements over the best research methodology to examine 
public sector reform, prominent scholars agree that the dynamic relationship 
between political institutions, central agencies, and reforming organizations is a key 
element in understanding public sector transformation. Political leadership can 
fundamentally reshape government structures and operations through reform 
initiatives (Peters & Pierre, 2004). Because the political and organizational contexts 
of administrative reforms are unique, observing reforms across agencies is as 
important as assessing reforms within agencies (Flynn, 2002). This is not to deny 
the important of global economic forces or local factors. Rather, any study on public 
sector reform should recognize that the broader forces of economic and political 
changes are mediated through networks of institutions. The specifics of these 
networks such as economic and political institutions frequently have a profound 
effect upon what actually happens during the course of reform and the final 
outcomes of the reform implementation.
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To be truly comprehensive, Thai government reform must be investigated at 
both a macro level such as international economic forces and a micro level, 
including domestic actors such as heads of government, central agencies, and the 
reforming organizations. Senior civil servants and executive politicians often initiate 
reforms and monitor their implementation, but various levels of public agencies also 
interpret the reforms being imposed on them. A fundamental question, then, is 
whether a reform is best understood through political and administrative elites, or 
rank-and-file civil servants (Barley & Kunda, 1992). This argument suggests that 
both the senior civil officials and political executives in Thailand account for degrees 
of a reform’s success or failure. Lack of commitment and declining support from 
either leaders or rank-and-file can make reforms uncertain or problematic.
Central agencies may have little incentive to advocate for a reform that 
decentralizes authority and decision-making. Under high domestic pressures to 
deal with a problem, a political leader may choose a quick reform scheme simply to 
mitigate the pressure. As Kamensky (1996, p. 248) notes, "conventional wisdom 
has long suggested that governmental reform is undertaken largely as a political 
symbol.” However, critics have argued that local public agencies tend to resent and 
resist reform schemes that are imposed on them (Peters & Savoie, 1994). One 
example of this tension occurs when Thai central agencies appear to expand and 
increase their power while suggesting other public agencies to slim down and give 
up power over policy.
In practice, Thai central agencies such as the Office of Civil Service 
Commission and political executives have been at the center of reform design and 
process. When the central agencies adopt a highly differentiated reform strategy
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allowing choices for implementation, they risk placing a heavy burden of analysis 
and information on themselves, and creating dissent among different groups of 
public servants. Hence, the central government’s reform strategy usually requires 
uniform practices or mandates to be followed by reforming public agencies (Peters, 
1998b). This practice has generally characterized Thailand’s IPAS reforms, which 
were enforced across all provinces regardless of the differences in the 
characteristics of provincial administrations. Peters (1998b) argues that this 
approach is not realistic because a public sector organization is not a uniform entity, 
but contains a vast degree of variation in organizational formats and cultures, as 
well as managerial problems. Given the degree of variation in management practice 
and reform implementation, agencies may perform in significantly different ways.
These arguments suggest that organization theory in the public sector is not 
sufficiently advanced to adequately guide an analysis of administrative changes that 
captures the differentiation within the public sector (Common, 2001; Hood, 1996; 
Peters & Savoie, 1995; Pitt & Smith, 1981). For the majority of public sector 
reforms, the principal administrative problem is to solve overlap, duplication, 
fragmentation, and restraints in decision-making. The rationality behind the effort is 
to encourage lower-level government or reforming agencies to find their own ways 
to achieve desirable outcomes. This issue of differentiation of reform practice and 
response by the reforming agencies suggests a methodological argument for 
observing multiple locations when investigating a public sector reform at the 
operational level of front-line public sector agencies.
In a study classifying management change by “high,” “medium,” and “low," 
Hood (1996) finds that the level of reform implementation for his study's observed
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cases cannot be explained by the single variable of economic performance. He 
suggests a contingency approach for public sector reform study that includes other 
variables, such as the size of government and the degree of integration. Other 
literature suggests that front-line agencies are hardly a unified group, since their 
interpretations of reform plans and management practices produce various 
outcomes (Olsen & Peters, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). Although certain global 
reform movements may influence local public agencies, local constraints may 
facilitate or hinder the reform’s implementation, due to internal differentiation of 
public sector organization, local context, and certain norms.
Thai public sector reform is ongoing, involving changes in ministerial 
structures, administrative processes, and management strategies, and it is a 
complex phenomenon, involving politicians and bureaucrats at the national, sub­
regional, and local levels. Concerning the stated factors, qualitative interviews are 
well suited to collect observations of concepts, norms, and practices (Rubin &
Rubin, 1995; Yin, 1994). In addition, guided by the literature discussion stated 
earlier, a single-country observation offers an appreciation of the uniqueness of the 
Thai public administrative context, as well as an in-depth qualitative study of 
particular Thai concerns such as a major change in economy and politics. Within 
this single-country test case, the investigation selects three out of Thailand’s 
seventy-six provinces, to capture the different ways in which the IPAS reform is 
being implemented and to see some consistency at the provincial level. This study 
emphasizes the unique context of Thai politics and economics within which the 
Thaksin’s public sector reform operates. The researcher hopes to explain not only
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the macro-level changes in social institutions that constrain or affect reform, but also 
the micro-level changes in which the reality and the impact of reform occur.
Provinces as Sites for Observation
As addressed in the first chapter, this study seeks to explore and explain two 
pivotal questions regarding recent Thai administrative reform. First, it seeks to 
uncover the origin of the Thanksin’s government reform initiative by investigating 
both the ideas and norms that key supporters and high-ranking bureaucrats hold, 
and macro-level factors that influence the reform. Second, it attempts to describe 
the implications and impacts of administrative tactics and strategies imposed on 
public sector organizations, provincial administrations, and field ministries. The 
latter objective involves an understanding of the interactions and attitudes of key 
groups in the reform process. The degree of variation in public service provision and 
operations in Thai provincial administration suggest some degree of difference in 
reform interpretation.
The finding that different public agencies respond to administrative reform 
differently suggests that it is important to understand the specific organizational 
context of reform implementation and practice (Common, 2001; Heredia & 
Schneider, 2003; Hood, 1996). This study used data on provincial characteristics 
(including per capita income, population size, party domination, and IPAS’ pilot 
status) to narrow the number of observation sites from 75 provinces down to 
seventeen candidates for the first stage of site selection. This work proceeded in a 
series of steps.
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To organize a provincial classification, the study established three provincial 
classes to be considered for grouping per capita income information based on 2000 
and 2002 data: 1) group one, provinces that have “high” per capita, 2) provinces that 
have “medium” per capita, and 3) group three, provinces that have “low” provincial 
per capita income. The selection process narrowed the provincial list of those three 
groups to seventeen potential sites using three population categories: 1) “high” 
population provinces, 2) “medium” population provinces, and 3) “low” population 
provinces. Finally, those provinces that were categorized in this way were then 
screened according to differences in partisan domination within the provincial 
territory, and whether the province had been involved in IPAS pilot projects at a prior 
time. Following the series of steps, a result of sorting out using the latter criterion 
produced three provincial observation sites: 1) province “A”, the site of “high” per 
capita income and “high” population with the Democrat Party predominance, 2) 
province “B”, the site of “medium” per capita income that has “medium” population 
size with the Thai Rak Thai Party predominance, and 3) province “C”, the site of 
“low” per capita income and “low” population size with the influence of the Thai Rak 
Thai party. Table 1 illustrates descrete provincial class by provincial population and 
provincial percapita income.
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Table 1










High 1,045,850-1,294,442 66,496 - 479,442
Medium 935,512-498,714 34,190-63,823
Low 370,627-482,181 21,625-32,007
Income in baht (40 baht = 1 U.S. dollar)
In general, budget allocation among provinces is proportional to the size of 
the population; a province with a larger population receives a larger percentage of 
available resources. The size of provincial population suggests a degree of 
administrative sophistication and public service provisions that provincial 
administration have to carry out. The study expected that provinces with a 
comprehensive administration and high local economic development would have 
more capacity to implement the IPAS reforms than would rural provinces with less 
comprehensive administrative structures and low economic development. Based on 
this presumption, the steps of site selection reflect different degrees of local 
economic and administrative advancement.
A province’s political environment can be seen as a historically developed 
response to political executives and policy agenda given by central ministries. This 
also includes the current intra-organizational relationship among the various field 
agencies in the province. Those provinces in which the dominant political party is 
the same as that of the incumbent government may be more willing to implement
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reforms, due to government support and political rewards in the form of approved 
development projects.
Apart from political climate, experiencing IPAS in the pilot phase is 
considered to be one of the most important factors. The study expected that 
provinces involved in the pilot phase should be able to more effectively implement 
reform practices and deal with obstacles than provinces that were not involved in 
the pilot phase. In this study, only province “B” was in the pilot project (See Table 2 
for the characteristics of the selected provincial sites).
Table 2




Provincial Per Capita Income 
(Baht)
77,162 44,084 28,825
Area (square kilometers) 7,394 12,534 6,539






IPAS Governors’ Budget (2004) 316,000,000 267,000,000 248,000,000
Provincial Budget (2004) 5,868,929,589 2,226,026,443 1,833,467,530
Provincial Budget (2005) 7,583,456,068 3,250,416,254 2,131,916,502
Provincial per capita income in Baht (40 Baht = 1 U.S. dollar)
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The information in this section concerns the general characteristics of the 
three provincial administrations where the IPAS reform was observed. This study 
selected the three provinces for primary attention from a continuum of Thai 
provincial administration. There are distinctive features of these provincial 
administrations in term of local economy, size of public services, administrative 
sophistication, and IPAS experience prior to the official mandate of reform 
implementation in 2003. Among the characteristics are those that were 
demonstrated earlier in the steps of site selection. These include provincial per 
capita income, size of population, and partisan domination. Additional diversification 
of provincial backgrounds is also provided in each individual provincial presentation.
Province “A” is considered a large province, with a population over one 
million. Its population density is larger than 150 inhabitants per square kilometer. 
Compared to the majority of Thai provinces, province “A” has seen relatively high 
economic development. One of its cities is known as a business center. According 
to the National Economic and Social Development Board, average provincial per 
capita income is higher than 75,000 baht (2000-2002). This factor places Province 
“A” in the highest per capita ranking among the three selected provinces. Thailand 
has long been the world’s largest rubber producer and exporter, and the province 
contributes to this rubber business and production. Economic, social, and political 
factors within the scope of the province are dynamic.
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With its large population and economic development, the provincial 
administration and all field agencies, headed by the governor, have to be 
comprehensive and responsible for a variety of services. This means that province 
“A” is given a relatively high budget. Each field agency varies in its number of 
divisions and officials, depending on the prescribed function by central ministries. 
Many field agencies occupy their own buildings, located fairly far from the provincial 
hall. Like other provinces, the provincial office is the center of various types of 
activities and formal meetings, though the agencies’ routine operations are divided. 
Due to a large administrative structure, the researcher experienced some difficulties 
approaching target interviewees. It took more than one week to set up an interview 
with the governor because of his tight schedule. In other cases, the researcher had 
to travel to different cities to meet and interview heads of field agencies.
Regarding its politics, unlike the other two provincial sites, political support in 
province “A” has long been established for the Democratic Party. All eight electoral 
districts belong to the Democratic Party’s representatives. In 2004, many observers 
believed that the Thaksin administration’s popularity had declined since 2002, and 
that Thaksin himself was unlikely to achieve an absolute majority for his own party. 
However, Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party dominated most of Thailand's regions in 
the 2005 legislative election. Only in the south was this landslide resisted: the Thai 
Rak Thai Party won only one seat in the region. The Democratic Party continues to 
be the only major opposition party in the parliament. This political climate in 
province “A” affected the IPAS reform to some degree. Politicians in local 
government were suspicious about the regional reform scheme. Table 3 shows the 
administrative components of province “A.”
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Table 3
Adm inistrative Components o f Province “A ”
Administrative Components Number
Sub-district 127
Total Local Government Authorities: PAO, Municipality, and TAO 141
Member of Higher House 4
Member of Representative 8
Central Administrative Unit 179
Regional Administrative Unit 16
Province “B” has a population slightly less than 800,000 (2003) in an area of 
over 10,000 square kilometers; the province has a population density of about 60 
inhabitants per square kilometer. Among the Thai provinces, province “B” is ranked 
moderately in term of per capita income of nearly 50,000 baht (2000-2002). There 
are more than two hundred ceramic factories in and around mineral sites in the 
province. The province also houses a large power plant located in its lignite mining 
area, which uses lignite for fuel. According to this study’s criteria, the province has 
a medium level of economic development, with relative moderate provincial per 
capita income. The Thaksin government chose province “B” as one of five pilot 
provinces prior to the IPAS mandate.
It is clear that officials in province “B” were mostly aware of the IPAS reform, 
which had been implemented during the pilot phase of reform implementation.
There are posters displaying ideas and charts concerning IPAS in the front offices of 
major agencies and bureaus. The majority of ministry offices are located in the 
complex of provincial administration buildings. The provincial hall was relocated 
from an old downtown area to its current location in the outskirts of the city, which is
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designated for government agencies. The old provincial building is occupied by the 
office of the Provincial Administrative Organization, a local government unit. Some 
central agencies are located near the old provincial building in downtown. Given 
that many field agencies are located in the same area in the provincial building, 
officials have a higher chance of interacting and physically meeting each other.
Concerning politics, representatives in province “B” are all from the Thai Rak 
Thai Party. During Thaksin’s 2000 electoral campaign, a number of different 
political party members in the Northern and Eastern regions, who were well 
acquainted with local people, switched to the Thai Rak Thai Party, giving Thaksin a 
political base in the northern region. The Thai Rak Thai Party has directed much 
government spending toward the Northern and Northeastern regions, policies that 
are very popular among the poor. As with other provinces, a number of national 
policies are channeled through the provincial administration and various ministry 
agencies. However, the fact that the Thai Rak Thai party is predominant in province 
“B” has raised people’s expectations toward the governor of province “B.” The 
governor and field agencies faced demands from the Thaksin administration to 
implement government policy, and from local people who raise particular problems 
at the provincial offices. All these forces press the provincial administration to 
respond effectively to the reform mandate. Table 4 illustrates major administrative 
components of province “B.”
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Table 4
Adm inistrative Components o f Province “B”
Administrative Components Number
Sub-district 92
Total Local Government Authorities: PAO, Municipality, and TAO 106
Member of Higher House 3
Member of Representative 5
Central Administrative Unit 70
Regional Administrative Unit 14
Province “C” is located in the northern region of Thailand. It is a province of 
about slightly less than 500,000 (2000) population in an area of about 6,500 square 
kilometers. With a population density of over 70 inhabitants per square kilometer, 
the province is in the fourth quadrant in rank order. Province “C” has been 
considered a remote rural administration whereas 80 per cent of the territory is 
mountainous area. The major natural product of the province is teak wood from a 
rich natural forest. Almost 70 per cent of the province’s spatial area is forest which 
is divided into zoning for conservation, local economy, and agriculture. The per 
capita income of province “C” is less than 30,000 (2000-2002), making it a low 
economic activity site in the view of this study’s criteria. According to the field 
interview in this provincial administration, most middle-rank civil servants wish that 
they could transfer to other provinces where social and economic activities are more 
exciting.
In fact, this province is considered a temporary workplace for those 
bureaucrats who are on the waiting list to be promoted upward toward a larger and 
comprehensive provincial setting. Given that many of the representatives of
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ministerial administrations feel that they were in the same situation -  looking for a 
chance to be transferred elsewhere, and the fact that province “C” does not have a 
comprehensive structure, they regularly held informal meetings and gatherings for 
both entertainment and work discussions. The relationship among the civil officers 
in the provincial administration is very close. Because of the absence of regular 
visiting by central officials and politicians to the province, their routine work is not as 
interrupted by ceremonies and the need to accommodate high ranking visitors as is 
work in provinces “A” and “B.” There are 52 central agencies, and 14 regional 
administrative units located mostly in the building complex of the provincial hall.
In the 2001 election, two representatives from the Thai Rak Thai Party and 
one from the Democratic Party were elected. As with other provinces under IPAS 
reform, a number of national policies are channeled through the reform measures 
which focus on local economic growth. However, the biggest challenge for province 
“C” was to utilize its forest-rich resources and reserved forest land for economic 
development. The general idea behind this utilization, as part of Thaksin’s policy, 
has been to transform those forestry lands into profit-making enterprises, such as by 
opening forests for concessions. While general government policy is against 
deforestation of valuable teak wood in preserved forest areas, the implementation of 
the IPAS plan, which concentrated on quantifiable economic measurements such as 
increasing local wood craft products, reduced the primacy of the former policy. 
Further, the forests make province “C” an attractive target for local politicians to 
seek pork-barrel policy concerning the utilization of forest land. In such cases, both 
politicians at the national level and local politicians working at the local government
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level were reported to have a narrow interest in promoting public responsiveness. 
Table 5 illustrates the administrative components of province “C.”
Table 5
Administrative Components of Province “C”
Administrative Components Number
Sub-district 78
Total Local Government Authorities: PAO, Municipality, and TAO 87
Member of Higher House 2
Member of Representative 3
Central Administrative Unit 52
Regional Administrative Unit 14
Data Collection and Investigation
Any investigation of dynamic phenomena such as administrative 
transformation requires a methodology focusing on administrative processes, 
interaction between different groups, and non-rational decision-making. Qualitative 
case studies allowed the researcher to investigate the current stage of Thai regional 
reform in a real-life context, in which the boundaries and perceptions of 
administrative authorities among public agencies are not clearly evident. The 
researcher can verify points through observation of processes and through 
conversations. Interactions overtime, including actions and reactions, cannot be
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studied effectively except through interviews and observing persons in real 
situations.
Most of the data in this study were derived from semi-structured interviews, 
observation, and archival information. Approximately thirty-five interviews were 
conducted over a six-month period between October 2004 and March 2005. Field 
research covered provinces “A”, “B”, and “C.” The interviews sampled key 
administrative officers in the central administration, the three provincial 
administrations, and other provincial public organizations, including local 
government units and provincial chambers of commerce, which have played a key 
role in provincial economic development since the 1980s. Interviewees included the 
executives from the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), the 
governors and vice governors, the representatives of field ministries within the 
provincial territories, the executives of the chambers of commerce, and local 
politicians from provincial administrative organizations and municipalities.
The study’s goal of seeking to understand the complexity of the IPAS 
reforms was announced through letters of consent and verbal introductions. The 
researcher approached interviewees by telephone call, accompanied by letter of 
introduction when requested. Access to the provincial administration was made by 
establishing relationships with referred local staff members. The starting point for 
making a short list of interviewees was the official appointment of reform 
committees. According to government mandate, provincial administrations had to 
appoint committees to oversee provincial reform, called Integrated Provincial 
Administration Committees, which included the governor, vice-governor, and heads 
of field ministries, civic groups, and non-government agencies. The majority of
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committee members were provincial staff. Chambers of commerce, which are 
considered government partners, were also scheduled for interviews, to assure 
balanced information. None of the interviewees knew the researcher personally; 
they consented to be interviewed either because of a reference from local staff, or 
because they trusted that the researcher was in fact a Ph.D. student.
The IPAS mandate has a long time span that affects official transfers across 
provinces. However, the personnel replacements and transfers within the province 
may not shift the reform plan and central policy on regional administration 
significantly. Principal guidelines, such as contractual agreements, devolution of 
administrative power, strategic planning proposals, and quantitative target 
measurements, are still the fundamental strategies of reform implementation. 
Although government procedures and new rules have been applied to the regional 
administration over time, the main components of IPAS remain the same. In short, 
changing rules and personnel should not affect the validity of this study 
substantively.
Following a qualitative interview methodology, the respondents were 
encouraged to express their opinions and understandings about the implementation, 
advantages, potential drawbacks, and perceived difficulties of the IPAS reform 
process. Interviewees were asked to what degree administrative power devolved to 
lower level organizations, how they evaluated the level of cooperation under the 
reform, how certain problems emerged out of provincial strategic planning and 
management, and how particular reform tactics affected the command and control 
structure, as well as collaboration among involved field ministries. The interview 
discussion also emphasized the extent to which reforms were implemented and how
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the local bureaucrats experienced it. By talking with the key decision-makers who 
were engaged in the Integrated Provincial Administrative Committee, the researcher 
had a chance to double-check the cohesion and points of departure in their 
responses.
Multiple sources of information are necessary for qualitative analysis. Apart 
from interview data, this study used archival information, including a literature review 
on issues dealing with administrative reform, government reports, news, and articles 
from the Thai press. Official IPAS documents, such as reform guidelines, were 
mainly from the Office of Public Sector Development. Internal reports and 
publications from provincial administration were also collected and analyzed. These 
documents not only serve for studying IPAS reform, but also extend the opportunity 
to trace the continuity and change of major reforms that preceded the current reform 
under the Thaksin administration. The qualitative approach in this study offers a 
rich variety of data types. The analysis includes a fresh view of IPAS 
implementation as given by the informants through interviews, the analysis of 
archival material and internal reports, and the observation of organization context. 
Multiple provincial sites enable the researcher to verify related activities across the 
spectrum of IPAS administrative reform.
Conceptual Framework
“Administrative reform,” as it is used throughout this dissertation, refers to 
deliberately changing the structures and processes of public sector organizations to 
improve their performance (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004b, p. 16). The public sector
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changes incessantly, but not all changes are necessarily intended. The word 
“reform” implies deliberate transformation from a less desirable state to a more 
desirable state; administrative reform involves those who have the responsibility to 
carry out public service and policy intentionally rearranging the public sector toward 
specific objectives.
The actual effects of intentional change can be less rather than more 
desirable. Most scholars are aware that administrative reform is an inherently 
political process, as those who engage in it make decisions from various 
standpoints and perceptions, playing different roles. As Rubin (1992, p. 20) put it, 
reform means change in a direction advocated by some groups or individuals. It 
does not necessarily mean improvement. Put differently, reform is a value-laden 
concept, and may carry more significant social and political values than is often 
perceived (Peters, 1998a). The various sets of influences and dynamics of reform 
implementation may facilitate the process or hinder it, with undesirable results.
Various intentions and socio-economic conditions can make a particular 
reform mean one thing to politicians, another to different group of bureaucrats, and 
still another to the citizen. As many contemporary efforts at public sector reform 
have shown in Australia and New Zealand, through widespread market-based 
mechanisms and the practices of business management, it is necessary to 
understand the drives and perceptions that underlie certain reform approaches. 
Public administration scholars have discussed an overwhelming trend away from 
traditional public management and toward the New Public Management approach 
described elsewhere. The principal questions to be addressed about public sector 
reform in Thailand nowadays are apparent. What drives the current administrative
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reforms? How do the various drives translate into reform strategies and tactics?
And what impacts do the reform strategies have on the implementation process? Is 
the reform scheme promoting, hindering, or simply accompanying what is 
considered a desirable goal of the public sector?
The general discussion above contains two related conceptual frameworks 
within which this dissertation proceeds. They are accounting for IPAS reforms, as 
well as the implication and impact of reform tactics and strategies toward provincial 
administration. This study considers IPAS and the Thai public sector reforms from a 
different point of view.
Rather than rely solely on global public sector reform as a major source of 
Thai reforms, the researcher also draws on the accumulated observations of Thai 
institutional development, the 1997 constitutional reform, and the political and 
administrative institutions in Thailand to build the conceptual foundations for this 
study. The cultural context and social institutions are among the complex forces 
driving administrative reform in Thailand. In examining how IPAS reforms began 
and continue, three fundamental concepts will be considered: changes in political 
and administrative institutions, management’s paradigm of administrative reform, 
and the implementation of reform strategies and tactics.
Institutional change is defined here as the struggle of public organizations 
with values and cultures; this struggle is the principal force of organizational 
transformation. This concept of change views administrative reform as a process by 
which political elites and senior bureaucrats contest and cooperate with one another 
to gain or maintain values. Besides formal rules and procedures, public institutions 
acquire values, moral models, and cognitive schemes to achieve their goals. Major
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government institutions may cope with constraints and pressures applied by their 
social environment, but common policy values can allow cooperation to occur with 
little disruption of organizational routines. These concepts will be used to investigate 
the role of major domestic institutions, political-administrative institutions, and 
international institutions with regard to Thaksin’s public sector reforms.
Various conditions affect the Thai state’s ability to rationalize administrative 
reforms within certain political, economic, and social contexts. As Heredia and 
Schneider (2003) argue, significant administrative change and economic factors 
redistribute power resources and affect public bureaucracies by influencing the 
opportunities and constraints they face. In such an environment, socio-economic 
problems influence institutional transformation, interweaving existing problems and 
causing unpredicted new problems. Governments facing a rapidly changing 
environment may be tempted by reform strategies that offer a quick solution as well 
as political advantage. Thus, one of the questions raised in this study is how the 
socio-economic environment, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the 1997 
constitution, in particular, provided an opportunity for IPAS to occur. Especially, the 
new constitution mandated the establishment of new type of public sector that would 
realize international organizations’ concept of “good governance” and toward that 
end ordered the revision of various public laws.
The second concept addresses the design and implications of particular 
management strategies and tactics of the Thai public sector reform. This study 
specifically looks at some elements of the NPM approach to public sector reform. 
Although the approach is widely used, the NPM has been defined in various ways 
because of its hybrid theoretical background, combining economic organization
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theory emphasizing centralization and contractualism, and management theory 
emphasizing devolution and managerialism. In addition, policy determination in the 
NPM agenda is primarily top-down, while its philosophy seeks to free the public 
sector from traditional public management as it promotes deregulation and 
decentralized administrative power. There seems to be considerable debate over 
whether the NPM approach is effective or not, with both sides presenting evidence 
and arguments (Heredia & Schneider, 2003; Kettl, 2000; McCourt & Minogue, 
2001).
It is tempting to describe IPAS through the NPM’s perspective, because 
IPAS contains a typical mix of privatization, deregulation of public sector 
management, devolution of management responsibility, performance monitoring, 
and contractual agreements and strives to separate policy and implementation. 
However, there may be differences between what is described in official documents 
and what happens during reform implementation. One the one hand, the rise of 
NPM led to an uncompleted search for a new public administration paradigm in 
Thailand, producing tensions between bureaucratic power and the new 
managerialism. On the other hand, significant tensions operated between political 
centralization and managerial devolution and between traditional and private-sector 
models of accountability. This study examines a range of management tools that 
the Thai central agencies imposed on public organizations as part of the reform 
scheme. As forms of coercion, several IPAS management practices do not merely 
represent a new approach to Thai public administration, but also entail a crucial 
change in paradigm affecting Thai public institutions. The introduction of public
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service contracts between the central government and provincial governors is an 
example of a new form of accountability relationship.
Third, the implementation of reform strategies and tactics to which this study 
refers means the practices and reactions that the selected provincial administrations 
have experienced. It is crucial to recognize when the existing public agencies are 
deficient, or too rigid to perform effective service and policy. Under such 
circumstances, public sector reform provides an opportunity to put in place a new 
and more constructive implementation structure. The tactics of reform 
implementation are critical to the dynamics of a given administrative reform. In 
investigating the IPAS implementation, this study not only seeks to understand how 
reformed public agencies operated on the ground, but also to observe the interplay 
and operations of a host of reform schemes and how they relate to provincial 
administration.
How to bring about behavioral changes in reforming agencies raises the 
question of the appropriate incentives and controls. Also, how does the scope of 
reform intervention affect the reform’s implementation? There are tradeoffs that 
present a paradox. Lipsky’s (1983) seminal work on street-level bureaucrats sets 
out the basic dilemma about the discretion and accountability of field-level officials. 
On the one hand, field agencies often need discretion to interpret rules and 
implement programs if they are to be responsive to the special needs of diverse 
clientele. On the other hand, inconsistent discretion can result in policies that differ 
greatly from original intentions. Although the notion of street-level bureaucrats 
appears in direct social service provision, the concept applies more generally to
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public programs for which those at the front lines of service delivery must deal with 
complex situations that might challenge the original intent of the policy.
In the interplay between policy design and actual implementation, particular 
attention should be paid to exploring the change of provincial organizations when a 
new reform scheme was implemented. At IPAS’s operational level, this study 
specifically examined the following management issues in the three provincial 
administrations: 1) strategic plans and management, 2) performance target 
measurements, and 3) power devolution and accountability. These three tactics of 
the Thai public sector reform are the core components of the reform design that 
reflect the goals of reformers, changing provincial administration in a way that 
departs from traditional public administration and management, yet maintains a 
centralized structure by central government.
Themes of the Study
In recent decades, the Thai government has increasingly undertaken public 
sector reforms. Whereas the government reforms in the 1980s appeared to be 
incremental, concentrating largely on economic adjustment policy, the public sector 
reform in the 1990s, particularly during the Thaksin administration, has been more 
comprehensive and far reaching.
Why were such broad reforms introduced? How have they been 
implemented, with what likely consequences? Scholars of public administration 
suggest that drivers of reform have varied from country to country. While reform 
practices may appear to be similar, particularly with regard to the NPM, there is
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evidence that the tactics and contents of reform implementation vary considerably 
among countries. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the divergence of reform 
strategies and the implications of this can be seen in both developed and 
developing countries, as the forces and the consequences of public sector reforms 
have been affected by political demands, socio-economic factors, and institutional 
change.
In addition to these developments in reform and practice, the most important 
premise of this research is that administrative reform matters. The Thai IPAS 
presents significant challenges to transforming the Thai pubic sector, and the 
present analysis is unique in the literature of administrative reform on two levels. 
First, it bridges the gap between macro-level and micro-level elements within the 
framework of the Thai public sector reform. Second, it reflects on both the dynamics 
of public sector institutions and the political and economic context within which they 
operate. In addressing these concerns, the researcher presents several important 
themes, which will be addressed through this study. These themes may be 
overlapping, but can be summarized as follows:
1. The changes in Thailand’s social and political structures since the 1990s 
have increased the perceived need and incentives for Thai government reform, 
resulting in a radical shift in the Thai constitution in 1997. The process of 
democratization following the ouster of military administration in 1992 forced the 
constitutional drafting assembly to transform Thai political institutions, the public 
sector, and the whole administrative process to match the transformations in socio­
economic and political structures. Apart from prior fragmented attempts of 
government reform, the introduction of the new constitution led to a number of
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changes in the Thai public sector and management innovations. There was 
evidence that international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank had 
influenced the Thai elites to incorporate “good governance” concepts into a 
domestic reform scheme.
2. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 created opportunities for strong political 
leadership in its aftermath. Perceived as the best choice among competing parties, 
Thai Rak Thai, led by Thaksin, won an unprecedented majority of seats in the 
parliament through the new electoral and party systems, which strengthened the 
power of the administrative regime. In part, a strong administrative regime was 
needed to cope with the consequences of financial crisis and constitutional 
changes. Consequently, Thailand under Thaksin experienced the strongest 
government regime in the history of civilian governments. This kind of 
administrative stability facilitated the change in major public sector institutions, 
including the reorganization of central ministries and the reform of provincial 
administration. The Thaksin administration seized the opportunity presented by this 
reform climate to facilitate the Thai Rak Thai’s political agenda by creating political 
clientelism through populist policies in regional Thailand.
3. Public sector reform is a complex matter. Successful and unsuccessful 
reforms in the past, with a variety of influences, have contributed to the design and 
strategies of IPAS under the Thaksin administration. Political executives and senior 
bureaucrats agree that reform is necessary, though their reasons for supporting 
reform differ. On the one hand, Thai bureaucratic institutions have tried to avoid 
politicization by introducing modern management approaches -  the new 
managerialism or the NPM. However, political executives have interpreted the
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reform implementation in a way that seeks to control both public policy and 
administrative processes. As a result, the implementation of reform measures 
seems to be contradictory and confused. These were evident in factors 
discouraging IPAS implementation, including contradictions in reform measures and 
political control superseding the goals of power devolution for provincial governor.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LEGACY OF THAI SOCIOECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
Introduction
Before anyone can understand how much progress has been made in the 
Thai public sector due to recent reforms, the political development and 
administrative heritage should be reviewed. Typically, the notion of government 
reform involves a set of complex historical development and evaluative structures 
that tend to stay in the memory of members of the society. These generally shared 
psychological orientations are inherited political and administrative cultures that 
place at the forefront some norms concerning a country’s public administration. By 
using a historical perspective, one can see how social conditions and economic 
transformation set the boundaries on the action of government.
However, this is not to say that society’s cultural values are immutable. On 
the contrary, there is a constant interaction of culture and politics that redefines the 
role of government. For example, the breadth and depth of Thai’s public 
participation in political and administrative reform at present would have been 
unthinkable before the 1980s. The military regimes had been controlling freedom of 
speech and free press to limit the power of communist propagation. The remainder
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of this chapter examines the historical development of politics and administration 
that constrains and informs the Thai administrative system.
Reform Historical Landmark under Absolute Monarchy
The development of the modern Thai nation-state has its origins in the reign 
of King Mongkut (1851-68) when the Kingdom was known to the world as Siam, a 
feudal territory headed by the absolute monarchy. The monarchical administrative 
system governed the territory through a hierarchy topped by minor royalty and 
aristocrats. They in turn were paid tribute by various levels of officials with the 
serfdom at the bottom of the social structure. Like other regions, this was the period 
when the Siamese regime had been intimidated by a flux of change driven by the 
Western competition of political and economic influences. To survive being 
colonized, Siamese kings had to open the country to European trade on terms that 
ended the royal commercial monopolies. The Treaty of Friendship and Commerce 
(the Bowring Treaty) in 1855, which provided a great extension of British trading 
rights and included extraterritoriality provisions, marked a new era in the relationship 
with Western states (Siffin, 1966, p. 42).
Amidst the course of Western colonialism, King Mongkut had to make similar 
agreements with France and the United States in 1856 (Siffin, 1966, pp. 47-48).
The engagement with the West during this period caused two major consequences 
for the socio-economic structure of Siam: 1) the kingdom lost control over taxes and 
duties on all of its monopoly trade and commodities, causing major reduction in the 
treasury and 2) Siam pursued strategies by accepting drastic skills and knowledge
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of the West necessary to transform the traditional state. The King’s efforts to 
balance cultural relationships and economic treaties with various Western nations 
greatly reduced the threat of particular economic conquest. In turn, further contacts 
with Westerners helped lay a foundation for potential administrative reform for later 
monarchs.
Although the beginnings of Siamese reform started in King Mongkut’s 
seventeen years of rule, his son King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) is credited with 
the establishment of the basic modern administration. By the time Chulalongkorn 
ascended the throne, the social and economic transformation had already affected 
Siamese society. The major reforms taking place under King Chulalongkorn were 
the very first revamping of the overall system. The reforms included the gradual 
elimination of slavery and serfdom, the creation of a professional military, the first 
state sponsorship of public education, the territorial survey to create the map of the 
kingdom, the construction of telegraph lines and railroads, the creation of functional 
ministries, and the development of a new pattern of provincial administration (Siffin, 
1966, pp. 54-59). Other significant development included the formation of a 
Supreme Court, the Ministry of Interior and municipal government, Tesapiban, 
though the latter was minimal during the period (Siffin, 1996, p. 87).
By the time of King Chulalongkorn, the Siamese faced three principal issues: 
maintenance of independence, internal political consolidation, and development of 
economic and administrative strength. The consolidation of central control over 
previously loosely administrative outlying regions was vital to prevent territorial 
encroachment by Western countries. As a few hundred noblemen and aristocrats 
were involved in the work of the King’s administration, outer provinces continued to
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be ruled as lesser kingdoms. Governors were becoming participants in 
entrepreneurial activities, and they exploited the subordinates in the territory more 
than before. Further, France or England claimed some border areas under which 
the Bowring and subsequent treaties were involved. To address this central 
strategic problem King Chulalongkorn turned his attention to the integration of 
hinterlands into the Kingdom.
The King’s reaction to the exploitation of provincial government was 
advanced by a new generation of princes and nobles, particularly those who had 
been educated in Europe. For example, Prince Devawongse went to England to 
study the cabinet and ministry structure of British government. In 1887, a group of 
princes and progressive officials submitted a petition to the king expressing their 
concerns on immediate problems facing Siam and suggested that a constitutional 
monarchy be instituted (Wyatt, 1969, pp. 89-93). Among other suggestions, this 
document proposed that the reform of administrative structure with a clear-cut 
ministerial responsibility and a more broadly based political structure could 
successfully save Siam from being colonized by the West. However, King 
Chulalongkorn expressed doubt about the appropriateness of Western political 
models and practices. Instead, the King opted for the reform of the executive 
branch of government.
King Chulalongkorn reacted to the progressive suggestions by issuing the 
reorganization edict in 1892 that resulted in the sweeping reformation of the basic 
structure of the government. These included the creation of a new Ministry of 
Justice to control the entire judicial system of the state, a new Ministry of Defense to 
control the old Ministry of Military Strategy, as well as the Marine Department, the
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Elephant Department, and the Armament Department, and a new Ministry of Land 
and Agriculture to manage agricultural taxes, for example (Siffin, 1996, p. 59). The 
young princes supported the administrative reform though their original demand was 
to adopt broad-based political participation such as elected parliamentary 
government. Hence, the 1892 edict served to cope with the group of old noble 
families and the group of young princes and progressive nobles. The reorganization 
was instrumental to mollify the disaffected groups while regaining the control of state 
power.
Bureaucratic reconstruction during the reign of King Chulalongkorn occurred 
simultaneously with the modernization of the Siam state. A major feature of the 
reforms was the employment of a large number of foreign technical specialists and 
advisors. To balance the influence of different Western nations, most administrative 
departments drew their foreign employees from only one nation. Thus, the Ministry 
of Justice employed French lawyers, the Railway Department employed German 
engineers, Danes advised the Navy, Americans assisted the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the British dominated the Ministry of Finance (Brown, 1978, pp. 193-15). 
Technical assistance from the foreign experts to the development of infrastructure 
and administration not only served to limit a dominant influence of particular nations, 
but also to provide a certain knowledge to the course of Siamese modernization 
(Dixon, 1999, p. 32).
One important aspect of the reformation is the modernization of the Ministry 
of Interior. Prior to the radical reform of the late nineteenth century, Siamese 
provinces generally enjoyed considerable autonomy (Riggs, 1966; Wyatt 1969). 
Essentially, the outer regions were characterized as tributary states. Governors
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received no salary from Bangkok, while their positions were based on heredity.
Thus, the reform of domestic affairs was critical for two reasons: 1) it was the 
domestic government that sought to capture the administrations that existed outside 
the capital area, and 2) it was aimed to supplant the deeply rooted traditional 
administration with the modern institution. Siffin (1966, p. 85) stresses that the 
Ministry of Interior was seen by the reformers as necessary for national security as 
well as administrative purposes, specifically establishing control over the outer 
areas. Scholars have agreed that there is a direct connection between the new 
bureaucracy following the 1892 reorganization and the shift of norms within the 
Siamese administration.
In conclusion, the comprehensive reform during the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn created the foundation of modern Thai bureaucracy. During his 
reign, relations with Western powers were rapidly approaching stability. The 
reconstruction of the bureaucracy had been the central element for the effectiveness 
and rationality of the state in dealing with domestic and foreign affairs. Siam 
attempted to centralize control while poor transportation and communication 
facilities made a large degree of decentralization of power inevitable. Thus, the 
reform had to create new functional ministries as well as provincial administration to 
effectively control outer territories but not to permit independent provinces. A new 
emerging bureaucratic class gradually developed a sense of relationships between 
government modernization policy and group interests that were beginning to appear. 
The process of making the bureaucracy within the structure of functionally ministries 
and departments not only concentrated the decision-making power in Bangkok, but 
also expanded the echelons of government to include field staffs potentially capable
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of implementing enacted laws, regulations, and programs in the Kingdom-wide 
territories.
Cliques, Power, and Bureaucracy after the 1932 Coup
The basic principles of Thai bureaucracy in the two decades following 1892 
enabled enormous development by modern administrative concepts. However, the 
administrative system which had been built during King Chulalongkorn’s reformation 
period was largely dependent upon the leadership and governance of the King and 
his ministries. This major reformation was continued until 1910 when the King died. 
The period after the death of King Chulalongkorn produced two significant impacts 
on the Thai bureaucracy: 1) an abrupt decline in monarchic administration and 
leadership and 2) the growth of educated young men seeking bureaucratic careers. 
Economics and internal difficulties during World War I caused emerging frustration 
against an inherited monarch which led to military dissidence in 1932. The coup of 
1932 did not involve a mass of rural people, neither did it impact deeply on the 
bureaucracy. On the contrary, control of government passed to a shifting 
succession of cliques led by a small number of military cliques and bureaucratic 
elites.
The observers of Thai politics have widely studied the transformation of the 
Thai political system in the period of constitutional monarchy where the conventional 
Western institutions of constitutional government took place (Morell &
Samudavanija, 1981; Riggs, 1966; Wyatt 1969). Riggs notes that the main arena of 
politics and administration in Thailand following the 1932 coup had come to be the
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cabinet as the heads of the ministries with their respective departments. Members 
of the cabinet post-1932 constituted the core of the elite who exercised political 
power to an exceptional degree. Contrary to western political institutions, the 
successive cabinets had been taken in terms of clique rivalry for power. Thus, the 
cabinet after the post-1932 period represented a dominant group of political 
contenders, often military, whether in the form of one party or a coalition of parties. 
Morell and Samudavanija (1981, p. 19) notes that most Thai people in the 1930s 
remained essentially separate from the coups and faction struggles in the 
parliament.
In Riggs’ intensive investigation about the elitist political culture, he argues 
that cliques and factions are often bound by ties of friendship, typically reaching 
back to school days and kinship, frequently by marriage. A clique may form an 
alliance with other cliques, often producing a “coup group,” to seize the power from 
an existing government. A coup group which seized power but lacked members 
with enough experience to administer the cabinet position must restore peace and 
order by inviting nonmembers-experienced bureaucrats with prestige-to join the 
cabinet. Since it is apparent that there are limited positions in the cabinet and ruling 
posts in the bureaucracy, the short-term appointment of bureaucrats is regarded as 
expendable as soon as the ruling military has gained enough experience and has 
consolidated its own power. Frequently, the ruling group chose to hold new 
elections and new parliament to legitimize its control by obtaining international 
recognition.
Given that significant changes in the state had already occurred in the 
1890s, Riggs argues that the Thai public administration following the coup of 1932 is
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merely the “substitution of one oligarchic elite by another” (1966, p. 112). The 1932 
coup can be viewed through the alliance of two broad elitist generations, the senior 
clique and the junior one, who were members of the small class of military and 
civilian bureaucrats. The economic difficulties and recession during the period 
1928-32 gave additional impetus to the movement against the absolute monarchy. 
These counter-elite groups had been discontented with the monarch’s reluctance to 
open up the political system and with the limitation of administrative positions 
dominated by the royal family. Although the coup group, calling itself the People’s 
Party (Khana Rassadorn) agreed to end monarchical absolutism, different factions 
among themselves brought splits and rivalry to the existing government immediately 
after the 1932 coup. The power struggle between the military generals and their 
bureaucratic allies remains a major characteristic of Thai politics between 1932 and 
1992.
Traditionally, the Siamese administrative system had centered on the 
monarchy as the basis for its legitimacy. The dynasty and royal family were the 
organizing forces to both development ideology and political rules. The end of 
absolute monarchy in 1932, however, introduced the new state with the legitimacy 
that was based on “representative democracy.” Although Siam escaped formal 
Western colonization, the military, social progress, and modernization of the West 
greatly influenced new elite groups. The new emerging elite embraced the 
democratic institution and the people as the justification for its act. The 
announcement of the People’s Party issued during the 1932 coup reflected the ideal 
transformation of the Thai state in the 1930s. Pridi Phanomyoung (a French- 
educated lawyer), an intellectual leader of a junior military faction, introduced a
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social reform that combined the principle of liberty with economic development and 
a modernization plan (Connors, 2003, p. 40). The plan reflects a nature of oligarchy 
in the development of Thai political and administrative culture.
Because of the fact that some elements of the military and bureaucrats 
associated with the palace remained a threat for the new regime, free speech was 
not allowed through the passing of the Protection of the Constitutional Act of 1933. 
On the other hand, the People’s Party enforced a guided plan for a parliamentary 
system that would be composed of two categories of members (MP): 1) the 
representatives from locally elected constituency who would then further elect 
members for national parliament, and 2) the members who are appointed by the 
coup group which would be abolished in a specific time. To control and secure the 
stability of the administration, the government introduced various measures that 
contradicted the concept of democracy. One of the measures manifested itself 
when Prime Minister Phibun Songkram (1938-44 and 1948-57), the leader of the 
military faction in the People’s Party, extended the role of appointed MPs for a 
longer period while the freedom of political party remained restricted. It was not until 
the 1997 constitution was promulgated that all members in Thai parliament were 
nationally elected.
The emergence of the military power in the state administration was rooted 
in the rivalry between the army, navy, and opposing elite groups. Soon after the 
end of absolute monarchy, disaffected members of the senior clique within the 
People’s Party and the old officials associated with the royal family turned to 
counter-revolution activity. Rebellion attempts indirectly contributed to the effort to 
consolidate the power of the junior clique within the 1932’s coup group. With
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several successful counter-rebellions headed by Phibun Songkram, the junior clique 
gained a momentum of power among the ruling elites while the senior clique 
became liquidated. Muscat (1994, p. 38) argues that it was under the leadership of 
Phibun as the Prime Minister that the unification of power, economic policies, public 
consciousness, and social mobilization took place.
In an effort to implement more rapid modernization that would strengthen the 
country’s position in the course of turbulent international environment, the Phibun 
administration eliminated vestiges of old Siam by adopting the concept of a nation­
state, creating nationalist ideology, building up the military and paramilitary forces, 
and prescribing standard behavior for the people including the use of modern dress 
and eating and bathing codes. The country’s name was changed from Siam to 
Thailand to emphasize the predominant Thai ethnic group and to fuse people 
toward the nation-to-be through the rhetorical device of democracy. Connors (2003, 
p. 41) notes that the xenophobic nationalism was expressed well in a number of 
anti-Chinese measures and the promotion of civilized Thainess through the decrees 
of state preferences (Rattaniyom). With the Thai nationalism propagation, the ruling 
elites could reclaim economic sectors dominated by the domestic Chinese.
In his second administration (1948-57), Phibun held the premiership for over 
nine years. But this administrative continuity did not provide the country with 
political stability. The Thai economy had been seriously damaged during the 1941- 
43 period of Japanese occupation and by the aftermath of the Second World War in 
which the Phibun government collaborated with Japan in 1941 and declared war 
against the United States and Great Britain. However, the Phibun regime 
essentially belonged to the 1932 coup and People’s Party who had the educational
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
and political aspirations of “Western” democracy. The strong anti-communist 
scheme of the Phibun government made it particularly acceptable to the United 
States as a new emerging hegemonic country (Muscat, 1994, p. 48). Into the early 
1950s Phibun had faced several failed coups attempted by a rival clique, particularly 
the navy. In September of 1957, power was seized from the administration by the 
key rival clique within his own faction, headed by Sarit Dhanarat (the commander of 
the First Army) (Siffin, 1966, p. 240).
From the end of absolute monarchy to the creation of nation-state during the 
Phibun period, bureaucratic members, mostly high-ranking military officers, had 
created the fusion of politics and administration of the Thai state. In their roles as 
members of a ruling circle they had shown themselves more responsive to the 
interests of bureaucratic subordinates than to interest groups or political parties. 
While consolidation and centralization of state power shifted from the royal authority 
to the new ruling cliques, ministerial functions and bureaucratic institutions largely 
remained the same. The reform proposal following the 1932 coup was hastily 
prepared for the transformation of the political system, rather than administrative 
advancement of Thai bureaucracy. The clique in the Thai cabinet, as a ruling 
institution, was as foreign to Siamese tradition as the house of assembly. As a 
result, the cabinet gained control over the assembly because the former had an 
effective administrative arm, the bureaucracy (military and civil), while the latter 
apparently lacked effective constituency (electorate and political parties).
The new role of the Phibun government was redefined as creating a nation­
state, Thailand, where private interests and political participation were restricted to 
merely administrative stability. The style of leadership appealed to the bureaucrats
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and the public to remain obedient since old cultural norms provide an easy 
rationalization for accepting a “status quo” (Riggs, 1966, p. 325). Thus, when the 
political doctrines of administrative authority facilitate the practices of bureaucratic 
rule, it becomes possible for subordinates and the “average” Thai people to follow 
the leader. One important policy that stresses this norm was the passage of the 
Cultural Maintenance Act of 1940, which prescribed the duty of Thai people to 
practice national customs and to promote prosperity of Thailand by conserving and 
revising existing customs (Connors, 2003, p. 41). The implementation of the law 
was expressed in the Department of Interior’s “Manual for Citizens” which reflects 
the growing area of administrative control over the population through bureaucracy.
Military Rule and Development Administration Period
The executive branch of the Thai government in the post-1932 period was 
headed by the Prime Minister and the cabinet, which was predominantly held by civil 
servants or military officials. It is this essential characteristic of Thai politics for 
which Riggs (1966) suggests the term “Bureaucratic Polity.” Thai public 
administration in the following two decades remained substantively static. Basically, 
the 1932 constitution remained the formal framework of government until the 
Second World War ended. At this period, political parties were formed and played 
limited roles in the National Assembly. Members of the Free Thai (Seri Thai) 
movement (a Thai underground movement to collaborate with the West against the 
Japanese), who originally took part in the 1932 coup, organized themselves into 
political parties. A group of intellectuals and loyalist officials who had not joined the
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coup also formed a progressive party. By 1957, several parties had become active 
on the Thai political scene.
In the flux of the post-war years, Phibun’s nationalist policy diminished its 
stance. Political debate in Parliament became more and more acrimonious among 
different parties and cliques within a party while corruption in the government 
increased. In the election of new members of parliament on February 1957, a clique 
within Phibun’s faction, Phao Sriyanond, won decisive support at the polls but was 
accused by another military clique, headed by Sarit Thanarat, of foul play (Siffin, 
1966, p. 166). The Sarit clique staged a military coup in October 1958 against the 
newly elected government and declared the temporary suspension of the 1932 
constitution. Unlike Phibun’s period where elections and parliament were resumed, 
the military coup group led by Field Marshal Sarit governed the exact opposite.
After Sarit’s death in 1963, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, who rose to power 
during Sarit’s rule, retained domination of Thai politics and administration for over 10 
years until 1973.
A significant transformation of Thai politics, economics, and public 
administration came in the late 1950s under Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959- 
1963). Sarit called his administration a “revolution" in order to distinguish his 
government from the political scene of the immediate past (Muscat, 1994, p. 87).
The administration deliberately revised a “Western” ideology of democratic 
government by imposing political stability and using harsh measures in order to 
maintain administrative stability. During the authoritarian regime, the Sarit 
government effectively suppressed all potential opposition. Factional politics 
disappeared while disaffected elements kept silence. Sarit's foreign policy in
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reversing the course of potential relations with Communist China initiated in the 
Phibun regime was not only appealing to the royalist and conservative elites but 
also useful for the regime to enhance the legitimacy associated with the traditional 
heritage of monarchy (Morell & Samudavanija, 1981, p. 64). Hence, an ideological 
recovery of the royalist revived many traditional ceremonial functions, reopened the 
opportunity for royal rural development projects, and occasionally engaged in state’s 
matters.
Scholars of Thai study mark that the modern economic development in 
Thailand started with the advent of the Sarit administration (Dixson, 1999; Ingram, 
1971; Laothamatas, 1992; Muscat, 1994; Riggs, 1966). Unlike the Phibun 
government, whose economic policy was constrained by a nationalist policy, the 
Sarit administration encouraged domestic Chinese business and private enterprises 
to join a new approach to economic development assisted by the World Bank and 
the United States. The new era of state modernization has also affected Thailand in 
two respects of some significance. First, central national development agencies 
were established. These included the National Economic Development Board 
(NEDB), the Board of Investment (BOI), and the Bureau of Budget (BOB). In 1959, 
the NEDB and the BOI were created as national planning agencies followed by the 
First National Economic Development Plan (1961-66). The plan essentially 
prepared Thailand for domestic and global economy with the aim of maximizing 
economic growth, entailing a degree of liberalization and of import-substitution 
strategies (Dixon, 1999, p. 80).
The BOB was created in 1959 the same year that the Budget Procedures 
Act was passed. Siffin (1966, p. 176) observes that old budget preparation and
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management processes were almost chaotic, involving large-scale lending and 
borrowing of money among individual agencies collaborating with foreign advisors. 
Previously, these budget processes were done by a division in the Comptroller- 
General’s Department of the Ministry of Finance. As part of a technical assistance 
program, foreign advisors suggested that the new budget bureau control contested 
resources and integrate budgetary process into one coherent unit under the 
authority of the Prime Minister’s Office. With the change, Riggs (1966, p. 332) 
concludes that this reform substantively strengthened the power of financial 
allocation by the head of the government. In hindsight, Muscat (1994, p. 92) reflects 
that the creation of new central agencies and related activities appears to lack 
sufficient coordination while the institutional role of the World Bank and American 
assistance appear to have been decisive.
Second has been the increasing power of Sarit’s regime and a certain group 
of leading technocrats who held senior positions in the new organizations. The 
junior staff positions whose values and experiences have grown with the 
organizations serve as apprentices in these new agencies. In the observation of the 
idiosyncrasies of Thai bureaucratic behavior, Siffin (1966, pp. 159-64) discusses a 
set of norms relevant to the dominant cultures of Thai bureaucracy. These norms 
include hierarchical deference, distaste for open confrontation or criticism, the 
reliance upon personal relationships and factions, and the concentration of decision 
making at the top. The lack of technical skills for modern management and culture 
which was incongruent with legal-rational bureaucracy attracted great attention by 
foreign assistance. Muscat (1994, p. 112) points out that it was because of these 
acknowledged weaknesses that United States Operations Mission (USOM) financed
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a project starting in 1954 to work in conjunction with Indiana University and the Thai 
higher education institute, Thammasat University, to establish an Institute of Public 
Administration, the first academic unit in Thailand that would offer a graduate 
program in administration.
Under Sarit’s regime, economic and administrative reform contributed to the 
expansion of bureaucracy and its penetration into regional development and the 
periphery through numerous development projects. Through the framework of 
national development plans and other newly established central agencies, the 
military, technocrats, and business elites gradually became involved in formal and 
informal patron-client relationships (Girling, 1981, pp. 72-78). Politicians were not 
significant in the alliance of this period due to the authoritarian rule. The 
technocrats saw themselves as the driving force of national development and were 
ambitious to cooperate with the military in various development programs.
Economic institutional reform not only created incentives for foreign and domestic 
investment but also provided a source of wealth for large numbers of influential 
members of government and the military in major private enterprises. In his 
investigation on military factions of Thai polity, Riggs (1966, p. 272) demonstrates 
that the participation of Sarit and his clique on business boards was predominant 
prior to and after his administrative regime.
More importantly, a strategy in the planned expansion of state’s 
administration and private market was the grandiose scheme to deter communist 
ideology. The state’s role to confine communist threat strengthened the dimension 
of security and development. Consequently, the military regime did not develop the 
country along the democratic approach but emphasized security measures while
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enhancing control and centralization through administration arms. Dhiravegin 
(1992, p. 160) contends that Sarit’s strong administration reflects his perception that 
the election and the party systems were not suitable for Thai society because they 
led to disunity, confusion, and disorder. Therefore, the public sector became the 
institution to be accountable for the demand of the people based on national 
security and political stability. This meant pursuing the consolidation of 
administrative hierarchies while implementing various governmental projects in 
remote provinces and villages as pre-emptive measures against communist 
insurgency. Part of this thrust into the provincial territories was made under various 
departments under the Minister of Interior, which had been established in 1898 as 
the major part of King Chulalongkorn’s reformation.
By the end of the 1960s infrastructure development and economic plans 
throughout the regional provinces quickly become established. The Second 
Economic Plan (1967-71) was a considerable technical improvement over the First 
one. After the death of Sarit in 1963, the military regime under his cohort continued. 
His successors, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (1963-68) and General Prapas 
Charusatien, continued to rule the country in a similar manner as Sarit except for 
some difficulties arising from factional struggle and internal conflict. The Thanom 
administration was also pressed by civilian and political opposition groups to put into 
effect the new constitution which had been drafted and delayed for a considerable 
time since the Sarit period. When the political situation was aggravated by the bitter 
conflict with rival cliques, Thanom allowed the new 1968 constitution in which a 
semi-parliamentary system was established with a two-house legislature 
(Dhiravegin, 1992, pp. 193-95).
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As noted above, Thai military regime was institutionalized. A decisive action 
to access political and economic resources is considerably attractive for military 
cliques. In the aftermath of the 1969 election, elected members of parliament in 
both the government and opposition parties intensely voiced various conflicts in the 
parliament. In fact, Thanom himself did not run in the election but received the 
support of his organized political party to hold the premiership. Finally, in November 
1971 Field Marshal Thanom, with the support of the army within his clique, staged a 
coup and continued a dictatorial rule. The new regime abrogated the Constitution, 
and banned political parties and political speech. Under the dictatorial rule, Thanom 
had attempted for a further period to create political stability but his administration 
proved to be disastrous for the middle class in Bangkok and rising liberal-minded 
bureaucrats (Connors, pp. 60-61).
Deep resentment against the regime culminated in the student uprising of 14 
October 1973, demanding a return to constitutional rule. The riot led to a bloody 
massacre of student protesters but a disaffected military clique, with General Krit 
Sivara as the army commander, refused to cooperate with the government in the 
repression of the student demonstration. Thanom and other leading rulers went into 
exile when the King requested peaceful withdrawal of involved groups. Amidst a 
political vacuum, the king appointed an interim administration under Dr. Sanya 
Thammasak (1973-75). Concerning this important intervention, Morell and 
Samudavanija (1981, p. 69) note that it was the first time in the history of Thailand’s 
constitutional monarchy that a premier was bestowed on Thai democracy by the 
King.
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In the following period came civilian governments between 1973 and 1976. 
Once again a parliamentary experiment was attempted. After long years of military 
rule, several civil groups, especially student organizations, labor unions, and 
farmers’ groups, began to press the government to alleviate their grievances and 
social problems. These demands were in stark contrast to organized right-wing 
offensive groups such as the militant Red Guards, Village Scouts, and Navapon, 
which were believed to have been mobilized by conservative forces including the 
Buddhist Church (Dixon, 1999, p. 97). The governments had to contend with rising 
liberal intellectuals and the conservative forces while it was clear that the civilian 
government was unable to cope with the situation. As great political turmoil and 
street demonstrations arose after the sudden return of Marshal Thanom to Bangkok 
in September 1976, a coalition of military, bureaucrats, and capitalist forces backed 
a military coup to bring political stability to the country (Connors, 2003, p. 62). The 
military returned to power in the wake of the crushing of student demonstrations in 
the bloody event on October 6, 1976.
Democratization, Market Force, and the 1991 Coup
The progress of Thai politics and administration in the earlier period 
illustrated the decision-making structures and processes that resulted in 
bureaucratic and military unification. Security and development dimensions were 
fused with political dimensions and various policy reforms. The 1948-73 period of 
dictatorial rule saw the consolidation of anti-communism and development 
administration as the rationale for political stability. Administrative institutions were
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used to strengthen management capacity, and economic development, as well as to 
tarnish political opponents, including those who called for a constitution and 
parliamentary forms. The period of 1974 -1976 renewed civilian governments and 
the progressive movement that challenged state power. With economic growth and 
demand for liberalization, broad social participation put pressure on the security- 
development to respond to the changing environment.
The bloody events of October 14,1973 and October 6, 1976 can be 
characterized as the natural outcome of an incongruity between social-economic 
change and political development. The lack of appropriate institutions to 
accommodate societal demands was expressed in the uprising against the military- 
bureaucratic regime to open the state’s political-administrative institutions to non- 
traditional groups, including the middle class (Dhiravegin, 1985), business 
entrepreneurs (Laothamatas, 1992), and provincial notables (Pongpaichit & Baker, 
2000). Between 1973 and 1992, the military-bureaucratic regime gradually lost its 
power in the parliament and the cabinet. Consequently, the character of Thai public 
administration began to shift from bureaucratic domination toward a democratic 
system, “democratic polity” (Neher & Marlay, 1995). This can be seen during the 
period between 1977 and 1988 when the government of General Kriangsak 
Chamanand (1977-80) and the government of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980- 
88) had attempted to relax their grip on power.
After the crisis of October 1976, the cycle of extremists, the sharp swings of 
the political and civil pendulum, took another year to resolve. The military first 
supported a civilian administration under Thanin Krivichien (1976-77). As noted 
above, the long period of anti-communism resulted in the overreaction of the state
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and the underdevelopment of civil participation. Thanin’s administration also 
banned political activities and required students to gain permission to hold even 
social activities (Connors, 2003, p. 91). A number of students and intellectuals were 
driven into remote regions in the South and Northeast to escape government 
persecution. The administration proclaimed a “democratic socialism” policy, 
meaning a limitation of rights in favor of more economic equality. Thanin spoke the 
language of land reform, economic justice, and equal opportunity, but also related 
these to traditional institutions, “a democracy with the king as head of state.” It soon 
became apparent that the political reform was counterproductive. Thanin’s failure to 
cohere liberal and conservative groups around the new administration came to an 
end in October 1977 when the army staged a coup and installed General Kriangsak 
Chamanand as Prime Minister.
Under the Kriangsak administration (1977-80), the government survived 
coup attempts by various military factions. Although the administration lacked 
strong support in both the parliament and the military, efforts were made to stabilize 
and expand the economy and to reduce rural insurgency. However, the end of the 
Vietnam War and the withdrawal of the U.S. military in Thailand in 1976 reduced the 
inflow of aid and transfer payment. The salient external event that affected the Thai 
economy was the impact of world inflation in the late 1970s. These factors caused 
the Kriangsak administration to allocate substantial resources to national security 
(Dixon, 1999, p. 98). The interaction of the shifting domestic events and the 
external economic shocks changed the framework of state policy toward mild 
authoritarian and economic management. The military started to lose control of 
many strategic areas and was unable to cope with the economic policy effectively.
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During the 1979 international oil shock, the Kriangsak government failed to 
handle the economic and financial stability of the country. He was harshly criticized 
by the public and support from the House of Representatives and the Senate 
eroded. Thus, Kriangsak submitted his resignation in early 1980. General Prem 
Tinsulanond (1980-88), the army commander and minister of defense, who was 
overwhelmingly supported by major parties and the business community, led a new 
cabinet. These two administrations were characterized as “semi-democracy,” in 
which the constitution of 1978 allowed extra-bureaucratic players while seeking to 
entrench bureaucratic and military power in the upper house. The administration 
recognized political activities and social activist groups within a legal framework. 
Prem’s administration, like that of Kriangsak, was based on a combination of civilian 
and military leaders with the greater influence of business groups tied into state 
policy. This is expressed in Prem’s cabinet members, as almost half of them were 
people with business backgrounds (Laothamatas, 1992, pp. 33-34).
Economic management was becoming more complex during the 1980s. The 
military and bureaucratic elites sought to maintain their control on national policies 
by forming an effective alliance with business groups. These had been 
implemented through the strategic positions in the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), the Minister of Finance, the Bureau of Budget, the 
Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Interior. In his analysis of business 
associations in Thailand, Laothamatas (1992) points out that the Joint Public and 
Private Sector Consultative Committees (JPPCCs) had played significant roles 
during the Prem administration. The JPPCCs had given key business associations 
formal access to an unprecedented discussion on government policies. The
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importance of these committees expressed itself in the rapid expansion of central 
JPPCCs in all provinces during the Prem period. Within a framework that 
development programs would remain consistent with policy objectives, Muscat 
(1994, pp. 180-84) argues that NESDB’s fifth plan (1982-86) has been a “milestone 
document” in Thai development planning.
Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Thai economy suffered 
from the impact of the oil price rise, subsidized energy, inflation, and a budget 
deficit. Many commentators had pessimistic pronouncements on economic 
progress. The negative aspects played a significant role in the policy changes 
during the Prem administration. The technocrats suggested a transformation that 
focused on long-term structural adjustment and austerity programs aimed at 
curtailing inflation and the balance of payment deficits. With the assistance 
provided by the World Bank, these measures and proposals were incorporated into 
the Fifth National Plan (1982-86). Between 1982 and 1983, the Thai government 
accepted two Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) as key elements to pursue the 
national plan (Muscat, 1994, p. 176). The major contribution of the SALs was to 
help the institutional development of central agencies, chiefly NESDB, the Bureau of 
Budget, and the Ministry of Finance, to organize the policy concerns within a 
rationalizing framework.
In part, the liberalization of politics and economics of the 1980s facilitated 
economic recovery and growth in the late 1980s. Although Prem’s cabinets were 
threatened by the rivalries among coalition parties and some military factions, Prem 
was able to establish the alliance of the bureaucracy, especially the economic policy 
technocrats, and the senior military. Working against the military-bureaucrats were
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political parties. Within the constraint of public-sector capital projects, the political 
parties and their respective cabinet members voiced intense interests involving 
large-scale capital projects. Although the reform of macroeconomic policy was 
stabilized, political rivals associated with competing interests among the coalition 
parties increased. In his late government, Prem appeared to lose the coherence 
within his administration and announced that he would not accept the premiership 
again.
The double-digit economic boom in the late 1980s created the rapid rise of 
new groups of provincial business and domestic firms. Essentially, the liberalization 
and expansion of the capital market facilitated business groups to raise money from 
domestic and overseas capital markets. Increasing rural wealth can be seen in the 
growth of the provincial banking system. By the 1980s, the number of bank 
branches outside the Bangkok and surrounding metropolitan areas had shifted from 
239 in 1960 to nearly 1,500 in 1988 (Ockey, 2000, p. 80). Much of the increase was 
forced by national policy to promote growth in the provinces. Among the most 
profitable businesses that emerged throughout the provinces were associated with 
government local infrastructure projects and illegal operations. Pongpaichit and 
Baker (2000, pp. 36-41) argue that the new business groups acquired political 
influence as a strategy to extend or defend their business position by participating in 
democratic politics. Economic development was not the only factor to generate the 
local power that would challenge the bureaucracy. Equally important, the return of 
elections and parliament after the Prem period provided the path to power of these 
new groups.
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Following the election in July 1988, the Chart Thai party’s leader, Chatichai 
Choonhavan, was chosen to be Prime Minister among the coalition parties. Under a 
new dynamic interaction between the ruling bureaucrats and technocratic elites and 
civilian government, the latter increasingly demanded political change as opposed to 
"semi-democracy” and bureaucratic prerogative. A significantly larger number of 
cabinet positions in the Chatichai administration (1989-91) were occupied by elected 
politicians who rose from provincial private businesses (Pongpaichit & Baker, 1995). 
All cabinet members under the administration were elected civilians, which was a 
significant departure from the predominantly unelected members in the past.
Muscat (1994, p. 171) points out that in the wake of the disappearance of the 
communist insurgency and with the new income in the economy, the military might 
have considered that coups were becoming less acceptable. It seemed that the 
direct military intervention in politics was over. However, the democratic 
government under Chatichai was overthrown by the military coup of February 1991.
When entering into office in 1989, the civilian Prime Minister Chatichai 
already had the plan for administrative reorganization. Chatichai immediately 
moved to reduce the power of the bureaucracy by relaxing the policy process 
established during the Prem period. Although the basic economic policy framework 
had not been changed, the administration suspended the policy apparatus and 
processes that it inherited while leaving the economic technocrats with only 
marginal influence. Chatichai interrupted structural adjustment reform by replacing 
the technocrats and NESDB and other agencies with new personal advisors who 
were young academics. Muscat (1994, p. 223) stresses that the Chatichai 
government ignored the policy reform maintained during the Prem years because of
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the economic boom of the late 1980s. Apparently, the changes of personnel 
technocrats and policy engaged the administration with disputes and incidents 
involving the army.
Although the administration received popular support in the beginning, it lost 
the support of the press and the middle class in Bangkok within a short period. The 
rapid move of Chatichai appeared to involve a series of bribery scandals, 
particularly in connection with major infrastructure projects and factional rivalries 
within the military. These, widely believed to have extracted personal and factional 
benefits from political offices, attracted swift public attention. When the bloodless 
military coup finally occurred in February 1991, it appeared to have wide 
bureaucratic and public support. It was corruption that provided the excuse for 
military intervention. However, this incident was not a simple return to authoritarian 
rule in which power would be held by the military to protect the nation. With a 
significant social and economic change, it was not surprising that the National 
Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) announced their intention to restore parliamentary 
government in the near future.
In hindsight, Samudavaija (1997) argues that a principal reason for the 
success of the overthrow of the Chatichai administration was consensus among 
military and civilian bureaucrats and big-business interests. During the Prem period, 
several coups failed miserably since there was no consensus on the need for a 
change of government. Conversely, Chatichai interrupted the rule of state 
decisional power by negotiating directly with members of the business community 
while offsetting the influence of technocrats. The administrator kept decision- 
making among his cabinet instead of consulting with the NESDB and the central
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JPPCC, as Prem had normally done when making major economic policy decisions. 
From an economic policy perspective, the Chatichai administration represented 
mainly a pause, characterized by preoccupation with political games, selected large 
projects, and the pursuit of economic rents.
While the 1991 coup contained significant support from various groups, this 
power seizure was distinct from previous coups in that the military group was not 
able to exert complete control over the political agenda. The NPKC appointed a 
respected business and bureaucratic retiree, Anand Panyarachoon, as an interim 
Prime Minister, followed in three months by General Suchinda Kraprayoon (1992) 
after a national election. In a short period, the Suchinda and Anand administrations 
introduced reform policies which strengthened the power of bureaucrats. The 
military and bureaucrats were in control of top positions, including the Ministry of 
Interior, which controls provincial administration. The NPKC also changed the 
boards of major public enterprises and replaced them with its leaders and allied 
technocrats. Following the April 1992 election the military attempted to keep control 
of parliament through the nomination of the coup’s leading officer, General 
Suchinda, as Prime Minister. In May 1992, hundreds of thousands of citizens 
protested in Bangkok, deeply disappointed over the return of unelected military to 
power and the planned political outcome. The public call for Suchinda to resign 
culminated in massive demonstrations which led to “May violence” when the 
administration decided to crush the uprising. King Bhumiphol intervened personally 
in the political crisis, resulting in the withdrawal of the army and the collapse of 
Suchinda’s government.
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Conclusion
The main points of this chapter can be briefly summarized. Features of the 
existing politico-administrative regimes are likely to exert a significant influence over 
both the choice of government reforms to be adopted and the feasibility of 
implementing certain types of policies. Political structures, the nature of central 
executive government, the relationship between domestic forces and international 
institutions, the global economy, and the prevailing administrative culture all have 
effects on which reform strategy was introduced and implemented. Thus, certain 
administrative regimes look as though they are nationalism-oriented, while others 
are more open to democracy and market-oriented reform. The remarkable 
reformation of Siam during the middle and late nineteenth century (King Mongkut 
and King Chulalongkorn) was primarily a response to the threat of British and 
French colonialism. Reform strategies were expressed in bureaucratic 
modernization.
After the monarchy was overthrown by the 1932 bloodless coup, a 
constitutional monarch was substituted. A new elite group of military men and 
civilians were primarily concerned with state-building rather than democracy or 
reforming the public sector. Although a constitution was promulgated, this only 
served to guarantee the existing regime. The military coup has become the usual 
means for transferring power among rival cliques. During most of the military-led 
administrative periods, elections and political parties are allowed. However, 
elections are not held for the purpose of change in policy reform but as elitist 
contests. Thus, administrative reforms were initiated by the group of military-
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bureaucrats under individual governments in response to their perceptions and 
socio-economic circumstances, especially the communist threat during the post- 
World War II period. During that period, Thailand received a large number of grants 
and support from the United States and international organizations for military 
security and institutional development project. This assistance made technocrats 
emerge in the center of a national economic and social development process along 
with the ruling group.
A significant change to expand popular control over the military-bureaucratic 
elite emerged in the aftermath of student and popular uprisings late in 1973 during a 
military authoritative regime. The military elites were thus confronted with the 
groups outside the official parties and parliamentary institution. Despite military- 
bureaucrats becoming institutionalized, gradual transformation toward civilian 
parliamentary institution has been increasingly significant. Participation within 
democratic rule becomes the counterbalancing force against the prevailing military 
and technocrats. It is tempting to conclude that the collapse of short military 
intervention in the coup of 1991 has propelled Thai society in the direction of 
democratic politics based on civilian government. With such a political environment 
as well as the force of globalization, demands for liberalization and participation 
have put pressure on the Thai state to reform its political and administrative 
institutions and to accept more responsibility.
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CHAPTER 4
THE 1990s REFORM AND THE RISE OF THAKSIN
Introduction
Administrative reform cannot be adequately comprehended without 
reference to the crucial relationships that exist in a complex political and economic 
environment (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004a). Changes are likely to be influenced by 
the actors who are involved in the state’s affairs: politicians, civil servants, external 
consultants, and citizens. Administrative reform in any country is the product of 
local preoccupations and priorities as governmental and private actors respond to a 
changing environment. In Thailand, what were political executives and bureaucrats 
seeking to accomplish and what barriers did they face under the given 
socioeconomic situation? In this regard, it’s crucial to consider both the continuities 
and changes in the reforms since the 1990s in order to grasp the pattern of reform.
Politics and administration in Thailand can be characterized by competing 
tendencies towards democracy and authoritarianism. When the absolute monarchy 
was brought to an end in 1932, it was followed by authoritarian regimes with 
constitutional rules, dominated by a small group of military-bureaucratic elites. 
During the 1980s, Thailand was ruled by an unelected ex-military premier with the 
support of an elected parliament. However, since the coup of 1991, the military has
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become less politicized while popular participation and parliamentary democracy 
have become the dominating forces in the political sphere.
As Thailand’s economy modernized, characterized by a thriving 
agribusiness, an export-oriented industry, and a successful tourist industry, political 
and administrative institutions seemed not to keep pace. The resulting tension was 
reflected in the reform movement following the 1991 coup and later the advent of 
the 1997 constitution.
Despite various attempts to introduce new laws and newly designed 
institutions to relax the state’s centralization, functional redundancy, bureaucratic 
expansion, and corruption in all levels of government, observers of public 
administration found that the same negative patterns continued. Whereas 
piecemeal public sector reforms between 1992 and 1996 could not effectively 
transform the Thai society, the theme of reform specified in the 1997 constitution 
was, in many respects, the most important reaction to institutional inertia. The 
constitutional goal of making Thai politics more open, including increasing local civic 
participation, decentralization, inclusion of non-governmental agencies, and the 
creation of independent public agencies, was unprecedented. Some reforms have 
been sweeping changes, such as those involving the electoral system, local 
decentralization decrees, and the creation of independent oversight agencies.
Other reforms have been more incremental in order to improve the way functional 
ministries and departments administer policies.
While much of the reforms were internally generated, international influences 
also played a role in modernizing the state’s institution. Thailand was more open to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
international influences as its economy modernized, and especially as the country 
adapted to the Asian fiscal crisis.
This chapter will consider pivotal factors that contributed to fundamental 
reform during the Thaksin administration (2001-2006). The chapter first discusses 
the global context that influenced Thai governmental reform during the past 
decades, including the impact of international economic transformation, the diffusion 
of relatively common ideas about reform tactics, and the roles of international 
organizations in Thailand’s institutional changes. The other significant factors that 
have generated political change are discussed in following sections.
The chapter will analyze the drive toward an ideal constitutional democracy, 
social participation, and decentralization. This movement culminated in the 1997 
constitutional amendment which is popularly known as the “People’s Constitution.” 
The second contributing factor to the reforms was the 1997 financial crisis and its 
consequences on economic structural reform. Lastly, the chapter will briefly explain 
the rise of Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party as a new political force of Thai 
politics following the 2001 general election.
Global Context and Local Reform Receptivity
Typically, global economic forces have been a vital factor in prompting 
consideration of public sector reform. However, such forces do not determine the 
precise timing, form, and degree of administrative reform. Scholars who observe 
public sector reform argue that the pattern of management change has differed 
considerably from country to country, suggesting that the effects of the global
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
market vary from one country to another. Changes in the global economy may 
provide the pressure, but they do not supply ideas or models of how the public 
sector could be better organized. Although economic globalization seems to be a 
major influence on institutional change, a number of other intervening variables 
should be analyzed to completely understand the reform in particular countries.
One of these forces is international organizations that may influence countries’ 
administrative reforms.
The roles of international organizations and Western countries have long 
been recognized as important factors that contribute to socio-economic changes in 
a number of individual countries. For many transitional economic countries, 
institutional reform has been done through structural adjustment programs with the 
support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (World Bank, 
1983). Political leaders and senior bureaucrats have shown sensitivity to economic 
pressures and requests from international organizations in their designs for 
structural reform. Global economic forces influence the work of international 
organizations. Assistance from these organizations has often been accompanied by 
approaches to institutional reform that result in some degree of policy convergence 
through a process by which reform tactics became increasingly similar over time 
(Bennett, 1991, p. 219).
In countries collaborating with the European Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), rising government expenditure coupled with 
poor economic performance inspired a set of fundamental questions concerning the 
effectiveness of public bureaucracies (OECD, 1995). Since 1989 the OECD has 
developed a wide range of administrative reforms for the member countries through
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its Public Management (PUMA) program. OECD and other international 
organizations developed a shared emphasis on improving the effectiveness, 
efficiency, and performance of recipient countries and members. These common 
principles do not mean that the reform approaches and the practices of member 
countries would be identical in all respects, but they do suggest that when a 
government wants to gain support of these international organizations it is more 
likely to adopt reforms to achieve the goals these organizations support; hence 
different countries’ reforms began to look somewhat similar.
Scholars who study international relations generally agree that the activities 
of supranational and intergovernmental organizations affect the ability of individual 
states to make policies appropriate to their particular political, economic and social 
contexts. Stallings (1992) has argued that there are three major channels through 
which the policies of supranational organizations can have an impact on domestic 
policies. First are short-term fluctuations and long-term developments in 
international trade and financial markets. Second, the leverage that creditors have 
on borrower countries can limit the latter’s policy options. Third are transnational 
social and political networks, especially business and technocratic collaboration that 
link domestic and international actors.
Stallings explains that high economic growth, freely available financing, and 
competition among industrial and socialist countries in the 1970s allowed the 
recipient countries to avoid high pressure to reform compared to the 1980s when 
lower growth rates, less availability of finance, and emerging consensus on the 
advantage of markets put heavy pressure on domestic reform. The incentive for a
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borrower country to reform was reinforced when a lender’s threats and promises of 
rewards are credible.
In Thailand, the influence of the IMF and the World Bank is apparent in the 
country’s economic development history following World War Two. Three policies 
that were directly and indirectly prescribed by the supranational organizations were 
communist containment, efforts to modernize public organizations and management 
systems, and the introduction of the first national development plan which 
emphasized a free market economy.
For most of the post-war period, successive Thai governments explicitly 
promoted industry while implicitly discouraging agriculture. Consequently, the 
institutional transformation and economic policies of subsequent governments 
largely focused on infrastructure projects while attempting to develop a secure 
environment for export and domestic investment.
Supranational forces, such as the World Bank, focused their policies on the 
close relation between policy makers in Thailand and other recipient countries while 
suggesting a rapid economic development approach for key government agencies 
(World Bank 1983, 60-3). Typically, major contributions from international 
assistance programs were intended to enhance Thailand’s policy apparatus, 
especially to organize the management capacity of central agencies, like the Bureau 
of Budget, the Ministry of Finance, the National Economic and Development Board, 
and other central planning agencies. In part, long-term strategies to encourage 
foreign investment included the removal of various free market obstacles such as 
state enterprise monopolies, state subsidies to certain business sectors, minimum 
wages, and price controls. The intended result was high levels of economic growth.
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By 1970, the Thai economy included roughly seventy state enterprises. 
Although many of these enterprises were seldom profitable, the state-owned 
enterprises as a whole earned net revenues for the government prior to the oil price 
rise in the mid 1970s. The successive governments following the 1970s were 
unable to make major state enterprises recover rising costs and they faced 
problematic financial conditions, forcing them to refinance their capital expenditure 
from external sources, especially the IMF and the World Bank. As the supranational 
organizations’ view of state-owned enterprise shifted toward privatization, the idea 
of improving the state enterprises of Thailand arose in the early 1980s (Muscat, 
1994, pp. 196-204). Despite strong encouragement from the international 
organizations to privatize to improve the state enterprise efficiency, each of these 
early privatization initiatives became enmeshed in a political contest among various 
groups.
Thai economic development policy shifted from nationalism and 
protectionism to a more open economy, with the assistance of supranational 
organizations. The economic policies between the 1980s and the 1990s saw the 
introduction of private concessions, contracting out of public service to private 
business, and various kinds of privatization measures. The World Bank continued 
to argue for the privatization of state-owned enterprise and state decentralization 
(World Bank 1996, 1997). The Thai government response to these external 
pressures can be seen in infrastructure projects such as telecommunications, 
energy, and expressways that were encouraged under the privatization schemes.
In principle, the policy was to reduce the burden on public spending, to increase 
efficiency, and to control construction projects. The privatization of state-owned
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enterprises has become part of the common language for almost all government 
agencies in Thailand.
During the 1970s, there were delays in the structural adjustment program 
and unexpected difficulties in most borrowing countries. To this point, the World 
Bank insisted that developing countries needed to develop better management with 
regard to public spending, public enterprise, and civil service reform programs 
(World Bank, 1991, p. 2). It appears that the World Bank came to the conclusion 
that privatization is not necessarily the only solution for transitional economies, 
although privatization seemed to work better in developed countries. The new 
perception promoted by the World Bank was that improved governance would 
produce better policy outcomes in individual countries. Stalling (1995) points out 
that the shift towards the issues of governance and a gradual reassessment of the 
usefulness of privatization as an economic policy in developing countries began in 
the late 1980s when the consensus of a “reduced government role in the economy” 
started to dissolve.
The World Bank’s interest in the notion of governance can be traced to the 
publication of its report in 1989 (World Bank, 1989). The Bank concluded that “good 
governance” is central to creating and sustaining an environment which fosters 
strong and equitable development, and it is an essential complement to sound 
economic policies. It was the advancement of a revised lending program that led 
the Bank to focus on improvements of overall public sector management and the 
improvement of sector-wide institutions. This concept of good governance was 
emphasized in the succeeding World Bank documents as the response to adverse 
policy consequences in borrower countries (World Bank, 1992). Consequently, the
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World Bank’s role in the diffusion of “good governance” language among borrower 
countries in the late 1980s was expressed in its general guiding principles attached 
to loan conditions and assistance programs.
However, it was not only explicit conditions of loans and assistance that 
favored the adoption of a particular set of governance reforms. It has been argued 
that “globalization,” particularly the acceleration of global economic integration and 
interaction, has facilitated the adaptation of ideas and lessons across the public 
sector worldwide. Ikenberry (1990, p. 101) argues that international competition and 
cooperation spreads ideas and policies by suggesting that decision makers adopt 
the efforts of leading capitalist countries concerning economic and governance 
approaches. Hence, countries might consider the policy solutions available within 
the international community.
For example, more than twenty delegations from foreign governments visited 
Britain in the 1980s in the search for the “best” policy. At that time foreigners were 
particularly interested in how Britain’s privatization policy was working (Henig et al., 
1988, p. 458). Through the process of seeking solutions, political elites and 
bureaucrats observed changes in the social and economic reform of other states 
and came to expect similar standards at home. Thus policy learning provided a 
channel for the diffusion of particular administrative reforms. The receptivity of 
decision-makers to new ideas is not automatic, but the new practices and 
experiences from abroad offered reference points for potential reform policy. 
Following the worldwide economic recession of the mid-1970s, most Western 
countries responded to the consequences of economic contraction with an 
increased emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness as the key to public service
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delivery. Emerging in the 1980s, a new approach to public administration was 
prevalent especially in the policy reforms of the Reagan and Thatcher 
administrations implemented in the United States and the United Kingdom (Dawson 
& Dargie, 2002). The reform measures promoted in the 1980s by these 
administrations and subsequent governments were to introduce various 
management innovations, to reorganize public agencies, and to emphasize market- 
based mechanisms as the primary instrument of cost reduction. The U.S. and U.K. 
experiences introduced a variety of new management terms, such as special 
operating agencies (SOAs), executive agencies, “next step” agencies, reinventing 
government, contracting-out, service agreement, deregulation, and one-stop 
service. Some scholars who study organizations labeled a particular cluster of 
these management improvements and techniques New Public Management (NPM) 
(Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004a).
In line with the external influences prominent in the last two decades, the 
Thai public sector experienced many reforms. These reform measures 
encompassed all public sector entities, including the central government, local 
government, state-owned enterprises, government-funded research institutes, and 
other government-affiliated organizations (Bowornwathana, 2000). Essentially, 
administrative reform approaches in the Western world were considered sources of 
examples and options. Organizational and personnel restructuring, innovations in 
the operating system, and changes in the culture of those public sector 
organizations were prominent reform efforts. Most attention was given to 
organizational performance, work force reduction, and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises and other government-affiliated organizations. The focus was primarily
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on budgeting, management techniques, and personnel adjustments. New Public 
Management, with its emphasis on business planning, performance management 
and devolved administrative power, increasingly takes part of the reform discourse.
Cerny (1994) argues that globalization has caused state policies to converge 
toward more liberal policy and deregulation because of the character of the 
international system, which typically transforms the behavior of countries within the 
broader system. Thus, the demands of foreign capital and investment on economic 
and administrative policy may intensify policy diffusion and emulation. As state 
control over economic, political, and social activities has eroded, states become less 
resistant to global capitalist democracy with the internationalization of interest 
groups and social movement activities.
The power of globalization and the international organizations in promoting 
liberalization policy can be seen during the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
When banking and financial institutions in Asia began to collapse in country after 
country (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea), Thai 
government representatives were sent to ask major countries and other international 
bankers to postpone short-term debt, which accounted for two-thirds of the country's 
total debt. However, the reaction of supranational institutions such as the IMF and 
the G7 countries was to protect the lender institutions which had invested in private 
companies in debtor countries (Laird, 2000, pp. 85-88). Instead, the United States, 
as the world’s leading financial power that supports the World Trade Organization 
and the IMF, pressed the Asian countries to open up the poorly equipped financial 
sector for outside competition, as it expected that the crisis would be overcome by 
infusions of foreign capital induced by privatization, liberalization, and legal reforms.
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Thailand’s 1997 crisis is indisputably a part of a global process of capital 
accumulation and cycles of growth and downturn. While domestic capital did 
exceptionally well half a decade before the crisis when these private companies 
suffered from a global downturn in the economy, domestic capital was insufficient to 
rescue the economy. The immediate need was to expand international capital. The 
IMF’s response was in line with the need to restore the profitability of capital and the 
lender institutions rather than to restore the economy of a particular nation and 
society. As the Thai government needed the IMF assistance, it had to accept 
numerous demands, including reform of alien business laws, revisions to duties, 
taxes and customs procedures, privatization, and relaxation of a range of rules and 
policies, all of which would increase opportunity for international assistance.
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Administrative Reform
Politicians and bureaucrats in Thailand appear to be extremely conscious of 
the potential impacts of Western democracy and economic globalization. This can 
be seen in the history of political and administrative reforms of the Thai government 
since Thailand’s absolute monarchy was transformed into a modern parliamentary 
democracy in 1932. In fact, the end of absolute monarchy was brought about by a 
small group of Western-educated bureaucratic elites and the royal family who had 
dominated the Siamese court. As addressed in Chapter 3, one of the most 
extensive reforms of the Thai bureaucracy following the end of absolute monarchy 
was made by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-63), who sought to modernize the 
state mainly to challenge communist expansion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
Although a constitutional democracy, Thailand was dominated by a 
hierarchically organized bureaucracy controlled by a small group of administrative 
elites at the top (Siffin, 1966; Neher, 1987). Bureaucratic elites determined the 
direction of socioeconomic development according to their preferences. The 
elected politicians remained a weak force for change and their relatively short time 
working in parliament weakened them compared to the civil service. As analyzed in 
Chapter 3, from Field Marshal Sarit’s (1959-63) authoritarianism without parliament 
and parties to General Prem’s (1980-88) parliamentary-based coalition politics with 
an unelected Prime Minister to Anand’s (1991-92) technocratic cabinet installed by 
the military, the character of Thai government has varied, reflecting both internal 
context and external influence. Throughout these changes, the bureaucratic elites 
remained the most influential force for change.
To offer some context for the recent design of the Thai public sector reform, 
this section will briefly describe the reform efforts of successive governments before 
the Thaksin administration entered the Thai parliament in 2001.
In the early 1970s the expansion of the Thai public sector became an issue 
of discussion among bureaucratic elites. The reorganization of government 
structure was discussed at a policy level in almost all successive governments.
In a study of bureaucratic expansion in Thai bureaucracy, Chandarasorn 
(1985) documented that the growth rate of public agencies within the government 
structure was enormous. Between 1933 and 1979, the number of ministries’ 
departments increased from 45 to 121, and the number of divisions expanded from 
143 to 1,264 (Chandarasorn, 1985, p 15). The administrative reform during this 
period was in the context of “bureaucracy” as a root cause of the expansion. Other
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contributing factors included socio-economic variables. Long administrative stability 
during Prem’s administration enabled the Thai government to adopt certain reforms 
including civil service reforms and the reorganization of the functional ministries. It 
was for this reason that the Office of the Cabinet Secretariat proposed a structural 
reform of departments to the then National Administrative Reform Commission. 
Muscat (1994, p. 264) concludes that there was a clear diminution of public-sector 
size and government functions in the 1980s, and a shift toward the private sector 
and the market institutions.
During the period of the so-called “quasi-democratic” system of General 
Prem’s government, a number of appointed technocrats achieved considerable 
success in economic policy against a backdrop of global economic impacts due to 
the oil crisis. In early 1991, Thai public administration gained new momentum when 
the military staged a coup against the Chatichai (1989-91) government and installed 
a successful ex-technocrat businessman, Anand Panyarachun, in the interim 
government. Anand used to serve in the Foreign Ministry and moved to the 
chairmanship of a major textiles conglomerate in 1997. Throughout the 1980s, he 
took a prominent part in business associations (Schmidt, 1996). Following the crisis 
of confidence created by Chatchai’s civilian government, the Anand government 
reasserted technocratic attention to economic and administrative reform as an 
attempt to revive international confidence by providing a contrast with the Chatchai 
civilian party politics in which rent-seeking propensity and inappropriate economic 
policy were generally noticeable.
The shift of administration can alter the structural reform policies of a 
bureaucracy (Bowornwathana, 1994). This observation exactly happened in the
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Thai public sector during the short period of the General Suchinda and Anand 
administration. After Anand took the premiership, he expanded a significant number 
of ministerial departments. Bowornwathana (1994) recorded these reorganizations: 
1) four new environmental-related agencies were added to the Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and Environment, 2) four new departments of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs were created to reflect geographical global strategies, 3) a new Intellectual 
Property Department was created in the Ministry of Commerce, and 4) the National 
Energy Policy Committee Office and the Land Traffic System Committee Office 
were established under the Office of the Prime Minister.
The Anand administration maintained parts of the Prem government's 
agenda. In addition to some administrative reforms that were implemented during 
the Prem years, Anand’s interim government promulgated an extraordinary amount 
of legislation and liberalizing deregulation. The administration confirmed market- 
based mechanisms and recognized the need to curb public sector problems that 
were caused primarily by a bureaucratic expansion of the civil service during prior 
years.
As discussed above, multilateral development agencies such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and their regional counterparts had 
imposed conditions to aid before Anand took the office. These conditions took the 
form of a “complex policy covenant" that Thai bureaucrats made with the 
development agencies when the economic and political conditions made 
international assistance necessary (Muscat, 1994, pp. 123-25). The Anand 
government found that it would not only have to adopt, but also implement those 
agreements. The government had to prepare an administrative apparatus to
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facilitate policies such as free trade, foreign investment, and stable employer-labor 
relationships. Thai public service reform was thus linked to the underlying change in 
the interaction with international organizations and the internationalization of global 
economy.
Public sector reform initiatives which were associated with market liberalism 
and New Public Management emerged by the early 1990s when the Anand 
administration ordered a landmark civil service reform in 1991 within the authority of 
the Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSC). With this change, many of the 
bureaucratic solutions were incorporated in the 1992 revision of the Civil Service Act 
that was passed hastily during the interim administration. The act laid a firm legal 
basis for the future reform activities dealing with the quality and integrity of public 
service, the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, and the legal clauses 
involving important implications for all government officials. These innovations 
facilitated a direction -- principles and procedural guidelines to create a more 
efficient and responsive Thai public administration within a competitive environment. 
The main driving concepts for institutional reform were “development,” “planning," 
and “efficiency” while the principal goal was a more market-oriented economic 
system.
The appointment of Anand in the interim government also demonstrated the 
increasing role of the middle classes from the commercial and industrial sectors.
The increasing internationalization of the Thai economy in the early 1990s driven by 
transnational businesses engaged in export and import forced the need for political 
stability as a precondition for economic growth. Economic growth and the 
international environment were considered the reform framework within which
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government operates. Without a parliament, the cabinet of senior technocrats, 
military, and metropolitan business elites enacted a set of reforms designed to 
complete the transition to an economy based on export-oriented industrialization 
and liberalization policy. Anand’s reform scheme was confined to economic 
performance and selected elements of bureaucratic reform. It was not oriented to 
meaningful political reforms.
Samudavanija (1997) argues that the globalization and internationalization of 
capital have made Thai elites, especially military-bureaucrats, no longer the main 
groups dominating the allocation of resources and the distribution of benefits. The 
1991 coup under the National Peace-Keeping Council (NPKC) had provided an 
opportunity for the claim that the Prime Minister need not be an elected politician. 
Given the imperative of implementing important programs and policy reform to 
maintain the legal basis for a viable capitalism in the era of globalization, the 
military-backed administration detracted from Thailand’s international reputation. 
Conversely, the dominance of the military and technocrats in the 1990s had been 
gradually reduced, both by their own miscalculated coup and by the international 
and domestic social and economic changes. Consequently, the democratization 
demanded by various social groups, especially academics, social activists, and the 
middle class, became significant.
During the 1990s, political crises that had typically been reflected in army 
intervention and military coups was redefined through the process of partisan 
political crisis, in which the ruling government was to be removed by non-military 
force: mass protest, media pressure, parliamentary indictment, and the 
fragmentation of coalition administrations (Hewison, 2003). Lack of transparency
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and lack of disclosure within bureaucratic and administrative systems have driven 
the public to participate directly in acute problems. Since the retreat of the military 
from an active governmental role in the early 1990s, wider societal forces have 
helped redefine the political and administrative relationship, reforming government 
functions and purposes, and readdressing the rights of government and the 
governed. Clearly, the movement provided a continuous climate for democratic and 
bureaucratic reform in response to a variety of political, social, economic, and 
technological forces.
Between 1992 and 2005, no military coup has taken place and no elected 
civilian government has reached its full parliamentary term of four years.
Successive governments have come and gone starting with Chuan Leekpai, a 
leader of the Democratic Party who took office in May 1992. The Chuan 
administration dissolved parliament in May 1995. The Democrat Party lost to 
Banharn’s Thai Nation Party in the subsequent election. However, the Banharn 
government (1995-96) held the office for only a little more than one year when 
Banharn was forced to dissolve the parliament in a controversial parliamentary 
debate. Following the national election in November 1996, Chavalit Yongjaiyudh 
formed a coalition government and became the Prime Minister for a short period 
(1996-97) when his cabinet ended in the wave of distrust rising from managing the 
financial crisis of 1997. The onset of the 1997 financial crisis and the 1997 
constitutional reform movement caused him to hand over power to Chuan Leekpai 
in November 1997.
Between 1992 and 2000, some elements of administrative reform had been 
proposed by all parties and were reflected in the policy statements of most
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administrations. While the incumbent political executives could assert their policy 
choices, technocrats also utilized the power of administrative process to influence 
the specifics of implementation and to shape bureaucratic rules. Discretionary 
recommendations, specific legislation proposals, and implementation of programs 
were important elements of Thai bureaucratic power. Hence, central agencies had 
opportunities to influence public sector reform. This was shown when the Chuan 
administration approved the Office of Civil Service Commission’s plan on manpower 
downsizing policy throughout the government. In 1995, with technical assistance 
from the United Nation Development Plan, the Office started to direct public sector 
reform toward the performance measurement of bureaucratic agencies through 
performance-monitoring tools and quantifiable criteria. The performance 
measurement in public agencies became one of the major reform tactics in 
successive administrations (Office of the Civil Service Commission, 1996).
Concerning decentralization of power, the mass protest against the short­
life-military rule in 1992 suddenly shifted the military power onto a civilian 
government. The Democrat Party led by Chuan, as a new administration, continued 
to rely on the bureaucracy when it came to implementing decentralization policy. 
Before the Chuan government, sub-district administrations were a quasi­
bureaucracy body in which the leader of each sub-district had twin duties, being the 
chief of people in the village while simultaneously being local government servants 
under the Local Administrative Act of 1914 (Nelson, 1998, pp. 32-33). The Chuan 
government transformed the sub-district councils into juristic entities (sub-district 
local government) while allowing the Interior Ministry to expand its roles over the 
new local self-government. For example, the administration expanded central
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government functions such as sub-district health stations and sub-district community 
development offices in parallel with the local development role of the new type of 
local authority. In part, the main reason was to ensure that the behavior of locally 
elected government strictly complied with the prescriptions of the central 
bureaucracies.
When the Banharn government came to power, the Thai economy was 
already experiencing a slowdown. The growth rate shifted from 8.6 per cent in 1995 
to 6.4 in 1996, and then it turned to recession in 1997. King points out that 
Banharn’s cabinet was composed of mostly provincial business people turned 
politicians and lacked support from politically influential technocrats (King, 1999). 
Banharn ignored the economic warning signs posted by the IMF and did little to 
reform government institutions to cope with arising economic problems. This 
brought the Banharn government to an end with a no-confidence vote. He dissolved 
the parliament and announced a new general election in late 1996.
This incident indicates that Thai governance has not always been obedient 
to the policy directives of international forces. In fact, political parties typically 
lacked both substantive policy stands and ideology while depending on technocrats 
to decide strategies concerning policy implementation. It has been argued that 
party formation in Thailand has been characterized by ambitious political individuals 
and factions who have limited skill and often have not been interested in broader 
policy issues (Shuchit, 1990).
Following the November election in 1996, Chavalit and his New Aspiration 
Party defeated by a narrow margin the Chuan-led Democracy Party. Having formed 
a government, Chavalit installed a new economic policy team. In the middle of the
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financial crisis, in May 1997, the Office of Civil Service Commission recommended 
that the Chavalit administration approve a master plan for bureaucratic reform that 
attempted to reduce the number of civil servants by thirty percent by 2001 and to 
seek more efficiency and effectiveness of the existing public agencies. The public 
sector reform measures included possible merging and dissolving of government 
units, devolving administrative power, contracting out to the private sector, and 
developing key performance indicators (Laird, 2000, pp. 196-99). Chavalit’s 
administration survived less than twelve months while being forced to pass the 1997 
constitutional draft in late September 1997 followed by his resignation.
After Chavalit resigned in early November 1997, the Democrat Party with a 
six-party coalition formed a second Chuan government. In the course of continued 
crisis, the government was not able to manage the situation but did get financial 
support from the IMF, and the successive government had to implement sweeping 
crisis-management measures that accelerated government bureaucratic 
transformation. Following the passage of the 1997 constitution, various reform 
strategies were implemented as the new constitution required more concrete reform 
implementation. Foreign models were studied and adapted into the Thai public 
sector transformation plans (Bowornwathana, 2004, pp. 247-59). This can be seen 
in the approval of the Decentralization Plan and Process Act of 1999, the National 
Education Act of 1999, and the effort to create autonomous and independent bodies 
specified in the new constitution during the Chuan government.
The adoption of the reform constitution in 1997 signaled a shift in the political 
and administrative transformation. Both the emerging policy agenda and the 
program of institutional reform were underpinned by a discourse of new public
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management. The core of public sector reform during the Chuan administration 
departed from the focus on general public sector improvement that had 
characterized many prior reforms. The focus began to shift to what would motivate 
the technocrats to change, as they were seen as part of the institutional problems. 
For instance, the Nukul Commission, which investigated the failings of the Bank of 
Thailand (BoT) during the 1997 financial crisis, identified a number of organizational 
defects that challenged the belief that these elite, technocratic agencies were any 
different from the rest of the bureaucracy (Nukul Commission, 1998). In fact, it 
revealed that there was in-fighting between departments: seniority, favoritism and 
loyalty had supplanted the merit system.
As the 1997 financial crisis unfolded, a number of factors converged to 
produce massive political and administrative reform. Rapid economic restructuring, 
increasing social problems, new governance structures, and a host of other forces, 
including the acceptance of international assistance, all contributed their share. The 
need for technical and modern management solutions on the one hand, and the 
serious shortfall in technocratic professionalism on the other, produced a situation in 
which scope and urgency of recommendations for reform grew to an unprecedented 
level leading to a need for constitutional overhaul that, in part, addressed structure 
and management of the public sector. Proposals for reform prescribed by the Civil 
Service Commission placed a heavy emphasis on the idea that government should 
be run more like businesses. Even when the reform-minded technocrats ostensibly 
acknowledge differences between management in the private and public sectors, 
specific suggestions have often been based on business practices. This was
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evident in reform proposals with respect to a variety of management issues during 
the Chuan administration and successive governments.
NPM-like reform strategies appeared to meet the goals of administrative 
reformers while satisfying political objectives. Political executives of the new 
government adopted a management perspective and NPM techniques in the name 
of administrative reform, while seeking to consolidate their power. At the same time, 
technocrats deployed their technical expertise and control of detailed operations in 
advancing the competency and effectiveness of the government that included 
familiar old ideas and new public management discourse such as shrinking 
government, use of private-sector performance-management and motivation 
techniques, treating citizens like customers, and separating public administrators 
from the public policy process. This uneasy coexistence of reform ideas and tactics 
offered potential repositioning for the bureaucrats to cope with a declining 
bureaucratic prestige.
Political Reform Movement and the 1997 Constitution
Following the 1950s, administrative power in Thailand was firmly held by the 
military and economic technocrats pursuing relatively liberal capitalist development 
policies along lines recommended by the World Bank (Muscat, 1994). Political and 
administrative crises and reforms generally resulted from tensions within the 
military. Power changed hands frequently, both through elections and through 
military coups in which the successful regimes sought to legitimate themselves by 
promulgating new constitutions which embody their attempts to reform the political
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order. The 1980s saw the decreasing role of the military while ruling technocratic 
elites merged with the new capitalist elite, with the latter vesting their political power 
in the parliament and cabinet (Laothamatas, 1992). The extra-bureaucratic forces, 
such as the Chamber of Commerce and other business and trade associations, 
have played prominent roles in politics and have influenced public policy.
Through the 1990s the pattern of political crises and reforms changed. As 
provincial entrepreneurs were able to organize themselves to gain representation in 
the parliament, wealth and business networks proved highly effective in electoral 
politics as a means of promoting and protecting their interests. To many political 
observers, the absence of military intervention since the mass protest in May 1992 
was a sign of democratic progress. However, the instability caused by 
parliamentary conflict and coalition governments was a disappointing setback as 
various parties and factions struggled for power. When a political crisis looms, the 
dissolution of parliament or the simple ouster of the Prime Minister engineered by 
opposition parties and by other elements of opposed middle class is more likely than 
a coup. The factional conflicts of parliament and mass demonstrations became new 
sources for the change of administrative regime. In capturing the new political 
pattern, McCargo (2000) concludes that the function of the Thai parliament is 
characterized by the struggle of opposition parties to join the government's cabinet.
For generations, the mass of Thai people rarely participated directly in a 
political crisis or attempted to present themselves in force against illegitimate 
governments. Further, the military regimes usually sought to keep political order 
through the promulgation of new constitutions, frequently contributing to political 
suppression and new crises. But in the 1992 political crisis, Thais outside Bangkok
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took part in the struggle for democratic process on an unprecedented scale. Unlike 
the student uprisings in 1973 and 1976, the mass demonstration against General 
Suchinda’s government in May 1992 was attended by various professional 
associations, activist groups, and educated people in major provinces around the 
country (LoGerfo, 2000). Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of 
Bangkok and other provincial cities to curtail the government and its 1991 
constitution. After the ouster of Suchinda, these forces continued their pro­
democracy activities and pushed for political reform.
In retrospect, by the 1980s business associations and a variety of social 
networks had formed a democratic movement. As Thailand became increasingly 
pluralistic, the political process was more oriented to engaging extra-parliamentary 
forces trying to change what had been a flawed and somewhat limited democracy. 
Despite some political transformation, mass vote buying and, particularly, corruption 
within the cabinet remained commonplace. Although political parties represented 
wider groups in the society, they did not seek political change that would widen 
political participation or institute more public controls over ministers and politicians.
Many Thai scholars argued that the emergence of a new aristocracy of 
money subverted the development of democratic processes through bribery and 
vote buying (Connors, 1999; McVey, 2000; Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000b; 
Samudavanija, 1997). As this new class grew, so did the democracy movement. 
Political upheaval continues, but a wider range of actors and forces have become 
involved in the operation of a Thai capitalist state.
In this transition, the bureaucratic and military elites have attempted to 
pursue formal democracy and promote a regulated economy. An irreverent fraction
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of the new capitalist class, based in the provinces, began to enter national politics 
and began to apply the same kind of illicit tactics they had used in local-level 
business and politics (Pongpaichit & Baker, 1997). Provincial capitalists sought to 
expand their influence in the parliamentary arena as a means of furthering their 
interests while metropolitan businesses opted for a more technocratic form of 
democracy. Increasingly, sections of these groups also had successfully benefited 
from the liberalized economy and had integrated into a more pluralistic system. 
While in the 1991 coup big business proved willing to work with the military and 
bureaucracy, the events of May 1991 fed skepticism about a return of military 
regimes.
It was in this context that the political reform movement became increasingly 
important in providing a platform and leadership for business and for reforming 
technocrats. It should be noted that the mixture of social class also forged a loose 
and largely intellectual alliance to address the flaws of the existing constitution and 
political system. Non government organizations (NGOs) or, more broadly defined, 
civil society organizations which united to oppose the 1991 coup had found common 
cause in the need for better human rights and community rights and for reforms that 
would bring more power to local community (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000b, pp. 111- 
12).
After the May 1992 incident, democracy groups and some NGOs focused 
their attention on ensuring clean elections, and later, pushing for the election as 
opposed to central appointment of provincial governors. Essentially, the 1991 coup 
and the constitutional deliberations of 1991 provided an opportunity for the 
articulation of needs for political and administrative reforms during the period of the
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administration of Chuan Leekpai (1992-95) and the rise of government under 
Banharn Silpa-Archa (1995-96).
Following the election in September 1992, the Democracy Party leader 
Chuan Leekpai won a majority vote and formed the core of the new government. 
Prime Minister Chuan was the first non-military leader since the mid-1970s. The 
party’s image was represented as a force for stability and moderation, against both 
the rogue politicians in the pro-military parties and the activist politicians who had 
taken to the streets and opposed Suchinda's rise to power. With the installation of 
the government elected by due process without the military’s intervention, 
democracy was reestablished and the democratization process continued. Chuan 
restored international trust and improved the economic environment by continuing 
the conservative fiscal policy of the past and by the appointment of professionally 
educated business technocrats who represented the new industrial and commercial 
elites (Muscat, 1994, p. 227).
The Chuan government declared its support for political reform, especially its 
desire to make the constitution more democratic. The actual reform efforts were 
focused on the sphere of business and commerce. For example, the emphasis was 
seen in March 1993 when the Bank of Thailand introduced the Bangkok 
International Banking Facility (BIBF) which arguably contributed to a quick rise of 
foreign debt during 1994-1996 (Siamwalla, 1997). As various groups outside 
parliament such as the Student Federation of Thailand and other NGO activist 
groups had been calling for political reform through constitution amendment 
(Connors, 2003, pp. 160-63), the administration evaded the pressure by appointing 
a commission called the Democratic Development Committee as an alternative to
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an uncontrollable reform movement. Faced with social demands outside parliament 
and conflict within the cabinet, the administration dissolved the parliament in May 
1995 when one of the coalition partners withdrew its support over a land reform 
scandal.
Later in the Chuan regime, NGOs and political groups increased their 
demands for political reform as a way of opening new channels for political 
participation, particularly after the attempt to press for political decentralization 
failed. The booming urban economy’s impact on rural resources contributed to a 
movement of local communities and NGOs to defend their causes. On the other 
hand, Bangkok-based business elites were reluctant to facilitate a distribution of 
power that would be potentially dominated by provincial politicians and local 
communities (Case, 2001). The technocrats and urban business elite feared that 
they would lose their influence of economic policy to the provincial capitalist 
politicians who had made the parliamentary system their power sphere. This 
tension between reformist groups prevented them from uniting to mobilize significant 
forces in support of a common reform agenda. The tension was temporarily 
reconciled when the administration of Banharn (1995-96) set up a political and 
administrative reform committee in an effort to make his government attractive to the 
urban middle classes and provincial based constituency at the same time 
(Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, p. 116).
The debate on the need for reform emerged in 1992-1995, during the Chuan 
administration, and became intense during Banharn’s time in office. The important 
point is that there was not just one discourse on reforms, but a variety of different 
social groups with different agendas. Earlier in 1996, the House of Representatives
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created a committee to find an approach to amend the constitution (Connors, 2003, 
p. 163). As a result, parliament amended the 1991 constitution, allowing the special 
reform mechanism called a Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) which would be 
independent from parliament, and the latter would have the power only to accept or 
reject the final draft proposed by CDA. Although there was a consensus among 
academics, the mass media, the urban middle classes, and NGOs groups about the 
reform, this amendment reflected the divisiveness among various power forces in 
modern Thai society (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 119-22). As the 
constitutional process became the focus of the reform movement, a number of 
socio-economic groups pushed for their candidates.
The CDA had provided the opportunity for a possible alliance between liberal 
and conservative. Anand Panyarachun, who was appointed the Prime Minister of 
the 1991-92 interim government, was elected President of the constitution-drafting 
committee. Equally important, the leadership of Anand reflected the influence of 
business elites and liberal-reformist groups. Other key figures within the drafting 
committee included liberal academics and specialists working on the technicalities 
of the draft. Among this group, there were representatives of conservatives and of 
lawyers interested in human rights. Anand had promoted the idea of “good 
governance” meaning honesty, accountability, transparency, and efficiency that 
incorporated management and public administration in the constitutional reform 
process. For NGO groups, the idea of good governance was interpreted to mean 
strengthening the local community, reducing the state’s power, and creating new 
forms of direct democracy (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 124-27).
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During the course of constitutional drafting, NGOs and liberal academics 
contributed many suggestions to the CDA. They provided an extensive definition of 
human and civic rights, and also of the duties of the state to enforce and uphold 
such rights. These included the issue of rights and freedoms, community rights over 
resource management and access to public information, an elected Senate, an 
independent electoral commission, an administrative and a constitutional court, 
electoral reform measures, and citizen initiative on legislation and a recall of political 
position. The NGOs and liberal groups were successful in presenting this demand 
through CDA’s members. The rhetoric of issues and debates allowed various 
reform groups to articulate the need for political reform in terms that encompassed 
the concerns of the bureaucracy, the people, and the central government. This 
unity was achieved by mixing political reform ideas, the enhancement of 
government stability and the expansion of political participation.
One of the important aims of the reform initiative was to prevent vote-buying 
and the influence of money politics through the new electoral provisions. The set of 
proposals from all parties concerned the mechanics of parliament and 
representative bodies. Okey (2003) summarized the important features of election 
reform that affect the political party system. First, multiple-member constituency 
was replaced by single-member constituencies with a centralized vote-counting 
center. Second, a change was made in the election methods to provide dual-track 
representatives, the number of MPs elected by local constituencies was maintained 
at 400, and another 100 MPs would be elected by the “Party List” system-a national 
vote on parties, with seats divided proportionate to votes among all parties which 
secured at least 5 percent of the turnout. The addition of the party list would
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increase the number of MPs who represented “national” interests while constituency 
MPs would no longer be allowed to serve as ministers. Further, ministers would 
have to resign their parliamentary seats to disrupt the long-term patronage 
relationships between ministers and constituencies. Third, MPs were required to 
hold at least a B.A. degree or equivalent.
The intention of the new electoral measures in the draft constitution was to 
separate the executive and the legislature: parties are expected to place senior, 
reputable figures on the party list so that they can readily assume ministerial posts, 
while elected local MPs will be confined to representing their districts. An appointed 
senate was replaced by an elected senate of non-partisan figures and was 
supposed to stand above partisan political interest while bringing wisdom to ponder 
legislative matters. However, the greatest contentious issue for most political 
parties was the separation of executive and legislative powers. The proposed 
changes in the electoral rules left most political parties ambivalent, while a minority 
in both houses of parliament was against the draft (Connors, 2003 pp. 169-72). The 
political parties were anxious that implementing the new system might weaken the 
power of the existing administration.
When the government of Chavalit Youngchaiyudh (1996-97) assumed power 
after the collapse of the Banharn administration, it was clear that Thai society was in 
a national crisis. Amidst the final phase of constitutional drafting process, the public, 
including business supporters and pro-democracy groups, rallied in support of the 
draft. The CDA orchestrated a campaign to push parliament to pass the 
constitution. In part, the supporting groups had hoped that passing the law could 
restore the confidence of international investors and alleviate the shortcomings in
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government management. During the eight-month period of the constitutional 
drafting process, Thailand experienced a crisis in the banking institutions, the 
devaluation of the baht in July 1997, the acceptance of the IMF recovery plan, and 
political maneuvering in the parliament. Chavalit’s economic management 
worsened the crisis and exacerbated the public’s loss of confidence (Siamwalla, 
1997). In September 1997, the parliament ratified the new constitution; ratification 
was followed by the fall of Chavalit’s administration.
The 1997 constitution provides a comprehensive system of political and 
administrative reforms that greatly increases governmental checks and balances for 
the citizens. New governance institutional arrangements such as a parliamentary 
ombudsman office, an administrative court system, an election commission, a 
decentralization procedure act, a national counter-corruption commission, a 
constitutional court system, and a public finance audit commission are mandated to 
enhance transparency and democratic society. At the same time that Thailand 
sought financial assistance from the IMF and the World Bank, it appeared that these 
institutional arrangements reflected the principles of good governance that were laid 
out by the international funding agencies (Bowornwathana, 2000). The new 
constitution provides civil society with various channels to control the government, 
and to play the role of partner in the new social arrangements (Connors, 2003, pp. 
191-95). All these changes presented a radical departure from the past Thai 
bureaucratic system which was embedded in the culture. Consequently, 
implementation was likely to prove challenging.
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Thai Governments and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
The dominant force for changes in Thailand has usually involved the 
economy and the market. The ideology of capitalism holds that the market 
approach to government will increase public sector efficiency and effectiveness. 
Introducing market-based reforms means privatizing activities that had been under 
the direct ownership and control of the pubic sector. For many scholars, public 
sector reform occurs as a result of the adaptation of the state to both domestic 
imperatives and international economy. In general, the Thai government followed 
free market economic principles. However, as Thailand encountered pressures 
from international organizations to adjust its economy to greater market 
involvement, the degree of market liberalization and public sector reform increased. 
The reality of the change has been more complicated. One should not exclude the 
context dealing with politics and administration.
In the early 1990s the Thai financial system was greatly liberalized. In 
hindsight, the appointed technocratic administration under Anand (1991-92) made 
most of the major decisions on financial reform. In the view of technocrats, the 
move toward market liberalization would not only spur the economy but also make 
Thailand a financial center for the region. The Thai government accepted the 
obligations under Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which demands the 
complete deregulation o f the current account transactions and fewer restrictions on 
capital accounts, making the trade and financial system more liberal (Trisorat, 2000, 
pp. 119-25). When elected governments were restored in late 1992, the Chuan 
administration pursued a liberalization policy by establishing the Bangkok
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International Banking Facility (BIBF) in March 1993. The BIBF sought to facilitate 
the flow of foreign money into the Thai financial market. This policy was seen 
conventionally as a necessity for Thailand’s liberalization policy (Hevison, 2003).
Although the liberalization policy was under control of the government, a set 
of prudent measures was not developed. According to Pongpaichit and Baker 
(2000a, p. 25), the private sector’s foreign debt increased approximately ten times 
from 7.8 to 73.7 billion U.S. dollars between 1988 and 1996. A large portion of this 
borrowing was invested unproductively, in property and stock market speculation. 
Much investment was poorly planned, resulting in falling rates of return.
Nonetheless, investors were attracted to Thailand because of the prospects of 
explosive growth of an emerging economy. Soon it became apparent that the Thai 
business and financial community lacked the capacity to manage its financial 
resources wisely. Essentially, a hasty adoption of financial liberalization by the 
technocrats without sufficient control measures was dangerous. As the patronage 
relationship between elite businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians has played a 
dominant role in the Thai financial system, this role was part of the emerging crisis 
in 1997. In this perspective, the crisis can be seen to have resulted from 
shortcomings with deep cultural roots in Thai society.
A series of further liberalization measures by government accompanied 
imprudent controls over the flows of foreign currencies into and out of the country. 
On one hand, the ineffective functioning of the administration was the core of the 
problem leading to the crisis. The lax and incompetent supervisory authority 
opened up the behavior that could be seen through the weakness of the disclosure 
system and the failure to oversee the macro economy. Some scholars captured this
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incompetence in their descriptions of the patronage and rent-seeking that prevented 
effective policymaking (Christensen et al., 1993, pp. 1-8). In contrast, an ensemble 
of private sector representatives, such as financial institutions and business 
associations, actively took part in the damage by their misallocation of capital and 
the mismanagement of funds. In other words, it was the weakness of the private 
sector and the government policy that simultaneously drove the growth and brought 
the economy to the crisis (Siamwalla, 1997).
Before the 1997 economic crisis struck Thailand, there were signs of 
deterioration in financial institutions. This can be seen through a series of banking 
crises and scandals since the 1980s. Essentially, banks and financial companies 
were operated mainly for profit by the business elite, who sought close connections 
with the government. The expansion of democratic elections following the 1980s 
increased opportunities for business elites to participate in the politics of business.
A transformation from technocrat-led policy to elected politician-led policy 
was an important factor that brought about greater financial liberalization. Before 
1995, the Bank of Thailand, a national central bank, was regarded as one of the 
best of Thailand’s bureaucratic agencies. However, the Bank’s failure to regulate 
the financial system and several fraud cases during the mid-1990s such as the 
collapse of The Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC) and the Finance One Company 
severely affected the reputation of the revered central agency (Trisorat, 2000, pp. 
84-90).
Although historically the Thai government has been sensitive to international 
sentiment and to the reactions of the international capital markets, the sensitivity 
increased dramatically after August 1997. In July 1997, there was strong urban
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protest against the politicians in general and the Chavalit administration in particular 
for mismanaging the onset of the crisis that resulted in the controversial devaluation 
of the Thai baht. Business leaders and the urban middle class welcomed the IMF 
since they had lost faith in the government’s ability to manage the crisis. 
Necessitated by the nation’s depleted reserve funds, the government agreed to the 
IMF’s aggressive macro economic policy and greater liberalization of state 
enterprises. Subsequently, Thailand’s economic policy makers were bound by 
certain guidelines and were subjected to advice from the IMF, World Bank, and 
other multilateral organizations on related reform agendas.
In essence, the IMF diagnosed Thailand’s problems as similar to those in 
Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America (Hewison, 2003). As with the assessment 
of the broader Asian crisis, the IMF noted that too much government intervention in 
the economy, too much corruption, and a lack of transparency were fundamental 
institutional problems. As reflected in the first three Letters of Intent signed between 
August 14, 1997 and February 24, 1998, the initial restructuring policy involved a 
severe tightening of monetary and fiscal policy. At the policy implementation level, 
this policy framework includes privatization of state enterprises, civil service reform, 
reform of the regulatory environment, improvements of corporate governance, 
foreign investment, and increased private sector participation in infrastructure 
projects (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 38-40).
The 1997 financial crisis was not only a problem of financial institutions but 
also a problem of political and administrative institutions. As a result, there was 
tremendous support for economic and political reform by sections of the 
bureaucracy itself, political parties, and the urban middle class. In an effort to
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mitigate the problem, the Chavalit government accepted the IMF financial 
recommendation to open up the banking sector to 100 percent foreign ownership. 
The crisis created a climate of intense reform pressure which pushed for passage of 
the 1997 constitution. Following the resignation of Chavalit, the cabinet was 
replaced by the Democracy party-led government. The need for reform was 
accepted by the second government of Chuan Leekpai (1992-95, 1997-2000) that 
began to implement a series of reforms including the banking system, public 
enterprises, public sector management, and the public laws required by the 1997 
constitution.
During the first phase of the IMF assistance program, the Chuan 
administration fully committed to fulfilling the conditions required to obtain loan 
assistance. The short-term objective of the IMF restructuring measures was to 
separate the distressed financial institutions from the healthy ones and to enhance 
investor confidence. However, these measures failed to create public confidence in 
the Thai banking and financial system (Trisorat, 2000, pp. 140-45). The IMF’s 
aggressive strategy began to provoke political reaction when, during the next Letter 
of Intent in 1998, the IMF proposed stringent interest rates and liquidity stipulations 
(Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 45-49). Business leaders attacked the IMF 
program for paying no attention to adverse economic impact and social 
repercussions resulting from the fast-track restructuring program.
The late 1990s crisis saw a decrease in demand and seizures in the 
domestic credit system. The bankruptcies and layoffs in businesses and industries 
led to rising social stress and growing political pressure. The social impact brought 
about an historic and unprecedented resistance to the assistance of the IMF.
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Thailand experienced a series of demonstrations against privatization and a 
nationalist campaign to protect Thai businesses (Tejapira, 2000). The government 
was under pressure from labor groups, NGOs, social activists, and opposition 
parties who accused the administration of concentrating its efforts on saving a small 
number of financial sectors while ignoring the impact on the mass of the people. In 
response to this political pressure, the Chuan government began to distance itself 
from the IMF while seeking an alternative strategy in responding to the existing 
problems.
The IMF had been warned by the World Bank and by the Japanese about its 
lack of concern about the social impacts of its strategy. In fact, in late 1998, Japan 
offered the Miyazawa Scheme for promoting social recovery in the Asian crisis 
coupled with hasty support by the U.S. on the initiative to issue bonds for funding a 
stronger stimulus program (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 59-62). Deepening 
social impact provided support for an alternative approach that matched the 
requirements to manage unemployment, provide welfare, reduce the school drop­
out rate, and stimulate small and medium-sized business enterprises. Because the 
Miyazawa plan allowed for many potential uses of the funds, the Chuan government 
accepted the assistance and quickly distributed the funds for country-wide job 
creation, local infrastructure projects, and other channels that would direct the 
money into the local economy.
The Chuan government also worked to implement the new constitution, 
creating major oversight organizations. These newly established organizations 
included the Constitutional Court, the Auditor General’s Office, and the National 
Counter Corruption Commission office. With assistance from the World Bank, the
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administration approved the Office of Civil Service Commission’s public sector 
reforms, including the development of a multiyear budget framework, the 
reorganization of functional ministries, and the public sector standards program. 
Further, the Office of Civil Service Commission initiated a number of ideas to 
improve the efficiency of the civil service, including fast-track career promotion, 
delegation of power and decentralization, and a generous incentive pay system.
Rising government problems coupled with global economic transformation 
inspired fundamental questions about the role and definition of the public sector. 
Kettl (2000, pp. 5-6) contends that at the heart of global reform movement is a 
debate about governance. The management reform movement builds on the 
overarching concepts that good governance is a necessary condition for economic 
prosperity. In fact, Thai economic stagnation in the 1990s and its association with 
lack of bureaucratic responsiveness, the erosion of trust in the successive 
governments, and the climate created by the local reform movement had forced 
Thai technocratic elites to seriously think about their model of governance and the 
functions of the public sector. All these elements combined to create a push to 
forge new structural connections between the Thai government and Thai society.
In many countries, the result of the governance debate was pressure to 
adopt a New Public Management (Frederickson & Smith, 2003; Kettl, 2000;
McCourt & Minogue, 2001; McLaughlin, Osborne & Ferlie, 2002). Although there is 
an extensive scholarly critique of the New Public Management, Frederickson (1997) 
argues that it is a safe generalization that NPM’s principles have influenced 
contemporary public sector reform.
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The NPM discourse also influenced Thai reforms, especially as public 
officials sought to figure out new ways of relating society and government and 
keeping public officials accountable to the public. For example, the reform-minded 
bureaucrats visited New Zealand, Australia, and England to examine their 
experience as exemplars of New Public Management reforms. The concept of a 
performance agreement (a written contract) between the ministers and the chief 
executives in public agencies emerged in the Thai public sector reform model. 
Another key piece of legislation was the 1999 State-Owned Enterprise Reform Act, 
which aimed at more effectiveness in the privatization program. In line with the 
macro-economic prescriptions being advocated by the World Bank and the IMF, a 
new State Enterprise Committee was created to facilitate and review all privatization 
proposals before forwarding them on to the cabinet for approval.
However, the business elites and the majority of the public who supported 
the Chuan administration in the early days of his term withdrew their support when 
the reform of financial institutions brought more harm to the domestic economy.
The Chuan government’s crisis management was blamed for not sufficiently 
protecting domestic businesses and financial services. During the late 1990s, the 
public had turned against the IMF and against the Chuan administration’s 
agreement on the IMF’s mandate especially the bankruptcy bill and privatization of 
public enterprises (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2000a, pp. 167-69). In the parliament, the 
opposition’s no-confidence debate advertised the government’s management failure 
to a wider public. On the street, the state enterprise workers and others organized 
groups and held anti-government rallies. The Chuan administration failure on 
financial reform brought about an adverse political outcome in the January 2001
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general election when the incumbent Democrat Party ran against the newly formed 
Thai Rak Thai Party.
The Thai Rak Thai Party and the Arrival of Thaksin Premiership
Thailand’s electoral reform, which was adopted in the 1997 constitutional 
charter, had far-reaching implications for Thai political transformation (Ockey, 2003). 
In part, the electoral system introduced the new rules for the election of the House 
of Representatives and the Senate, where the latter formerly had been an appointed 
body. One important and unprecedented aspect of the electoral system is the 
application of the proportional rule for the election of the party-list members of the 
House of Representatives. The party-list members are believed to be good and 
capable candidates representing all constituencies. Hence, the Prime Minister and 
the cabinet are supposed to come from the party-list members, rather than the 
regular candidates that are based on single-member constituencies. The electoral 
reform was also aimed at reducing high party fragmentation in the House of 
Representatives that the Thai parliament had experienced in the past.
The January 2001 general election was the first election under the reformed 
1997 constitution. Essentially, the election presented the contest between the 
incumbent Democracy Party and the new Thai Rak Thai Party which emerged soon 
after the collapse of Chavalit's government in November 1997. The Democracy 
Party was established in 1946 during the earlier period of power struggle among 
groups of competing military elites (Riggs, 1966, pp. 64-69). The Party can be seen 
as a complex organization with a substantial historical development. Its relatively
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high degree of internal democratic participation allows capable individuals to rise 
through the party’s hierarchical structure. This was evident when Chuan Leekpai, 
who had been advancing his political career without family business support, rose to 
be the party’s leader. The Democracy Party succeeded in consolidating its 
provincial base in the South, in additional to its original Bangkok support.
Unlike the Democracy Party, the Thai Rak Thai Party was originally tied to a 
telecommunication tycoon politician, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was involved in the 
cabinet since the mid 1990s (in both Banharn’s and Chavalit’s administrations). 
When Chavalit resigned as the Prime Minister following the July currency crisis that 
precipitated the Asian financial crash and the constitutional promulgation in late 
1997, Thaksin started to form his own party (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, pp. 62-65). 
Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party attempted to capture the reaction to Chuan’s 
Democracy Party that was perceived as supporting globalization at the expense of 
domestic social stress and economic hardship. The Thai Rak Thai Party sought to 
define itself through the images of successful entrepreneurs who wanted to revive 
the economic situation and to improve the situation of the rural poor. Hence, a set 
of mixed political campaign themes were aimed at the urban middle-class voters 
and the rural voters (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, p.19).
In the 2001 election, The Thai Rak Thai party sought to win rural voters, 
especially in the Northeast, by proposing an “economic platform” including a million 
baht revolving fund for countrywide rural villages, a debt suspension program for 
farmers, and a public health-care scheme based on treating basic ailments for a 30 
baht-per-visit charge (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2002). The campaign was different from 
Chuan’s Democracy party’s policy platform and it made Thai Rak Thai attractive to a
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large majority of rural and poor voters. The electorate's strong disaffection with 
Chuan's pro-International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic policies and the promises 
of Thai Rak Thai Party were instrumental to Thaksin's victory. Table 6 reports the 
dominant party in Thai parliament between 1979 and 2001).
Table 6
Majority Party in Thai Parliament between 1979 and 2001
Parliament Largest Party No. of Seats Total Seats
1979 Kitsangkhom Party 83 301
1983 Kitsangkhom Party 92 324
1986 Democratic Party 100 374
1988 Chat Thai Party 87 357
1992a Samakkhitham Party 79 360
1992b Democratic Party 79 360
1995 Chat Thai Party 92 373
1996 New Aspiration Party 125 393
2001 Thai Rak Thai Party 248 500
Source: Adapted from Pongpaichit, P. & Baker, C. (1995). Thailand Economy and Politics. 
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, p. 343.
Following the 2001 election, the Thai Rak Thai entered the parliament with 
nearly half of the seats to become the parliamentary majority (248 seats including 
party-list candidates). The new election provision effectively eliminated small 
parties since they did not meet the rule of five percent popular vote from all 
constituencies, which is required to be eligible for a parliamentary seat. In addition, 
the coalition with the Chat Thai and Chart Pattana Parties consolidated Thai Rak 
Thai’s control of the parliament. The only opposition was the Democracy party, the
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second largest party, that won 128 seats. Of the 500 possible MP votes, Thaksin 
received 339, making him the Premier. Thaksin’s government, with nationalist 
rhetoric and populist policy, gained significant support from major conglomerates, 
many supporters of earlier reform movements, and provincial people (Conners, 
2003, p. 172-74).
In fact, when Prime Minister Thaksin was accused of failing to properly 
declare his assets at the time of the previous administration by the National Counter 
Corruption Commission (NCCC), the court’s decision presented a controversial 8-7 
verdict that freed Thaksin from guilt (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, pp. 1-7). Since 
Thaksin was perceived by many influential leaders to be able to manage the country 
in a time of trouble, the court’s announcement seemed to side with the majority of 
public sentiment that saw the need for a strong and charismatic leader like Thaksin. 
McCargo and Pathmanand (2005, p. 16) argue that the court’s decision to ignore 
Thaksin’s charge indicated an alarming failure of the 1990s reform movement and 
the charter of 1997 that sought to strengthen oversight institutions and advance 
democratic reform. This interpretation suggests that the new political class had 
failed to embrace the system of checks and balances in the 1997 constitution.
Thai Rak Thai’s addition to the Thai political dynamic has to be seen in the 
context of the long heritage of Thai politics and the rhetoric of policy-based political 
parties. On the one hand, it is tempting to see Thai Rak Thai as a genuinely 
reformist political party through its substantive policy platform and its relatively 
coherent organization uniting various factions. The executive character of Thaksin 
and his billionaire telecommunication business, Shin Corporation, reinforced the 
perception that he was seeking to offer a way out of the country’s crisis, to help the
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bankrupted businesses, and to improve the life of the rural poor. On the other hand, 
McCargo and Pathmanand (2005, pp. 10-11) argue that the Thai Rak Thai’s 
cabinet with Thaksin as the Prime Minister was not different from former Thai 
cabinets composed of provincial business politicians and urban-entrepreneurs. Like 
other businessmen turned politicians, members of Thai Rak Thai approach politics, 
these authors argue, as a way to further their business interests through a partisan 
association while bypassing formerly dominant bureaucracy. Similarly, Pongpaichit 
and Baker (2004, pp. 75-80) contend that Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai stood for a 
force of wealthy entrepreneurs and groups of reformers who were willing to follow 
the “vision” of a successful business leader.
The arrival of the Thaksin administration indicates the change from 
dominance of the technocrats and military in the past decades to the democratically 
elected business elites centering on the Prime Minister’s Office and the cabinet.
How reformist that change really is and what agenda this new set of elites supports 
is still a matter of debate and subject for scholarship.
Conclusion
During the 1990s, continuing socio-economic transformation has rendered 
Thai government institutions more complex. The period saw rapid economic growth 
with increasing liberalization policies. The thrust toward financial globalization 
created new marketing opportunities, but it also widened the gap between reality 
and expectation among the technocrats, new business class, and various social 
groups. Consequently, each succeeding administration initiated some institutional
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and administrative reforms, but the government clearly lost control over economic 
governance and lacked the ability to direct political and administrative improvement. 
The international organizations’ technical assistance provided Thai government 
elites with guidance toward liberalization, but the implementation process did not 
easily yield a satisfactory result. Importantly, the good governance measures and 
the reduction of public sector spending became recurring themes.
The advent of the 1997 economic crisis partially reflected the mismatch 
between social transformation and institutional advancement. The past experience 
of high economic growth of the 1980s saw the political role of civil society begin to 
change. The slowing of economic growth in 1996 and the economic collapse in 
1997 sparked a wave of demands for political and administrative reform. The 
solution to the fiscal crisis has resulted in unintended consequences, policy reforms 
that created a new round of problems. New interest groups have emerged since the 
1990s, including social activists, provincial business associations, and farmers’ 
groups, and have become increasingly active and a source of social capital for the 
democratic process (Unger, 1998). The civic movement provided support for the 
1997 constitutional charter.
With the new opportunity for the state transformation following the aftermath 
of the financial crisis, the Thai government moved quickly to reorganize public 
sector operations, political institutions, and political processes. The changes were 
implemented in the late 1990s. The period following the revision of the constitution 
the financial crisis caused harsh criticism against the strategies proposed by the IMF 
and the policy implementation of Thai government. The impact of the economic 
crisis and the policies to address it, along with the new constitutional framework,
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paved the way for the rise of public sector reform. The Thai Rak Thai party and 
Thaksin were seen to be capable of solving the unanticipated consequences of prior 
policies. The Thai Rak Thai’s political platform for social policy and economic 
revival came to dominate Thai public discussion through a new style of political 
campaign that emphasized a mix of economic nationalism, populist policy, and 
public sector improvement, while supporting financial liberalization.
The Thai Rak Thai Party’s landslide victory in the 2001 general election was 
possible because of the alliance with new provincial elites, the support of major 
conglomerate businesses, and the Thai Rak Thai’s rhetorical campaign that pledged 
to mitigate the impact of prior economic liberalization policies and pressures from 
international capital. The name Thai Rak Thai (Thais love Thais) reflected the tone 
of old-fashioned nationalism that rejected the post-crisis policy direction under the 
Democracy Party. With the new election provisions, the result of the election 
effectively reduced the instability of government that had occurred in the past, 
resulting from shaky multi-party coalitions that consisted of weak and fragmented 
parties resulting in policy contention. Thus, the reform made possible an 
unprecedented single-party government and political stability in the history of the 
democratically elected parliament of Thailand. Prime Minister Thaksin and the Thai 
Rak Thai Party have become a new force of domestic capital that captured the 
center of political power. Equally important, the relationship between the Thai 
politicians and public servants became more focused on the consequences of 
structural reform, and on the interactions between elected officials and civil servants 
in the administrative reform process.
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CHAPTER 5
THE INTEGRATED PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
Introduction
Historically, Thailand has long been characterized by competing tendencies 
towards democracy and authoritarianism. Such tendencies were evident between 
the post-1932 period and the military coup of 1991. The authoritarian period saw 
political and administrative development which was dominated by bureaucratic elites 
and especially army officers. The success of democratic forces culminated in the 
promulgation of the 1997 reformed constitution which opened up political 
participation while seeking to restructure the Thai administrative system to respond 
to and keep pace with socioeconomic change.
Equally important, economic globalization has presented a series of 
challenges to the Thai government to adapt its institutions, public policy, and 
government operation to new situations. On the one hand, a series of reforms was 
introduced to respond to the cycle of economic and financial crises, especially in the 
1980s and the late 1990s. On the other hand, the idea of public sector development 
has shifted away from the traditional practice to unexplored areas.
The new political situation following the 1997 financial crisis presented the 
rationale for administrative reorganization and reforms of governance that were
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unlikely in the past decades. This change allowed the Thai state to examine and 
adopt to a substantial degree the public sector reforms which have been available in 
the international community (Bowornwathana, 2004). As a result of Thailand’s 
involvement with the foreign countries and awareness of global developments, its 
reforms have been a hybrid of traditional public administration and new public 
management (McLaughlin, Osborne & Ferlie, 2002).
With a regional economic crisis and political challenge in the 1990s, NPM- 
related ideas about administrative reform were reflected in the clauses of the 1997 
constitution’s mandates such as the downsizing of central government ministries, 
the creation of new autonomous public organizations, the empowerment of people’s 
participation, and the promotion of local government authorities. The 
implementation and consequences of Thaksin’s administrative reform were 
controversial and stirred intense debates.
The significance of Thaksin’s administrative reform was that the ongoing 
decentralization plan for regional and local government authorities was shifted 
toward the reorganization of central ministries with heavy focus on a wide range of 
management arrangements. The administrative reform encompassed sub-national 
governments across provincial administrations that share jurisdictional territories 
with numerous local authorities. This reform was introduced under the title 
“Integrated Provincial Administrative System” (IPAS), generally known as “CEO- 
governors.” The Thai Rak Thai’s overwhelming election victory in 2001 facilitated 
the process of administrative reform that claimed to de-concentrate central power to 
provincial administrations and the appointed governors. The IPAS’s devolution of
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power to sub-national governments and various management changes deserves 
closer scrutiny.
There have been significant changes in administrative process since Thaksin 
assumed power. This chapter begins with the analysis of Thaksin's political 
grouping, government policy shift, and administrative reorganization which is 
important to the understanding of the political dynamics of the government 
administrative reform. Having described the government effort to reform the public 
sector, the next section examines key aspects of management strategies 
implemented in the provincial administrations and the sub-region governments.
This section investigates the rhetoric and nature of IPAS reforms that occurred in 
provincial administration. This section is then followed by an analysis of the IPAS’s 
impacts on the existing local government decentralization program and some 
lessons learned about Thaksin’s IPAS reform.
The Politics of Thaksin’s Administrative Reorganization
The efforts to reform the Thai administrative system during the Thaksin 
aministration were a paradoxical mixture of old politics and new management 
initiatives. Following the 2001 election, the Thai Rak Thai party led by Thaksin won 
nearly half of the seats of parliament. Before the election, the Thai Rak Thai party 
tried to improve its chances by admitting politicians from other competing parties 
into Thai Rak Thai. Since the Chavalit government and his New Aspiration Party 
collapsed in the 1997 crisis, factions from that party shifted to the Thai Rak Thai. 
Changing parties and recruiting potential candidates from other parties was an old
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electoral strategy in Thailand. With the party’s policy platforms and popular 
promises following the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, the Thai Rak Thai attracted new 
and old politicians to become members of the party. Pongpaichit and Baker (2004, 
pp. 82-3) estimated that around 100 sitting members from other parties ran in the 
2001 election under the Thai Rak Thai ticket. In early 2002, Chavalit’s New 
Aspiration Party merged with the Thai Rak Thai. As a result, Thaksin’s government 
gained an unprecedented parliamentary power which the past civilian governments 
had never experienced.
Arguably, the Thai Rak Thai’s new “populist policies" presented some 
departure from the traditional Thai party’s policy orientation. Thailand’s policy 
formation and implementation have long been associated with technocrats where 
bureaucracies were principal instruments. In retrospect, public policy initiatives 
were fragmented in nature and they were typically made by individual public 
organizations, especially before the 1997 financial crisis. After the 1997 crisis, the 
reformed constitution changed the electoral and party system in a way that 
encouraged a large and well-funded party. Old-style party politics in which internal 
factions competed for pork-barrel policy and minister positions were superseded by 
tight party control. The extent of Thai Rak Thai’s electoral success in 2001, by 
constructing a policy platform that appealed to various social groups and business 
elites, and the change of electoral system allowed the party to be more proactive 
about government policies (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, pp. 97-98).
Thai Rak Thai’s core policies addressed the problems of farmers and the 
urban poor while the image of Thaksin Shinawatra, the party’s leader, as a 
successful businessman, drew urban middle class and bureaucrats’ interest. In a
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sense, Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai are creations of the 1997 crisis. Hence, the 
group of Thai Rak Thai entered parliament with an initial goal to revive the Thai 
economy. The Thaksin administration pursued this ambition in three main 
directions: stimulating economic growth, reducing social problems, and shaping a 
new administrative style. Recognizing that the Thai economy had to survive the 
severe crisis and progress to a connected international economy, the Thaksin 
administration employed various populist policies to maintain political support and 
revived the small and medium entrepreneurs through domestic economic stimulus 
programs such as creating an SME bank (Small and Medium Enterprises), a 
“People’s Bank” which provided micro-credit loans for the poor, and an “OTOP: One 
Village, One Product” which supported villages’ job creation activities (McCargo & 
Pathmanand, 2005, pp. 89-93).
Apart from the government’s populist policies, Thaksin declared that his 
government sought to win three wars: the war on poverty, the war on drugs, and the 
war on corruption (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, p. 91). Thaksin’s policy 
initiatives were undoubtedly beneficial to the majority of Thai people. Government 
run by one dominant party can be more effective than a weak coalition cabinet as 
had typified previous administrations.
There were some serious problems with the Thai Rak Thai’s policies. One 
was that the administration sought to enlist political support through unreformed tax 
policy to support the interests of business elites and middle-class groups. A second 
problem was due to the underfunded 30-baht healthcare charge program. A third 
implementation problem arose due to poor management control of the one million
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baht village and development fund. Even the handling of the drug traffickers proved 
controversial.
Painter (2004, pp. 376-81) argues that in order to achieve these rather 
dramatic policy initiatives, the administration politicized government policies in a way 
that enhanced the power of political executives. Political power was concentrated in 
the circle of Prime Minister Thaksin (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, pp. 108). This 
circle includes business people, experienced politicians, police officers, military 
men, high-ranking civil servants, academics, and social activists. It soon became 
apparent that the administration substantively controlled normal government 
procedures. For instance, McCargo and Pathmanand (2005, pp. 223-32) analyzed 
the September 2003 police promotion list and reported the number of officers who 
used to be Thaksin’s classmates from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory 
School Class 10 and the Police Cadet Academy Class 26. In part, the politicizing of 
police activity was used as an instrument to pursue the anti-drug policy and to 
suppress so-called provincial “dark influences.”
In fact, the government’s policies improved the popularity of Thaksin while 
undermining the political base of opposing groups both inside and outside the Thai 
Rak Thai party. Not only did the government’s populist policies like the war on 
drugs rely on an inner circle of senior police officers who worked on an operational 
level, but they also implicitly served as a way of weakening provincial power brokers 
who engaged in local politics and illegal businesses. Thaksin’s ambitious war on 
drugs forced narcotics suppression officers, police, and provincial governors to 
compete to achieve the prosecution goals embedded in Thaksin’s policies, resulting 
in controversial extra-judicial murder cases in which both the drug dealers and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
manufacturers were killed without trials (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, p. 189). In 
other cases, this type of concentration of power enabled the administration to initiate 
a wide variety of reform initiatives while simultaneously politicizing civil officials to 
respond to government policies.
To a certain extent, high civil servants were both confronted by Thaksin’s 
new policies and subjected to strong pressure for organizational change. New 
proposals for ministerial arrangements were linked to the government’s social and 
economic policies since this organizational apparatus was a central part of the 
Thaksin’s policy implementation and necessary for the success of those policies.
Before the political party reforms, rural infrastructure improvements and 
government services such as roads, schools, and irrigation projects could be 
initiated by individual elected politicians within their constituencies. This pattern of 
pork-barrel has changed under the government of Thai Rak Thai when the cabinet 
became the legitimate source of decisions that channeled government budget 
through its populist policies. This shift of political patronage forced local civil officials 
and provincial politicians to cooperate with Thaksin’s cabinet and the government’s 
policy directions.
The administrative arrangements under Thaksin were also important. 
Generally, the continued improvement of the public sector required that both political 
executives and bureaucrats work together through the process of negotiation and 
bargaining. Following a long discussion with the Civil Service Commission and 
involving central agencies, the Thaksin administration finalized a comprehensive 
change of the bureaucratic structure in October 2002, through two royal decrees: 1) 
the Government Administration Act of 2002, which sought to define the aim of the
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Thai state in relation to the effectiveness and efficiency of administrative authorities, 
and 2) the Administrative Organization Act of 2002 that defined the structures and 
functions of government organizations. These new laws were the charters for a new 
ministerial structure of government, the creation of new reform agencies, and the 
revision of administrative procedures (Bowornwathana, 2005).
Since the ministerial reorganization scheme was central to the government’s 
policy implementation, the Thaksin administration mobilized Thai Rak Thai’s PMs to 
pass the bureaucratic reform bills, which marked a more dramatic reform than other 
administrations in past decades. As a result, the Government Administration Act of 
2002 expanded the administrative power of the Office of the Prime Minster and also 
created the Office of Public Sector Development (OPDC) as a reform clearing house 
while the Administrative Organization Act of 2002 made a new structure of 
government functions, ministries, departments, and offices. The latter provision 
created seven new central ministries, increasing the number from 15 to 20, while the 
departments under all ministries expanded from 126 to 143 (Painter, 2005, p. 13). 
One of the new ministries, the Ministry of Information and Communications 
Technology, was created to regulate rising digital infrastructure and telephone 
services while it seemed to benefit a mobile phone and satellite company 
associated with Thaksin's family (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, pp. 58-63). Table 
7 shows the revision of the administrative structure of Thaksin’s administration.
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Table 7
Ministry Reorganization under the Thaksin Administration
Old Ministries New Ministries
1. Office of the Prime Minister 1. Office of Prime Minister
2. Ministry of Defense 2. Ministry of Defense
3. Ministry of Finance 3. Ministry of Finance
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
5. Ministry of Agriculture and cooperatives 5. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
6. Ministry of Transport 6. Ministry of Transport
7. Ministry of Commerce 7. Ministry of Commerce
8. Ministry of Interior 8. Ministry of Interior
9. Ministry of Justice 9. Ministry of Justice
10. Ministry of Education 10. Ministry of Education
11. Ministry of Public Health 11. Ministry of Public Health
12. Ministry of Industry 12. Ministry of Industry
13. Ministry of Science, Technology and 13. Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment Environment (new)
14. Ministry of University Affairs 14. Ministry of Science and Technology
15. Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare 15. Ministry of Labor
16. Ministry of Culture (new)
17. Ministry of Energy (new)
18. Ministry of Tourism and Sports (New)
19. Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology (New)
20. Ministry of Social Development and 
Human Security (New)
Since 1997, the Office of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) had been 
assigned as the secretariat of the Administrative Reform Commission (ARC) of 
several administrations. Similarly, CSC played a significant role in proposing reform 
blueprints for the ministry reorganization during the early Thaksin administration.
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Recurring suggestions given by CSC were to remove some of the duplicated 
functions that caused coordination problems and increasing operating costs. 
However, no former administrations could make as comprehensive a restructuring 
project as Thaksin’s government. The scheme of ministry restructuring went 
through a lengthy discussion in parliamentary committees and central agencies. 
Different proposals were explained to seek a clear hierarchy of coordination and 
control and a more logical grouping of functions and activities.
Both the political executives and senior bureaucrats were equally interested 
in the outcome of ministry restructuring. The lengthy proposals and negotiations 
before the final decision reflected less technical issues than politics in the process of 
administrative reorganization (Painter, 2005). Further blurring the distinction 
between technical and political concerns and issues, the secretary of the Civil 
Service Commission, who was actively involved in the design of the reform, was 
appointed by Thaksin as a permanent secretary of one of the new ministries.
Following the passage of administrative restructuring law, the number of 
government functions and public agencies increased while the total number of civil 
officials in the bureaucracy was not allowed to expand. Because there were more 
government functions to perform, the reorganization of bureaucratic structure within 
senior positions substantially provided Thaksin with discretionary appointment 
power (Bowornwathana, 2005). In effect, the process of creating and reorganizing 
departments disrupted the dominant power of the incumbent technocrats. The 
rigidity and inertia of departmental operations were now relaxed by new 
opportunities for senior and middle civil officials to be promoted and transferred to 
opening positions. The increased number of ministry functions offered more
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discretion to Thaksin for the political appointments and selection of civil service 
working in the expanded government. Not only did the reorganization strengthen 
the prime minister’s power, but the effort reflected the politicization of the senior 
officials in line with Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai’s policy preference.
Apart from the establishment of new ministries, the Thaksin government 
started the comprehensive process of reforming the bureaucratic system in March 
2003 as part of the existing Strategic Plan for the Thai Public Sector Development 
scheme. As a new reform agency, the Office of Public Sector Development 
(OPDC), which acts as advocate of administrative reform to initiate and follow up on 
the revised structures and the processes of the overall administrative organization, 
has become a significant agency in the government’s reform process. Like other 
principal central agencies such as the Office of the Civil Service Commission 
(OCSC), the National Economic Development Board (NESDB), and the Bureau of 
Budget (BoB), the OPDC is under direct supervision of the Prime Minister’s Office 
headed by Thaksin. The arrival of OPDC forced the OCSC to confine its former 
dominant role on public sector reform initiatives to civil service planning and 
personnel development.
Setting up the new ministries and departments including the OPDC 
significantly revived groups of individual bureaucrats who sought to be promoted 
and were eager to respond to the government’s policies. Unlike fragmented reforms 
during the short-term administrations of Banharn Silpa-Archa, Chavalit Yongjaiyudh 
and Chuan Leekpai during the period of the 1997 financial crisis, the new reform 
agenda expanded and flourished under the leadership of Thaksin. In addition, the 
administration adopted the “good governance” reform promoted by the World Bank
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by promulgating the 2003 Good Governance Act as part of the reform mandate in 
the bureaucratic development process (Painter, 2005, p. 9). In fact, the law is broad 
enough to comprise public management measures such as transparency, 
accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and participation while, at the same time, it 
is vague enough to allow discretion and flexibility in interpretation as to what issues 
are included and how good governance should be evaluated.
The idea of “good governance” in the 2003 Good Governance bill reflected a 
set of guiding principles of the World Bank. The World Bank was concerned that the 
Thai government revised administrative processes in the handling of development 
assistance and urged policy instruments that would foster preferred patterns of 
interaction between the two parties. Essential to the idea was to promote state- 
market relations and administrative structures that would ensure accountability, due 
processes of law, and related safeguards (Grindle, 2004, pp. 525-48). The passage 
of the 2003 Good Governance Act was seen to close the credibility gap from the 
perspectives of the international organizations and domestic supporters as it 
referred to the attempts at political improvement, while at the same time addressing 
the revision of managerial dimensions of the Thai public sector. More important, the 
bill gave more discretionary power to the Thaksin administration and the OPDC to 
direct the approach and scope of public sector reform.
Prior to the Thaksin administration, there were individual public sector reform 
innovations during successive governments. In part, these attempts can be seen 
through the 1997 Public Sector Reform Master Plan of the Chavalit administration 
and the 1999 Public Sector Management Reform Plan of the Chuan administration. 
Although Thaksin’s government supplanted these reform provisions with the
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Strategic Plan for the Thai Public Sector Development revised by the OPDC, 
principles and outlines remained mostly the same but the reform effort was 
intensified. The bureaucratic experiences of administrative changes during the 
1990s helped the reformers under the Thaksin government in initiating a variety of 
ideas and tactics that were found in private management, particularly in the western 
experience. The similarities can be seen in the effort to increase productivity and to 
make public organizations more efficient through the use of private-sector 
performance management and motivation techniques (Bowornwathana, 2004; 
Painter, 2005). This approach to public sector reform is often referred to as new 
public management (NPM) (Common, 1998).
The connection between the NPM approach to public sector reform and an 
efficient public organization that facilitates a thriving business and industrial sector in 
Thailand was embedded in the 1997 reform constitution following the 1997 
economic crisis. The impact of the fiscal crisis raised the possibility of 
comprehensive reform initiatives while pressuring the reforming process to seek 
alternative approaches of management improvement.
As the Thaksin government committed to its ambitious policy goals, many 
possible initiatives and management changes came together within the political 
environment. One result was that NPM reform strategies were advocated without a 
coherent intellectual underpinning (Painter, 2005, p. 18). In other words, senior 
technocrats and the OPDC officers saw the advantage of NPM approaches as a 
means of public sector improvement, but the administration at that time was seeking 
different goals, including consolidating its administrative power through the
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bureaucratic reforms. This phenomenon was evident especially in the increase of 
bureaucratic politicization under the leadership of Thaksin.
IPAS’s Management Strategies and their impacts
The Integrated Provincial Administrative System (IPAS) and its strategies 
have not proceeded independent of the environment. Major events such as the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, the change in the constitution, and the local context 
where political competition was inherently contentious, paved the way for IPAS as 
the new provincial administrative system. The initiative was intended to grant more 
power to provincial administration as well as to effectively implement various 
governmental policies through regional public agencies. In the political context, 
IPAS strategies can also be seen as a path to secure a chance for future election. 
As Thaksin’s major economic policy deals with popular social policy and domestic 
spending, one can see the relationship between the reform of the regional 
administrative arm and the government agenda.
There was a sign of the regional reform mandate when Thaksin appointed a 
committee to conduct a comparative cases pilot project attempting to test the new 
provincial reform early in his first term. The reason for the study was to explore 
potential impacts and convince officials of its feasibility and usefulness. The pilot 
study was never completed although there were some positive results in reducing 
social problems such as drug selling. The sub-committee for regional reform was 
hesitant to draw definite conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the reformed 
provincial system. Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the evaluation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
158
research, the Thaksin government mandated the integrated administrative provincial 
system in October 2003 following the announcement of the Strategic Plan for Thai 
Public Sector Development in March 2003.
As part of the public sector development plan, IPAS was put under the 
charge of a new Public Sector Development Commission (PDC), with the secretarial 
support of the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC). The 
OPDC is responsible for public sector development including training programs, 
advising, monitoring, and evaluating reformed organizations. It operates under the 
supervision of the Prime Minister’s Office and directly reports to the Prime Minister. 
This reporting structure suggested that the involved public organizations would be 
required to give quick consideration to the OPDC’s requests and recommendations 
for reform of government-wide administrative rules and related laws issued by the 
Prime Minister’s Office. The OPDC proved useful for Thaksin’s administration as a 
method of integrating individual reforms among different public organizations into a 
more comprehensive reform.
The attempt to lay out a new provincial administrative system gained 
majority support, as it was generally agreed by most reformers that the territorial 
administrative system needed to be reorganized (Mektrairat, 2004). The CEO- 
Governor scheme was widely touted across Thailand as a means to achieve 
increased accountability, to manage provincial territories affectively, and to help 
advance the government’s objectives in the provinces. As part of the government’s 
propagation program, Thaksin talked regularly about CEO ideas, government 
reform, and other changes in management methods in his weekly radio broadcast 
as well as in many government seminars. In a symbolic act, the government hired
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Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter for management advice but 
ignored his report that addressed the importance of economic decentralization to the 
provinces (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005, p. 175).
With the assistance of the OPDC, the government also held an intensive 
training course for permanent secretaries, provincial governors, and department 
heads as part of the overall bureaucratic reform scheme. The governors and senior 
bureaucrats were required to attend the course given by international management 
scholars as well as by Thaksin himself, his Deputy Prime Ministers, and the Minister 
of Finance. Much of the discussion and the presentations in that training and those 
seminars suggested that the governors should operate the provincial administration 
like a business. Thaksin advocated the “CEO-Governor" as a symbol of the IPAS 
reform and regarded it as an exemplar of his management style drawn from his 
successful business conglomerate. He saw himself as the super CEO of the 
country who, like any company's CEO, should have the freedom to manage his 
company.
Thaksin's idea of CEO-governor included the theme that provincial 
governors should assume the role of “prime minister’s assistants” and would acquire 
more power over personnel and financial management in their jurisdictions 
(Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, pp. 102-03). In conjunction with the ministry 
reorganization, the CEO-governor scheme increased the power of provincial 
administration that had previously been limited. Under Thaksin’s directives and the 
guidance of the newly established OPDC, the government instructed the Interior 
Ministry, the Office of the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of Budget, and the 
National Economic and Social Development Board to ensure that necessary rules
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were adopted for the new governors and the Integrated Provincial Administrative 
System. At the same time, the IPAS implementation provided the opportunities for 
the Thaksin government to capture resources tied up in the reform process and 
other reorganization measures. These resources included the exclusive budget for 
governors to combat drug and to support the populist policies.
The IPAS model was the cornerstone of Thailand’s regional reform effort. 
Typically, in the past, Thai provincial administration consisted of different 
government organizations, the sub-government level of ministerial agencies. These 
ministerial agencies and departments largely operated independently from one 
another and they were accountable to their respective line of command in different 
ministries. The central ministries were separated horizontally into both political and 
administrative aspects. On the one hand, factions in the parliamentary cabinet 
contested for ministerial offices to maintain potential political support and patronage 
through public spending. On the other hand, each department had legal authority to 
carry out public programs and services which, in part, led to functional duplication 
and bureaucratic expansion (Chandarasorn, 1985, pp. 331-37). This was the 
traditionally decentralized system of the Thai state in which territorial administrative 
agencies represented central government policies and were subordinate to central 
ministries in Bangkok. Because of this structural problem, the desire for 
comprehensive government reform included revamping the national/provincial 
relationship as well as improving the details of management.
The experiences of public sector reform under the Thaksin administration 
reflected both political climate and management preferences. On the one hand, the 
reform was largely comprehensive, with a very rapid implementation of the ideas of
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Thai Rak Thai’s social and economic policies. The most remarkable change was 
management practices that the Prime Minister’s Office issued requiring that the 
IPAS across all provincial administration be accompanied by strategic plans, 
performance measures, and public service agreements. On the other hand, 
government political agendas that were clearly aimed at the rural vote would need 
effective bureaucratic mechanisms. The OPDC embraced strategic planning as a 
top-down management reform tactic which started in the FY 2003 budget process. 
This framework requires sub-government agencies to develop regional and 
provincial strategic plans with frameworks for evaluation by the government.
The officials of the new OPDC were an important source of management 
ideas and they directly supervised provincial administration in the process of IPAS 
implementation. Since Thaksin was ambitious to overcome existing bureaucratic 
problems, he made the OPDC serve as an inter-ministerial think tank on structural 
changes of administrative modernization. As suggested by its responsibility, the 
core belief of OPDC was that the Thai public sector could be reshaped by large- 
scale reform in a continuing process. In fact, to a large extent the reform elements 
and management tactics suggested by the OPDC reflected the influential model of 
“New Public Management" (NPM). As the government attempted to achieve more 
efficient and accountable provincial administration through non-traditional methods 
of public management, significant components of the NPM that echo in the IPAS 
such as a separation of strategic policy from operational management, a pursuit of 
accountability through quantifiable performance measures, and an emphasis on 
competition especially through internal markets and contracting public services to
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the private sector, were increasingly clear. Table 8 illustrates major elements of the 
IPAS.
Table 8
Elements of Integrated Provincial Administrative System
Management Tactics Characteristics
Strategic Plans Integrated territorial and functional plan is 
required for every provincial 
administration. New appointed body of 
“Integrated Provincial Administrative 
Committee (CEO committee)” is 
mandated to facilitate strategic planning 
and management process.
Performance Measurements Heavy use of quantifiable output 
measurements. All provincial 
administration as well as ministry agents 
need to develop data collection related to 
their respective responsibilities, services 
outputs, and outcomes. As an evaluator 
body, The Office of Public Sector 
Development collaborates with provincial 
administration to develop necessarily 
data.
Performance Related Pay Flexible money incentive is introduced as 
opposed to the traditional standardized 
civil service pay scale. This new reward 
system is granted to successful provincial 
administration that meets the agreed 
service outputs and program outcomes.
Management Contracts All governors and the Prime Minister’s 
Office have to agree on “Public Service 
Agreements” (PSA), which are the 
executive summary of the provincial 
strategic plans including performance 
targets that each provincial administration 
seeks to reach. The agreements become 
the base of accountability.
(continued on the following page)




Service Delivery Units Departments in different ministries are 
encouraged to improve the efficiency of 
some special operations related to their 
responsibilities. Departments collaborate 
to streamline work processes for a special 
service delivery. This plan is to expedite 
service delivery in a form of “one stop 
service”.
Devolution of Administrative Power The governors and the representatives of 
ministry agents in provincial 
administration are given more control over 
personnel matters. The governors are 
expected to exercise as much power as 
the “CEO” in private organizations.
Developing and implementing provincial strategic planning for quality 
improvements, better performance planning and outcome-based budgeting requires 
change in organizational culture in sub-regional governments. The OPDC knew that 
it would be difficult to change this culture rapidly. Both the OPDC and IPAS 
supervising committee understood that the first year's plans by agencies would be 
only a start in the process and that refinement would start occurring in the second 
year. Provincial administrations differed in their approaches to preparing strategic 
plans. In many cases, they assembled a rather large group of representatives, and 
charged them to compile a plan for the strategic plans. This group became the 
IPAS "committee" or "team." Some individuals reluctantly volunteered for this 
assignment, while others eagerly sought it out. Typically, little guidance was 
provided at first. However, with additional OPDC workshops and handouts, these 
groups were better able to work out a useful approach.
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Strategic Plans and Management
One of the central tenets of the IPAS and other public sector reforms of the 
Thaksin administration was to use strategic planning more effectively as a driver in 
policy implementation. Provincial strategic planning served as a bridge by linking 
the government policy that Thaksin sought to achieve to the program approaches 
and resources that are necessary for provincial and regional development. In this 
promotion of a strategic planning approach to regional administration, central 
government agencies claimed to act as policy overseers. The provincial 
administrations were assumed to recognize the role that strategic planning can play 
in holding territorial governments accountable for agreed strategic goals and results 
under one leadership, the CEO-governor. Toward this end, the OPDC took a further 
step in this direction by requiring contractual agreements that separated the role of 
policy provision by the central government and policy implementation provided by 
CEO-governors.
The early symbolic beginning of IPAS was the Prime Minister’s Office’s 
mandate for provinces to create a committee called the “Integrated Provincial 
Administrative Committee” (IPAC). Like the Joint Public and Private Sectors 
Consultative Committee (JPCC) in the past, the IPAC of each province was 
appointed by the governor’s office and served as a planning and budget reviewing 
body, but it had no legal authority concerning budget appropriation. Although the 
IPAC played a role in guiding the provincial strategic planning process, it had no 
power to control provincial policy implementation. Ironically, the committee was 
divided into various sub-committees according to the specializations and expertise
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of territorial government agencies, which kept them from dealing adequately with 
shared policy issues. In addition, non-public sector representatives invited to join 
the committee were outnumbered by the civil officers. The CEO-governors who 
acted as the president of IPAC continued to rely on the skills and substantive 
knowledge of different ministerial representatives.
The emphasis on provincial strategic plans and regional plans (groups of 
designated provinces) was closely associated with Thaksin’s policy agendas, “the 
populist policies,” that addressed a variety of economic and social issues. Thaksin 
assigned Deputy Prime Ministers to oversee and advise groups of provincial 
administrators. The governors signed Public Service Agreements with these 
political executives as part of IPAS’s protocol. An apparent consequence of this 
advisory group on the territorial government was that the elected officials tried to 
intervene in some policy areas by controlling the outcome of the provincial planning 
process through IPAS implementation. This intervention turned out to be frustration, 
as one of the respondents explains:
The strategic plan of our province includes many aspects of societal and 
development plans, but Thaksin’s scheme has focused mainly on economic 
growth. The governor will be evaluated whether he achieves the provincial 
economic plan. Further, in a visit by Thaksin’s advisory team, he has 
convinced the IPAS committee to adopt a sports development program as 
part of the strategic plans which was not part of the original plan proposed by 
the local committee of our province, (interview with a staff of provincial 
strategic administration in province “A,” January 10, 2005)
The initial emphasis of the IPAS required by the OPDC concentrated on 4 
frameworks for provincial operations. A list of these frameworks appears in Table 9.
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These evaluative frameworks divide into 4 major categories: 1) policy effectiveness,
2) quality of public services, 3) administrative efficiency, and 4) administrative 
development. Table 9 summarizes the 4 major criteria of IPAS evaluation.
Table 9
Integrated Provincial Administrative System’s Policy Framework
IPAS’s Policy Compliance (100%)
1) The Effectiveness of Strategic Plans (60%)
- National Policy
- Regional Strategic Plan
- Provincial Strategic Plan
2) The Quality of Public Service (10%)
- Citizen Satisfaction
- Counter Corruption Effort
3) The Efficiency of Provincial Management (10%)
- Cost Saving
- Timely Service Response
4) The Development of Provincial Organization (20%)
- Knowledge and Learning
- Provincial Database
- Change Management
These points of evaluation introduced new management accountability that 
made governors follow the provincial strategic plan and implement IPAS reforms. 
The provincial reform pressed governors and various field ministries to improve 
inter-organizational collaboration, to develop output indicators, and to report their 
performance in the form of a Self-Evaluation Report (SAR card). Traditionally, such
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
167
evaluative assessment of provincial administration had never been taken seriously 
by the central-level agencies. This new institutional control devised by the OPDC to 
encourage and constrain certain types of behaviors of provincial administration was 
evident in the requirement of strategic planning and managing for results. The 
OPDC took them as a means to control administrative output and to encourage 
reform progress. It claimed that these requirements serve as focusing devices to 
governors for better policy outcomes and for increasing overall administrative 
competence (OPDC, 2004a). A respondent who has many years of experience 
working with different provinces says:
The change that the CEO governor reform brought to provincial 
administration can be considered as a turning point. Administrative 
fragmentation was reduced and provincial officers clearly work harder than 
before. Yet, their attitude toward the administrative reform has not improved 
because they were pushed to do so. (interview with the head of provincial 
commerce ministry of province “A,” January 12, 2005)
To remain parallel with Thaksin’s provincial initiatives, the Bureau of Budget 
(BOB) attempted to modernize the budgeting system, creating a results-based 
budgeting. In part, the Bureau of the Budget instructed provincial administrators to 
use the strategic provincial plan as a basis for the budget request. Based on this 
linkage, the goals, objectives, strategies, and performance targets from various 
territorial governments were subjected to some scrutiny by a secretariat of the Office 
of Governor, Provincial Strategic Administration Unit, prior to inclusion in the budget 
appropriation request. However, decisions about the budget allocation remained in 
the Bureau of Budget and the Prime Minister’s Office. Although provincial strategic
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plans provided a stronger link between sub-government’s spending and the 
government’s policy objectives than traditional provincial budgeting, a major 
problem arose because provincial strategic plans cut across the plans of ministerial 
functions and central departments outside the provincial plans. This led to 
confusion about the priority of the sub-government’s responsibilities toward the 
governors and their responsiveness toward the ministerial functions.
A working staff member at the Provincial Strategic Administration Unit, the 
Office of Governor, pointed out:
There were numerous obstacles at the beginning of IPAS implementation 
that dealt with budget proposals according to provincial strategic plans. This 
happened primarily at the operational level in provinces where the 
representatives of the ministries at the sub-government level implemented 
ministerial strategic plans which may not always agree with provincial 
strategic plans, (interview with a staff of provincial strategic administration in 
province “A,” January 10, 2005)
In this context, a respondent argues:
The problem of tension between ministerial plans and provincial level plans 
was aggravated by outdated budgetary rules that failed to support the 
provincial reforms during the hasty reform implementation in the first year. 
As a result, the Thaksin government had to add 20 million baht to the IPAS 
budget for the governor’s exclusive control, regardless of provincial plans 
and needed projects. In fact, this amount of budget under the governor’s 
authority was substantively small (less than 3 percent of the total budget 
received by all territorial agencies for each province). The administration 
promised a higher budget the following year when barriers of the IPAS 
system were removed, (interview with a staff of provincial strategic unit, the 
office of provincial governor in province “A,” January 10, 2005)
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In province “B” which was chosen as one of the IPAS pilot cases a year 
before the mandate, the deputy governor argued:
Implementing IPAS while cross-ministerial functions were still under the 
process of reorganization was a big barrier toward the governor’s power 
devolution scheme. The ongoing change concerning various departmental 
reorganizations such as transferring authorities and officials from the 
Department of Forestry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, and 
the Department of Mineral Resources the Ministry of Industries, to the new 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment significantly confused the 
issue of governor devolution, (interview with the deputy governor of province 
“B,” March 3, 2005)
The role of the IPAS committee was to work with all agencies and 
subcommitees to anticipate future needs and trends and to help make sure that 
provincial government realizes the implications of present decisions. This initiative 
would hold agencies accountable for program results by requiring ministerial 
agencies to clarify their mission, set program goals, and measure performance of 
those goals. Starting in 2003, provincial agencies had to accomplish several 
actions: (1) establish goals that define the level of performance to be achieved by 
each program, (2) express the goals in an objective, measurable way, (3) describe 
the processes and resources required to achieve the goals, and (4) provide a basis 
for comparing actual program results with established goals.
Although provincial strategic planning was the cornerstone of IPAS, it did not 
link the provincial plans and implementation to budgeting and performance 
measurement during the first phase. The deputy governor of province “B” 
concluded that “the mandate for provincial strategic plans compelled provincial 
administrations to develop strategic plans, yet the planning process and cooperation 
were left to agencies’ discretion. Not surprisingly, the quality and usability of the
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plans remained unsatisfying” (interview with the deputy governor of province “B,” 
March 3, 2005).
In large provinces, administration appears to have experienced limited 
success implementing of IPAS. The governor of province “C” reported:
It is commonly known that large and complex provincial administrations were 
heavily involved with ceremonial duties which distracted the leaders from 
important management issues. In the reality of working conditions, the CEO- 
governors of large provinces were preoccupied with accommodating tasks 
for central delegations and political executives, presiding over various public 
functions and community activities, and examining document-based routine 
decision making, (interview with the governor of province “C,” March 18, 
2005)
However, these distractions were much more minor in small and remote 
provinces like province “C.” Also, in C, the administration was less complicated than 
in a large province where many sub-government agencies participated in provincial 
administration. The governor argued that the small size of some provinces 
permitted those governors to manage provincial programs and to oversee policy 
implementation better than could be done in the large ones.
A major distinction stands out when analyzing IPAS adoption in small 
provinces. The main element is the emphasis on cooperation instead of 
confrontation and conflict with ministerial groups, local governments, and private 
citizens. This cooperation was achieved by various means, such as the provision of 
informal assistance and teamwork among sub-regional agencies, municipalities, and 
businesses. By way of illustration, province “C” adopted a “Tea Council” (informal 
talk outside a provincial office) technique to overcome obstacles to fostering 
cooperation (interview with deputy governor of province “C,” March 15, 2005).
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Administrative and strategic leadership within provincial bureaucracies, the 
organizational mission and culture, and the beliefs of administrators all had an 
important impact on IPAS’s performance. But perhaps the most important problem 
was the contradiction in IPAS between requiring the governor to lead the planning 
but not granting governors necessary power to manage provincial administration. 
This tension can be seen in the Thaksin government’s economic policies. The 
provincial strategic plans are a five-year look into the future to establish the strategic 
goals for individual provinces. The plans were required to indicate resources 
needed for potential achievement of the strategic goals in each province. However, 
the Thaksin government wanted provincial budget allocation that would shift 
resources quickly to identified political priorities such as the government’s village 
funds, the People’s Banks, the Small and Medium Enterprise programs (SMEs), and 
other regional economic stimulation. The result was policy centralization on the one 
hand, and inadequate resources to administer the provinces on the other.
The economic policy frameworks ran counter to power devolution for 
governors. Although many ministerial agencies in the interviews agreed that they 
benefited to some extent from provincial reform, they complained about inadequate 
support received such as information technology improvement, staff for program 
analysis, and consistent standard operation procedures. One of the provincial 
governors contends:
Changes in the ministeral roles of sub-region administration into the more 
economic role of national public policy imply that provincial policy 
incoherence will be the eventual outcome as the process of ministerial 
control through sub-regional representatives becomes more tenuous. If 
provincial government and ministerial agencies are expected to receive their 
policy direction from the central government, and, therefore, from above,
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there is less need to worry about devolution of power. Indeed, centralized 
control may well be seen as legitimate, (interview with the governor of 
province “B," March 9, 2005)
Thaksin saw the advantages of provincial strategic plans that are connected 
to the administration’s political purpose. He demanded that the 2003 budget should 
be linked to provincial output and performance. At the same time, he set up a 
Budget Commission, chaired by himself and consisting of a Deputy Prime Minister, 
a Finance Minister, the Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, four other ministers 
appointed by cabinet, two hand-picked experts and the director of BOB (Painter, 
2005). During the revision of the budget rules, many reform measures were 
implemented by prime ministerial order. Effectively, the new commission 
supplanted the task of the BOB in finalizing and submitting the budget bills including 
governors’ budget proposals. The Budget Commission also became the final arbiter 
for determining budget allocations before they were submitted to the cabinet. This 
episode reflected a change in the operation of the provincial administrative reform to 
facilitate accomplishing the government’s objectives. Indeed, the Thaksin 
administration was less interested in the reform of budgeting techniques in relation 
to the rational strategic development efforts of provinces. The attempted budget 
control by the administration contradicted ideas about decentralizating central power 
and responsibilities.
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The previous section on dealing with IPAS’s strategic planning had an 
implicit assumption that provincial strategic plans would help improve the 
management of Thai provincial administration. The application of strategic plans in 
the Thai public sector was not new, but the Thaksin administration pioneered the 
provincial reform by creating more formal links between budget allocations for public 
agencies and the data required by the central government agencies to measure the 
attainment of program objectives. In fact, this effort to improve the results of 
government spending had concerned individual public agencies since the early 
1980s. The earliest reform attempt using this approach was the introduction of the 
Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) when the oil price crisis in the 
early 1980s began to place pressure on General Prem’s administration (Dixon, 
2005). Caught in a financial crisis in the late 1990s, the Thai government was 
confronted with the need for more accountability and improved resource allocation 
decisions.
The renewed pursuit of budgeting reform by the Thai government since the 
1997 Asian economic crisis can be seen through the introduction of results-based 
budgeting. The 1997 crisis forced sharp spending cuts in response to decreasing 
revenues, and it changed the normal budget surplus of Thai finance into deficits.
For the attempt at results-focused budgeting, Thaksin permitted a “laboratory” 
scheme for transforming highly centralized, input controls to budgeting for results. 
Using this approach, the BOB offered to reduce line itemization for spending 
agencies based on “conditional devolution” considerations.
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The important financial standards addressed by the BOB included: 1) clear 
objectives and expected level of service delivery and outputs related to expenditure 
requests, 2) identification and costing of agency outputs, 3) timeliness of financial 
and performance reporting, 4) better procurement management, and 5) 
development of an internal audit. This shift was part of the budgeting revision from 
PPBS toward Results-Oriented Budgeting (ROB) (Office of the Bureau of Budget, 
2003).
A major element of the IPAS’s budget-related reforms was its application of 
quantifiable targets to outputs and measurement of the achievement of those 
targets. These changes were intended to introduce a comprehensive performance 
reporting system in the provincial administration. The OPDC pushed the reform 
tactic across all governmental organizations. The OPDC and the BOB issued a 
number of guidelines and provided consultations to governors and sub­
government’s representatives in each province concerning the new evaluation 
framework. The development of performance data and its definitions represented a 
changing approach to central control over provincial administration.
The stated purposes of the IPAS’s guidelines are to make the provincial 
governments improve program effectiveness and public accountability; set program 
goals, measure program performance against those goals, report their progress, 
and provide more objective information relating the effectiveness and efficiency of 
provincial programs to spending. To this end, the IPAS requires provincial agencies 
to develop and submit to the OPDC a variety of documents that report past 
performance and detail expected performance targets. When the information from 
these reports is combined, the data can form a basis for making decisions on
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performance benchmarking. However, the combination of target indicators has the 
potential to confuse the OPDC, as well as provincial officers. Complexity of various 
agency objectives as well as complexity of the performance indicators contributes to 
this problem. A major factor that seems to limit IPAS measurement is a lack of 
consisent indicator definition, as this quote suggests:
We really don't understand how the OPDC define their key performance 
indicators. Last year, the provincial revenue on rubber goods was calculated 
from small factories’ operation, but this year it includes all related revenue 
generated by the whole provincial rubber industry. We had tried to get 
feedback and negotiate but the officials at OPDC don’t know the working 
definition of such things. We don't expect to get much out of it. ...our staffs 
are somewhat confused with things, (interview with a head of provincial 
agriculture and cooperative ministry in province “A,” January 17, 2005)
The IPAS reforms under the Thaksin administration reflected his private 
sector management background. Faced with slow progress concerning budget 
system improvement and the lack of strong leadership from BOB, Prime Minister 
Thaksin demanded that agency outputs were to be identified and be linked to 
management cost by late 2003.
For the 2004 budget, each agency, including all provincial administrations, 
was required to determine expected service outputs and make contractual 
agreements about service targets consented to by respective ministers. Because it 
was critical for the spending agencies that their accountability be partially 
determined by service levels, the politics of creating indicators and negotiation over 
those indicators became a salient issue in the reform implementation process. This 
integration of performance output measurement into the budget system became a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
large step forward for the Thai public sector that reinforced the idea of contractual 
management and a separation between policy makers and service providers.
The OPDC proposed to use provincial output indicators to maintain 
accountability in the face of enhanced governor power devolution. At the same 
time, an ongoing negotiation about standard performance for control measures was 
developed to meet the government mandate. This shift toward a formal public 
service performance measurement needed an effort to set up new procedures for 
data collection, new definitions with regard to indicators, and new patterns of 
information usage in government documentation. The OPDC applied these data to 
develop the benchmarking of provincial performance and to inform the political 
executives about policy achievement among different provincial administrations. 
The government also initiated new incentives such as performance pay and 
promised higher CEO budget allocations to push competition among provincial 
administrations. With all these changes, the enhanced policy role of Thaksin’s 
government in the provincial reform implementation process was highly visible.
The OPDC required the submission of provincial strategic plans every year. 
To provide for increased responsiveness, the OPDC suggested provincial agencies 
should consult with major social groups and stakeholders during the plan 
development process. The operational definitions of important aspects of the plan 
development process, such as consultation and stakeholders, were left to agency 
discretion. Not surprisingly, different components of committees were apparent 
across provinces and, as a result, the quality and applicability of their strategic 
planning varied.
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Formal compliance dates for IPAS’s implementation were set by the OPDC. 
For example, in December 2004, provincial administrations were required to update 
the strategic plan created in the previous year. A six-month self-evaluated 
performance report was to be submitted to OPDC, followed by a full twelve-month 
report at the end of a budget year. Information contained in these documents was 
designed to be integrated so expected and actual performance levels could be 
compared. Table 10 reports the 2005 IPAS’s schedule.
Table 10
Schedule for Integrated Provincial Administrative System
Schedule for Implementing IPAS (FY2005)
December 15, 2004 Provincial Strategic Plan be sent to the Office Public Sector 
Development
December 22-23, 2004 Central agencies and individual provinces agreed on Key 
Performance Indicator (KPI), target, and scoring system
December 27-30, 2004 Public Service Agreement (PSA) for FY2005 be signed 
between provincial governors and designated deputy Prime 
Ministers
January 4, 2005 The cabinet approved regional strategic plans.
April 15, 2005 Provinces submitted 6-month report (Self Assessment 
Report: SAR card)
September 1-30, 2005 Evaluation of service satisfaction by outsourcing agency 
(Thai Rating and Information Services Co Ltd: TRIS)
October 31, 2005 Individual province submitted 12 month report (SAR card) 
and administrative performance report (PSA)
November 1-30, 2005 Office of Public Sector Development evaluated the 
implementation of Public Service Agreement.
Office of Public Sector Development, December 3, 2004
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Performance measurement was a new step in regional government reform 
even though territorial governments had used it sporadically before the mandate of 
IPAS. The creation of IPAS’s performance indicators posed something of a 
paradox, but the government embraced it since it helped in communicating the 
CEO’s management results. The CEO governors are accountable for the result of 
performance outcomes at provincial level but central ministries and their delegations 
at the provincial level do plan and implement most of provincial programs.
However, an overemphasis on creating output targets and performance 
measurement created numerous efforts at documentation and generated many 
reports that may not translate to an improved provincial administration.
Although the provincial administrations produced key performance indicators 
to reflect the collective goals of various sub-governments led by the CEO Governor, 
there were differences between agencies’ goals and intended outputs. It was not 
feasible to incorporate all agencies’ outputs into one comprehensive measure of 
IPAS. Hence, the OPDC allowed provincial administration to propose a set of 
agreed performance targets as long as they complied with the required four-point 
measurement frameworks. Because of limited staff resources and since numerous 
sub-government units were part of the provincial administration, the OPDC hired the 
Thai Rating & Information Service (TRIS) to do much of the work, including 
negotiating output targets and measuring the IPAS’s performance.
TRIS’s experiences in assessing various corporate companies and major 
national public enterprises were applied to an unprecedented process of 
performance indicator development and quantifiable outputs for provincial 
governments. It collaborated with all ministries and provincial administrations to
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create numerous definitions concerning the performance measurement of IPAS's 
outputs that each governor agreed to produce in the form of public service 
contracts.
Unlike the traditional command and control hierarchy, the contracts were 
made with Thaksin’s Deputy Prime Minister instead of the Minister of Interior. TRIS 
was the change agent who introduced various private sector models of performance 
measurement to the staff of the provincial administration. For example, internal 
performance outputs in the form of a “balanced scorecard,” which had been used in 
business firms since the early 1990s, was promoted as part of the IPAS reform.
This concept was directly converted into the four-point provincial policy 
measurement framework mentioned earlier (OPDC, 2004b). The four sets of 
measures were assumed to balance in the sense that the CEO-governor had to pay 
attention to the entire policy framework mandate, not just one group of all 
administrative issues.
One of the chief problems the OPDC faced was that it was difficult to agree 
on a common ground about how performance targets were defined and 
implemented. The OPDC needed a structured approach to performance 
assessment, including a set of standard measurements and mandatory elements. 
These mandatory elements were necessary to make performance comparison 
possible between provinces or groups of provinces. The establishment of 
performance definitions and output targets was mostly accomplished by the OPDC 
through the contractual work with TRIS and through communication with the 
provincial strategic planning unit under the office of the governor. In this case, the 
office of the governor clearly played an important part in the assessment process
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although the office’s operations did not pay attention to the improvement of man­
power for the new tasks and the restructuring of the office to effectively implement 
the IPAS plans. In fact, the only change of the core unit at the office was its name, 
from Provincial Policy and Plan Analysis Unit to Provincial Strategic Planning Unit. 
All staff and divisions remained unchanged.
Concerning the IPAS’s monitoring, staff at the sub-government offices had 
responsibility to report their performance to central ministries for which they were 
held accountable as well as to provide information and reports for the governor’s 
office. The collection of data and documentations dealing with different levels of 
performance schemes required by the central ministries and the CEO-Govenor 
became overwhelming since the provincial staff was to be assessed by the OPDC 
as part of provincial performance under the CEO reform and also the sub­
government unit in the individual ministers. The governor of province “B,” who 
replaced a former governor when the IPAS’s pilot project ended in 2002, pointed out 
that the data requirements for the performance output measurements were not 
realistic (interview with the governor of province “B," March 9, 2005). In fact, many 
interviews with the representatives of central ministries in the observed provinces 
showed that data gathering required by the OPDC brought about uncomfortable 
extra work for the provincial staff because new data had to be collected in the 
provinces, while critical parts of the data were only available at central agencies 
(interview with head of provincial labor ministry in province “A,” January 6, 2005). 
The issue of unrealistic data requirements was seen in a controversy about the 
definition of gross provincial product (GPP) because the data existed only at the 
national level and only in an aggregated form.
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The emphasis on GPP in the IPAS reform reflected Thaksin’s policy 
preferences. As mentioned above, his policies were rooted in an attempt at reviving 
the rural Thai economy through the government’s populist policies. Specifically, his 
policy focused on increasing economic activities designed to increase the 
purchasing power of Thailand's majority rural lower class. Apart from this, the CEO- 
governors and the IPAS's plans were aimed at reinforcing the regional economic 
programs. A second theme in Thaksin’s economic policy focused on "mega­
projects," which involve investing over 50 billion dollars in public works, including 
roads, public transit, and a new international airport. Supporters of Thaksin argue 
that these policies had driven a stable, demand-driven recovery of Thailand's 
economy, which was previously dependent on exports, making it vulnerable to 
external shocks (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004, pp. 66-70).
However, GPP measurement is difficult since the central government has 
dominated the economic development of Thai regions for decades. In addition, 
provincial administrations varied considerably in their size, management capacity, 
and approach to collecting the newly required GPP data. The head of the provincial 
commerce ministry in province “B” related that the 2003 provincial GPP was 
overestimated since the data was created to seek potential support from the 
government (interview with a representative of commerce ministry in province “B,” 
March 9, 2005).
Because the province is a large site of government-supported industries, 
especially ceramics, and that business owners were articulate stakeholders, the 
businesses were pressing for higher estimates of economic growth while it was 
difficult to collect and report business data. In addition, an effect of the cross-border
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economy was largely missing since the data inquiry in the calculation of GPP data 
tended to rely more heavily on easier-to-obtain proxy data than the richer data. 
Consequently, economic data was highly dependent on information provided by 
central agencies such as the National Economic and Social Development Board. 
Because of inadequate data to estimate GPP, province “B” as well as most of the 
other provinces requested permission from the OPDC to change key estimated 
indicators. Province B adjusted the target for gross provincial commerce from 10% 
to 6% and revenue from tourists was also reduced to reach the more realistic target 
in order to avoid a negative performance evaluation.
The negotiation of target measurement between TRIS and provincial staff 
occurred in every provincial administration and in most sectors where the 
performance indicators were used. A staff member of the strategic planning unit in 
province “A” argued that OPDC’s performance measurement overemphasized 
economic competition, and this put stress on all governors to win the government’s 
approval of the provincial public service agreement and the end-of-year evaluation 
of IPAS (interview with a working staff of Provincial Strategic Administration Unit at 
province “A,” January, 25, 2005). One frequently voiced problem discussed by the 
interviewees was that they needed a clear and complete guideline from the OPDC, 
rather than implementing the performance reform by trial and error, with frequent 
changes. Contrary to the bureaucrat’s experience, statements given by the 
secretary of OPDC in several public media claimed that the course of public sector 
reforms featured a clear set of planned stages and they were moving in the right 
direction.
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In publishing the 2005 report on government reform, and particularly the 
assessment of IPAS, the OPDC revealed benchmarking data that listed 
performance scores of all provincial administrations according to the four-element 
evaluation framework. The benchmarking sought to encourage provincial 
administrations to improve their operations and the report was openly accessed by 
the public. The report can be seen as a form of oversight that ranks provincial 
performance on required key evaluative areas of management. According to the 
report, the average score for all 75 provinces scored was 4.26 out of a possible 5. 
Individual province’s benchmarking scores generally fell in a narrow range. The 
report failed to provide detailed information on how the four-point evaluative 
framework was scored. The three cases in this study were marked below the 
average score even though one of them, province “B,” had been part of the IPAS 
pilot project. It is not clear if these case study provinces complied less well than the 
average or if they negotiated for changes in the measures less successfully and 
therefore inflated their results less (see Table 11).
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Table 11
Integrated Provincial Administrative System’s Rating in 2004
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Office of Public Sector Development: Report on the assessment of provincial performance 
agreement (September 26, 2005)
Devolution and Accountability
Redefining public sector accountability and the devolution of central power 
are key components of the IPAS scheme. Traditionally, the representatives of 
central ministries under the governors’ leadership largely ignored the provincial 
policy-making process because they were accountable to their ministries more than 
to the province. Due to the functional specialization of each ministry, their policies 
and management regarding regional development were incoherent. This was 
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sub-national governments in the provinces. This structural flaw was a major 
concern of public sector reform advocates and of the Thaksin administration.
Efforts to fix this problem were part of the IPAS initiative. The Thaksin 
administration promised that CEO-governors under the IPAS reform would have 
more power that included the promotions and punishments of middle-level officers 
who were assigned to provinces by central ministries.
In light of these issues, a new model of provincial government strategic 
planning was needed. In particular, there had to be a close link between the 
strategic planning and devolution processes so that provincial program priorities 
could be made more coherent. Furthermore, there had to be clear alignment 
between the needs of ministerial representatives who set part of the strategic 
direction of the province and the focus of the operational front-line services who 
deliver service to the public.
To make this work, provincial decision makers have to set organizational 
priorities and clearly identify the process for executing the strategic plan. Also, to 
establish strategic alignment, a performance measurement system should be 
implemented that establishes performance measures that apply at the high levels of 
the organization and cascade down to operational measures at the departmental 
level. Ideally, provincial administrators should get continual feedback on how the 
plans are working, so that they can adjust the strategic direction as necessary 
(Office of Public Sector Development Commission, 2004a).
The goals of IPAS’ power devolution for regional government were 
ambitious, but the parallel reorganizational operation of the central ministries 
became a barrier to IPAS’s implementation. As mentioned earlier in this chapter,
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there was an increase in the number of functional agencies and a number of 
transfers of high-ranking positions as part of Thaksin’s reorganization program. 
Additional legislation was also drafted to clarify functional roles and power of newly 
established ministries and departments. Within this reorganization program, some 
major tasks and responsibilities were not transferred to the regional and local 
government.
The IPAS seeks to empower provincial governors, as well as ministerial 
representatives, for example, by cutting regulations and easing restrictions 
on those administrators.. . .  One purpose of the governors’ and ministerial 
representatives’ empowerment is to enhance coordination among incoherent 
multiple programs in the exercise of provincial authority. However, the 
revised roles and responsibilities of central ministry and sub-regional 
agencies are far from complete. The results are predictable-more role 
conflicts, task uncertainty, and government operation that is open to more 
descretion. (interview with a staff of provincial strategic administrative 
devision in province “A,” January 10, 2005)
The difficulty of the CEO-Governor’s power devolution is reinforced by 
another:
There are a couple of provinces whose governors do not delegate their 
power to middle-rank officers possibly because the governers want to control 
short-term program outcomes. In our province, delegation attempts are still 
far from perfect. I would say personally, that this is one area that really 
gripes me. Our role is not clear and we do not have a clear understanding of 
some parts of the delegated tasks that involve ministeral management 
power. You don't see a solution in just one or two years since we must rely 
on formal channels of dispute resolution, (interview with a secretary of 
provincial governor in province “B,” March 8, 2005)
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The decentralization of power from the central government to lower level 
governments had been an important item on the national agenda since the 1997 
constitution was promulgated. However, the dual track of ministerial reorganization 
and provincial reform ran counter to the devolution and decentralization scheme. In 
the management of expenditure, the reforms included performance-based 
budgeting for line ministries; a strengthening of the capacity of central agencies to 
construct and review strategic plans; and a progressive expansion of fiscal 
transparency. These measures suggest that central policymaking under devolution 
will is likely to engender competition between line ministries and provincial 
administration.
By themselves, the ministerial devolution measures might have been useful, 
but in context, these apparent benefits of power devolution were illusory. That is to 
say devolution does not necessarily increase governors' autonomy to establish 
provincial policies that respond to particular local needs. Rather, national social 
policy protects line ministries from competitive pressures and urges department and 
program managers at the provincial level to maintain core functions and 
responsibilities in order to gain their program funding. This suggests that provinical 
governors, left to their own descretion, will tend to marginalize the devolution 
scheme.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Thai reform strategies emphasized a more 
contractual, performance based, discretionary style of organizational management. 
In line with this strategy, the relationship between different levels of organizational 
hierarchy such as the central ministries and the sub-regional operating units shifted 
toward contractual agreements with quantifiable performance measurements. As a
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result, new forms of administrative accountability that emphasized an output- 
outcomes model of accountability gradually superseded traditional forms of 
accountability that were based on a hierarchy of command. But these reforms did 
not address a variety of problems that remained, including limited scope of the 
governor’s controls, changing rules of implementation, personalism, and political 
interventions.
The CEO-governor has been presented like a man on horseback expected 
to cure all problems in a province. But there are still many important 
problems he can not manage. As I knew it, military, education, and local 
government issues are beyond the responsibiliites of the CEO. Inherent 
negative cultures dealing with patron-client relationship, nepotism, 
ceremonial tasks, politician influence, let alone conflicting rules and 
guidelines issued by different central agencies are all big problems we are 
still facing, (interview with the governor of province “B,” March 9, 2005)
Given these difficulties, much of the ability to coordinate the subnational 
ministry offices at the provincial level depended on the personality, skills, and 
personal networks of the governors. Their recruitment thus becomes a central focus 
of the analysis. The OPDC revised the recruitment and selection of governors. 
Whereas in the past, governors had been picked from within the Ministry of Interior, 
now recruitment was to be open, based on competition between candidates from 
various ministries. According to the OPDC’s recruitment change, the IPAS’s 
governor selection was subject to a special national recruitment committee presided 
over by Thaksin’s Deputy Prime Ministers. Although the OPDC suggested that 
governors could be chosen from outside the Interior Ministry, none of the incumbent
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CEO-governors were from the outside. This aspect of reform initiative was not 
implemented at the time of this research.
While the new selection process did not necessarily open the position to 
competition and assure the most skilled governors, it did enable the Thaksin 
government to decentralize control and simultaneously maintain accountability by 
using a more open competition and then selecting candidates for governor. In part, 
this strategy helped assure that NPM approaches would be integrated into the top 
ranks of the civil service in the Thai public sector. The new recruitment process 
reinforced the OPDC’s structural arrangements that attempted to influence behavior 
within provincial administration, determine the performance of provincial outputs and 
outcomes, and structure its relationships based on contractual agreements. More 
concretely, appointed CEO-governors were forced to manage increasing provincial 
economic targets according to the government policy framework.
Thai public sector has seen a rise of accountability in its administration 
following the 1997 reformed constitution, with greater use of various institutional 
arrangements and political processes. Following the constitutional framework, the 
2003 Good Governance Act gave greater opportunity for Thaksin’s public sector 
reform agenda. The first section of the Good Governance Act decreed that the 
public sector must respond to the state’s policies, manage public affairs efficiently, 
streamline the administrative process, be adaptive to changing situations, and 
regularly evaluate organizational performance. The implication of this law for 
provincial administration and accountability was that it increased a great amount of 
monitoring through stringent assessments and other control mechanisms. The form 
of accountability was especially illuminated in the OPDC’s promotion of performance
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targets as part of IPAS implementation. The rise of performance measures 
reflected the changing nature of accountability in the Thai public sector.
It is logical to assume that devolution and performance measurement and 
contracting are two sides of the same coin, that devolution could occur only if the 
goals of the lower levels of government were consonant with those above and their 
performance in carrying out those policies was routinely measured and reported. As 
it worked out, though, the need to control policy trumped the devolution of authority. 
The need to implement macro economic goals watered down and to some extent 
replaced the goal of devolution and regional administrative reform. The governor’s 
CEO scheme and power devolution were weakly designed and organized. Large 
parts of sub-government organizations maintained their domain of responsibilities 
under their respective functional ministries.
As an example of economic policy goals taking priority over devolution goals, 
in Province B, the governor and his office were held responsible for policies and 
programs that were important at the national level, but were not included in the 
provincial level plans. A head of the provincial commerce ministry in Province B 
asked in an interview how the governor and his office could be accountable for the 
empowerment program for small and medium-sized businesses when there were 
no related performance targets and goals specified in the provincial plan (interview 
with the representative of commerce ministry in province “B,” March 9, 2005).
Interviews with most representatives from central ministries suggested that 
their perspectives on accountability were quite different from that of governors. 
Sub-government units in provincial administrations engaged in public service 
contracts with respective central departments in the same way that governors had
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the agreement with the office of prime minister. However, the ministerial contracts 
were driven by departments’ programmatic concepts which operated exclusively in 
term of their expertise. Hence, the devolution of personnel power for the governor 
did not effectively restructure the accountability between governors and provincial 
staff. This observation was confirmed by the governor of province “B” as he argued 
that the least problematic task concerning the devolution of central power to the 
governor was civil service promotions for which he normally requests the opinion of 
respective ministerial heads (interview with the governor of province “B,” March 9, 
2005).
Concerning budgets, most of the central ministries hesitated to leave the 
decision to governors even though the OPDC did suggest that budgetary decision­
making should be transferred to the CEO-governor (interview with head of provincial 
agriculture and cooperative ministry of province “C," March 17, 2005).
The new accountability framework implied a new relationship between 
government ministers and the provincial governor. First, the governors understood 
that their tenure in “good” provinces (relatively large population provinces) 
depended on their performance in implementing IPAS reforms. Now known as 
CEO-governors, provincial governors worked under performance-based public 
service contracts that they negotiated with the responsible Deputy Prime Ministers.
The OPDC monitored performance on behalf of the office of prime minister. 
The governors were free to manage their provincial administration in the ways they 
deemed best suited to meet the government performance goals. It was evident 
from the interviews that the bureaucratic inertia including traditional practices in 
provincial administration remained an obstacle to regional reform. In fact, the
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governor’s position in Thailand used to have secure tenure and limited authority; 
now it seemed that they had limited tenure and overwhelming responsibilities.
Second, provincial administrations were placed under the same rules and 
regulations as the private sector. That is to say, the traditional rules of public sector 
and service employment regulations were replaced by dynamic regulatory change. 
The governor of each province was forced to operate under the rhetoric of private 
sector management, like a chief executive officer of a private company, managing 
policies and decisions on the number of outputs and service delivery contracts. 
However, these structural changes did not lead to good accountability because 
vague or unachievable performance specifications undermined performance 
arrangements. It was necessary to say that the output performance that CEO- 
governors were expected to deliver was substantively selective and negotiable. The 
CEO-governors were assumed to be accountable for the output results while the 
political executives were responsible for the outcomes.
By preference, the government was interested in achieving political 
outcomes and maintaining political support. However, policy outcomes were often 
not within the control of political executives, partially because the complexity of 
performance measurement and vague specifications of output targets allowed 
provincial administrations to determine what they wanted to produce.
IPAS and Local Government Decentralization
Local government in Thailand has been known for having limited power 
under the control of the central government. Since the end of absolute monarchy in
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1932, central ministries played a principal role in the production of public services 
across provincial and local government jurisdictions. Rapid economic growth since 
the 1980s has placed an increasing burden on the highly centralized administration. 
As addressed in Chapter 4, the period following the1980s saw the establishment of 
Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committees (JPPCCs) which sought to 
facilitate regional social and economic development in regional Thailand. This 
collaboration provided local business associations and the private sector 
opportunities to become involved in local government politics and in the national and 
regional policy-making process (Laothamatas, 1992). Such a collaborative 
framework continued afterwards, reflecting the relaxation of stringent centralized 
policy-making process. In part, this process emerged from the political 
transformation during the 1970s’ anti-military rule period, and it was reinforced by 
economic factors in the 1980s (Connors, 2003, pp. 229-232).
During the late 1990s, the Thai government introduced ambitious public 
sector reforms that redefined roles and resource allocation between central 
governments and local government authorities. This effort was specified in the Thai 
Constitution of 1997, in Section 282, that mandated a decentralization law that 
reorganized the respective powers and duties between central government and 
local authorities and among local authorities themselves. Subsequently, seven 
entirely new laws were enacted in order to fulfill the 1997 constitution’s provisions 
(Nelson, 2002). These laws included the 1999 Decentralization Plan and Procedure 
Act that called for the transfer of public service responsibilities to local authorities 
and for increasing shared revenue to all local governments to no less than 35% of
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total local spending by the year 2006. Table 12 illustrates important acts concerning 
the decentralization plan between 1999 and 2001.
Table 12
Law Reform for Local Government Decentralization
Acts Enacted Year
The Act for the Request of Local Ordinances 1999
The Decentralization Plan and Procedure Act 1999
The Act on Voting for the Removal from Office of Members of 
a Local Assembly of Local Administrators 1999
The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration Civil Servants 
Administration Act 1999
The Administration of Pattaya City Act 1999
The Local Personnel Administration Act 1999
The Act on the Elections of Local Councils and Executives 2001
The Decentralization Plan and Procedure Act defined six functions to be 
transferred from central ministries to local administrative authorities. These 
functions and responsibilities were: 1) infrastructure, 2) promotion of quality of life,
3) maintenance of social order and peace, 4) planning and investment promotion, 
commerce and tourism, 5) management and conservation of natural resources and 
the environment, and 6) promotion of arts, culture, tradition, and local wisdom. The 
transfer of these functions was based on the powers and duties of various local 
administrative authorities, ranging from small rural local governments to urbanized
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municipalities. A National Decentralization Committee, which was created in 1999, 
was given responsibility to define the overlapping functions between the central and 
local governments. It was also created to oversee transfers of financial resources 

























Figure 2. Oversight Roles of the National Decentralization Committee
Responsibility for sub-region governments is both through the governor and 
through the ministerial appointees at the provincial level. Since both are controlled 
from the center, final decision-making authority rests with the central government, 
which can give orders to and control the scope of responsibility of the regional 
government. Since the 1997 constitution, a large and complex body of 
administrative laws emerged that required a rebalancing of administrative power 
among the different levels of government.
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According to the Government Administration Act of 2002, all the provinces 
except Bangkok remained sub-regional governments considered regional branches 
of central ministries. This new law slightly increased the power of The Prime 
Minister’s Office dealing with the administrative power to cope with substantive 
reform implementation processes. In part, this can be seen in the assignment of the 
OPDC to oversee the reform under the authority of the Office of Prime Minister. 
However, the change in regional and provincial administration that could have been 
anticipated did not succeed, as was evident in government’s total general 
expenditures in which over 80 percent was spent by various central ministries 









Ministerial and Central 
Agencies in Province
Figure 3. The Structure of Provincial Administration
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Beyond central and sub-regional governments, local governments are 
statutory bodies of the national government. The local authorities divide into 4 
major categories: 1) Provincial Administration Organizations (PAO; 75 units), 2) 
Municipalities (1,125 units), 3) Tambon Administrative Organizations (TAO or sub­
district; 6,744 units), and 4) Special Administrative Organizations (SAOs) 
designated by laws, specifically Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and Pattaya 
City (Suwanmala, 2004). Under the 1997 constitution, the local authorities are 
governed by elected local councils and elected executive committees. Each 
possesses distinct internal structures. Other than this, a course of responsibility 
transfer from central ministries to local bodies has occured incrementally.
After the 1997 financial crisis, local government authorities, Municipalities, 
PAO, and TAO have been increasingly promoted by democratic movements as well 
as international assistance organizations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. However, the progress of decentralization specified in 
related laws covering functional transfers, civil service transfers, and financial 
resource allocation has been gradual and problematic (Weist, 2002). Potentially, 
decentralization could lead to substantial reduction of service responsibilities and 
resource needs on the part of sub-regional administrations at the provincial and the 
district levels. However, local governments’ services and internal management, 
especially thousands of small and fragmented TAOs, are largely undeveloped, while 
local officials have limited knowledge about financial regulations and legal process 
(Nelson, 1998). Most TAOs are too small and fragmented to be efficient, viable or 
accountable local government units. Instead of strengthening local governments 
through the existing decentralization framework, Thaksin’s idea of the CEO
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
198
Governor unified provincial administration and worked to strengthen provincial 
management in lieu of strengthening the local governments.
With the IPAS reform and the CEO-governors, the Thaksin administration 
gave an ambiguous signal for the ongoing decentralization plan. There were at 
least two reasons that the local government decentralization process did not gain 
much attention from the government.
First, Thaksin’s overwhelming election victory was not based on strong 
support for a pluralist and decentralized polity. On the contrary, Thaksin was 
presented as an image of a successful conglomerate business person who sought 
to save Thailand in the aftermath of economic crisis. Hence, strong leadership and 
centralized power seemed to fit the political and economic climate. Accordingly, 
Thaksin made the governors directly responsible to the Prime Minister instead of the 
line of command of the ministry of interior. Since a number of local governments’ 
development and service delivery plans were hampered by poor coordination and 
lack of horizontal collaboration (Suwanmala, 1999), the IPAS bypassed the role of 
local governments and sought the solution of fragmented local authorities by 
strengthening CEO-governors.
The Deputy Governor of Province “C” explained why he thought that reform 
ought to be directed by the provincial leadership rather than by local leaders.
The CEO concept emphasizes the leader of an organization who must have 
exceptional knowledge and skills to lead an organization. However, only a 
small number of village heads sucessfully lead their community. The 
leadership of TAOs have insufficient experience working with the local 
community. This is not the case for provincial governors that have had long 
experience and have skills in managing bureaucratic operations. As a result, 
the reformed CEO-governor is well suited to and the most effective for the
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new role of regional leadership, (interview with the deputy governor of “C,” 
March 15, 2005)
Second, the Thaksin administration’s major policies involved a number of 
populist promises such as a revolving fund for every village, a local initiative income- 
generating project, a farmer’s debt suspension program, and a 30-baht-per-visit 
charge health-care scheme. In fact, substantive portions of these policies were 
parallel to the roles of local government authorities.
The administration’s recentralization in these policy areas marked a shift 
from the course of local government decentralization. The Thaksin government 
became silent about its decentralization plan and reiterated that a strategy for 
appropriate provincial administration had to be revised for better results. The 
government budget had been channeled through the central ministries and their 
field operations in the provinces and the districts to the local governments. With the 
IPAS reform, provincial administrations did not simply pass funds on to local 
government bodies, but also coordinated local government planning to achieve 
provincial expenditure plans, which they would draw up and submit as part of 
provincial strategic plans.
Several interviews with local political executives in province “A” provided a 
sense of the reaction to this aspect of the government’s IPAS reform. An executive 
member of the PAO in province “A” made the following observation:
Whether the CEO-governor reform and the local decentralization policy went 
together is questionable. Despite increases in responsibility transfers from 
central ministries to the PAO, the ministries did not transfer their civil service 
staff and related budget to local authorities. The role of the central 
government becomes insecure when local governments are given more
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authority under the decentralization plan. Hence, the central government 
has reversed its role to control the local governments instead of supervising 
them, (interview with a president of PAO in province “A," January 18, 2005)
Another local official pointed out:
According to the government reform framework, the central ministries would 
change their roles to focus on policy and technical assistance while allowing 
local government authorities to produce public services. However, the 
objective of 35% of the national budget transferred to local government this 
year was impossible to fulfill, as currently the allocation was only 23.5 %. 
This happened because the central ministries maintain their control over 
budget power and policy implementation, rather than letting things go out to 
the hand of local governments. The CEO-governors have a substantive 
power to review local development programs within their provincial 
jurisdictions.” (interview with the mayor of the largest municipality in province 
“A,” January 19, 2005)
These narrations given by the local government authorities show the 
contradiction between local government decentralization policy and the CEO reform 
that strengthens provincial governors and sub-government ministerial agencies in 
provinces. That overarching provincial strategic policies took precedence over local 
government policies had become a major concern of local politicians. Local 
government authorities are responsible for tax collection, local planning, and 
budgeting while being held accountable to the local people. Even after the 
decentralization policy was apparently implemented, the Department of Local 
Administration Promotion (DLAP), the Ministry of Interior, continued to oversee the 
local governments through general guidelines and advice for local planning, 
budgeting, and financial management (Suwanmala, 1999).
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Provincial governors are influential in supervising local government 
administration particularly through the implementation of provincial strategic plans 
that include substantive infrastructure projects and social programs. For example, 
the assessments of CEO-Governors’ performance were higly centralized at the 
central government: the OPDC, the Office of the Prime Minister, and the Ministerial 
Offices. The establishment of the CEO-governor system reinforced an attempt to 
curb the rise of local government authorities as part of the IPAS reform. Underlying 
the provincial changes was a desire on the part of the Thaksin administration to 
ensure that both provincial-level bureaucracy and local authorities deliver what the 
government wanted.
The CEO-style provincial governor and the dominance of national policy 
implementation took priority over local democratic accountability. The CEO- 
governors acting as the prime minister’s direct subordinates gave the administration 
enormous additional means to exert policy control countrywide.
What is the role of local accountability supposed to be when the CEO- 
governors challenge the local government constituencies in providing public 
services while the local people do not have democratic means to hold the 
governor accountable to them? In fact, the provincial reform potentially 
contradicts the constitutional mandate of supporting decentralization and of 
developing large-size local government authorities, but increased the 
tendency of political patronage and politicization on part of bureaucracy, 
(interview with a president of the PAO in province “A,” January 18, 2005)
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Conclusion'
Thailand has often been described as a bureaucratic polity, where the 
bureaucracy dominates the government. That characterization has probably been 
correct for most recent Thai history. However, as management ideology has tended 
to favor the private sector, especially during periods of economic crisis, non- 
traditional approaches to administrative reform have increased. There has been a 
pronounced economic component within the reform policy of the Thaksin 
government. Early in Thaksin’s first term, he introduced a major administrative 
reorganization involving all central ministries and regional governments. This 
included initial pilot projects that brought provinces into an “Integrated Provincial 
Administrative System” and set up “CEO-governors.” The administration claimed 
these reforms would make the provincial governors and sub-governments operate 
more effectively to implement central policy and to manage provincial organizations 
like businesses.
The provincial reform included eliminating much of the traditional oversight 
from the central ministries, adopting new contract-based agreements between the 
ministries and senior bureaucrats, establishing performance target measurement as 
a tool for accountability, and replicating management tactics of private sector 
management. This reform has precipitated a fundamental shift in relationship 
between political executives and the civil service and their relative roles and 
responsibilities in providing public service. On the one hand, the administration saw 
advantages in de-concentrating central responsibilities to the lower tier of 
governments in provincial administration when the economic situation pressed for
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downsizing the central agencies. On the other hand, the regional reform sought 
greater control over the bureaucracies and their programs through a variety of 
management tactics, especially output target performance. However, all 
responsible parties had a difficult time delivering accountability while wrestling with 
constant changes and unclear definitions of outputs and outcomes.
Observation of provincial administration and interviews provided some 
evidence about how IPAS reform became problematic and elusive. The clearest 
instance of this problem was the service delivery agreement through which 
Thaksin’s ministers were accountable for objectives and outcomes, contracting with 
the CEO-governors and heads of departments for performance measurement. This 
research uncovered many occasions when the lack of agreement between strategic 
plans, unclear definitions of measured outputs, muddled responsibilities, and lack of 
financial and staff support hampered the IPAS implementation. The administration 
claimed to give more unified power to the governors and strengthen provincial 
control over ministerially controlled sub-governments. However, many interviewees 
recounted that confusion and contradictions pertaining to rules and discretion on the 
part of reformed provincial agencies were prevalent during the reform 
implementation process. Further, tension arose in those situations where 
management innovations and reform tactics became counterproductive.
Before the arrival of Thaksin in 2000, the Thai administrative system was 
slowly progressing toward the direction of democratic governance that supported 
local government decentralization and multiple autonomous organizations. When 
Thaksin assumed power, public sector reform advanced only where it served the 
goals of his political expediency. The reform attempts resulted in absolute control of
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the government over provincial governors and hampered the progress of local 
authorities. Considerable decentralization of responsibilities and resources to local 
government has taken place, but this process was interrupted by a politicization 
strategy aimed at asserting administrative control on the part of the central 
government.
The local governments could not simply be treated as central government 
agencies, because they are political bodies accountable to a local constituency.
The governors, on the other hand, were responsible to the Thaksin administration, 
not to the public. These two sets of reforms clashed because the governors needed 
to control the local governments to achieve their performance goals in economic 
development. Together, management and political reforms were being deployed to 
reshape the bureaucracy into an instrument of the Thaksin government’s political 
programs.
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CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Introduction
This concluding chapter builds on the earlier substantive chapters in order to 
present critical findings of Thaksin’s Integrated Provincial Administrative System 
(IPAS reform). In Chapter 1, this study posed significant questions, such as 
whether international organizations and global economy affect Thai administrative 
reform in general, whether or not the Thai public sector reform clings to the New 
Public Management approach of governance, and what type of implications and 
impacts would arise from the IPAS’s implementation process. While the IPAS 
undoubtedly made an important contribution to sub-government administration, 
there were points of contradictions and implications in such efforts to replace 
traditional provincial structure by private sector managerial strategies. Given the 
frustrating complexity of the IPAS implementation, the conceptual dominance of 
New Public Management (NPM) was evident in the recent Thai public sector reform. 
This underlying change was made through the Government Administration Act of
2002, the Administrative Organization Act of 2002, and the Good Governance Act of
2003. The term Integrated Provincial Administrative System (generally known as 
CEO-Governors) was used in academic, governmental and organization
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discussions in Thailand, but it was not clearly defined. Central to the IPAS reform 
ideas were the changes in both governance and public management that sought to 
respond to perceived needs and demands, particularly in the post-economic crisis in 
1997. Hence, much of the reform implementations had been concerned with 
changing bureaucratic rules and a set of compliances to governmental policies. 
Essentially, the belief of the reformers, which can be discerned as influential in the 
progressive reform movement following the 1997 constitution amendment and the 
aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, is that the Thai public sector organizations 
were inefficient, fragmented, and often ineffective. These assumptions led to the 
managerial preoccupation in the IPAS reform with strategic plans, performance 
measurement, output indicators, balance-scored card, public service agreement, 
and the like.
Conversely, the regional reform introduced a greater degree of devolution for 
governors in the management of provincial and regional affairs. The devolution 
scheme had prominently included a new initiative to “public service agreement” in 
which a command and control system based on performance measurement was 
added to the old traditional hierarchical structure. Within this new reformed 
structure, the management of governors stressed a comprehensive set of output 
indicators, including required internal and external performance evaluations. The 
implication of this change was that the structure of provincial administration was to 
move from traditional hierarchy under functional ministries to a new accountability 
system based on a contractual agreement with the Thaksin administration. One 
crucial link in the relationship between governors and the administration was 
provincial strategic plans that must comply with Thaksin’s policy agendas.
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The IPAS scheme and power devolution, therefore, introduced a 
sophisticated set of reform elements that created an opportunity for politicization, 
recentralization, and new control measure on the part of sub-regional governments 
simultaneously. Thaksin’s public reform tactics were fused with politics, in which 
Thai Rak Thai’s political agendas were integrated into the reform rhetoric, a portion 
of senior bureaucrats were politicized, and the local government decentralization 
plans were delayed. Although the IPAS reform was simply presented as the 
management improvement of provincial administration, the processes generated 
multiple conflicting agendas and substantive impacts in the Thai public 
administration. This concluding chapter discusses three issues dealing with IPAS’s 
impacts and implications in light of what this researcher has observed.
Thaksin’s Reform Strategies and the Implications
Why did Thaksin perceive central and regional bureaucracy as such a barrier 
to government transformation? Why did he launch a new reform agency, the Office 
of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), to guide and oversee the 
reform implementation? Before answering these questions one should be reminded 
that the characteristics of Thai public bureaucracy had remained central to the study 
of the contemporary Thai public sector. That means that the changing element of 
Thai bureaucracies implies the interruption of bureaucratic influence over the public 
policy-making process. Before the Thaksin administration, bureaucrats retained 
considerable leverage power in their relationship with politicians. Instead, the 
ministerial reorganization and the creation of OPDC under Thaksin changed an inert 
bureaucratic structure which has been left in the past to new agencies in order to
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develop specific procedures and regulations necessary for government policy. 
Although a portion of reform-minded technocrats had been active in the 
development and implementation of reform plans, the new reforms would not have 
fully materialized without the distinct leadership of the Thaksin administration.
While there was wide public support for change in organizational structures 
of the government, Thaksin's reform appeared to face the challenge of political 
interference in the public sector operation. This does not necessarily mean that 
administrative intervention exclusively produces conflicts between politicians and 
civil servants, but it refers to politics that are inherited in the process involving an 
administrative reform by the engaging parties. These gradual resistances include 
some sections of politicians who operate at local-level government politics and a 
number of frustrated bureaucrats. Within this context, Thai administrative reforms 
have been caught in the paradox of reform measures such as decentralizing 
responsibilities and result-based performance targets, on the one hand, but on the 
other hand the reforms sought greater control over the management of bureaucratic 
operations. In another case, the technocratic reformers may seek to distance public 
sector operation from the political executive through explicit management tactics 
and a quantifiable approach, but the politicians in power may perceive the 
advantage of such tools and tactics and exploit the reform in any available channels.
In analyzing the exercise of administrative power during Thaksin’s first term, 
the study found that the Thai Rak Thai’s dominant party had introduced a far- 
reaching program of social and economic reforms. Chapter 4 especially addresses 
the “populist" policies that produced a kind of the “clientelism” of rural and low- 
income class. This strategy, in particular, invigorated a large part of public service
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operations and established bonds of patronage with the Thai Rak Thai Party across 
the Northern and Eastern regions, where the party’s representatives were dominant. 
In addition, scores of political advisors, part of them from the leading section of 
bureaucrats, formed the entourage of each minister and deputy minister, which 
reflected the increasing power of the Prime Minister and his cabinet. This form of 
policy initiative and intervention from political executives undermined the existing 
power of bureaucracy which has been in control of substantive policy areas in 
Thailand for decades.
Given that both the Thaksin administration and reform-minded bureaucrats 
had their special interest in particular reform attempts, the administration may 
endorse the reforms for political opportunities while the bureaucrats assume career 
advancement by participating in the process. Hence, the rationality of alleged 
reform may become merely a symbol since the reform was hampered by different 
conflicting interests and goals by the involving parties. In analyzing a functional 
reorganization in the first term of Thaksin, there was evidence that the 
administration used its discretional power to transfer and promote senior 
bureaucrats while a group of senior bureaucrats who participated in the reform 
benefited from this politicization. By this method, the cabinet approved a ’’challenge 
system" under which government agencies which chose to take part in the public 
sector reform programs were rewarded for meeting the government performance 
targets. In fact, enthusiastic compliance with Thaksin’s political agendas and 
priorities was virtually a key assessment criterion.
Provincial administrative reform through the IPAS reflected decisive political 
executives over parliament factions and sub-region governments. Along with the
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IPAS, provincial plans had to comply with Thaksin’s policy priorities. This is a point 
where policy making continued to be highly concentrated, partially because the 
1997 constitution strengthened the power of the prime minister. The provincial 
bureaucrats had some discretion for program implementation, but this power was 
limited under national government policy agendas. Although the fragmentation of 
sub-government bureaucracy may have deep roots in the provincial administration, 
the IPAS performance frameworks and government agenda clearly indicate the 
control of political executives over the regional bureaucracy which resurfaced more 
recently during the leadership of Thaksin. In this case, strategy for government 
transformation was defined as top-down and grand reform mandates tended to 
defeat prior incremental ones. Shifts in control elements in the complex control of 
sub-government can be seen through the IPAS’s implementation to develop 
strategic planning, contractual agreement, and performance indicators and 
measurement across all levels of government, for example.
In the case of contemporary Thai public administration, politician-bureaucrat 
relationships are crucial to the understanding of recurring public sector reform. It is 
also in this context that this research examined the implications of Thaksin’s 
administrative reform, particularly when a number of public agencies were 
reorganized resulting in the transfers and promotions of many high-ranking public 
servants. Particularly in the case of the IPAS reform where top-down attempts to 
transform the public sector occurred, it was evident that the regional administrative 
reform process was trumped by Thaksin’s political agendas. In part, this study finds 
that a degree of coordination takes place between the head of provincial ministries 
in the operation of provincial administration. During the implementation of IPAS
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reform, much inter-agency collaboration was reported which may result from parts of 
the measures that forced organizational collaboration. However, this sort of sub­
government integration ran counter to local government authorities that had been 
undergone an increasing transfer of functions and responsibilities mandated by the 
1997 constitution and the 1999 Decentralization Plan and Procedure Act.
One of the contradictions with the approach of Thaksin’s public sector reform 
outlined in Chapter 5 was that local government authorities had been negatively 
affected by IPAS measures such as strategic planning and provincial power 
devolution. After 1999, there were decentralization frameworks and a 
decentralization committee for the strengthening of local government authorities, 
particularly the efforts to transfer functions, resources, and personnel from central 
ministries to those local governments. Instead, Thaksin’s government reforms at 
the central and regional governments generally neglected cooperation across local 
government authorities. It should be stressed that the IPAS reform played down the 
emerging roles of Provincial Administrative Organizations, which represent local 
constituency in provincial regions. The provincial administration led by governors 
thus assumed greater roles on regional developing programs than the local 
governments. Indeed, as the IPAS reform proceeded, provincial administration had 
come to act as the intermediaries between the central agencies and the local 
government authorities while the government policies surpassed local needs and 
responsiveness.
The strengthening of regional government through IPAS measures while the 
local government decentralization program was ignored produced a political impact, 
particularly the effect on democratic processes and local government institutions.
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Essentially, the drive of Thaksin’s regional reform is not political equality and 
popular control, but efficiency in a context of fragmented bureaucratic structure that 
was outstripping the goals of national policies and the cost of public services. As 
addressed in Chapter 5, the most important criterion for provincial benchmarking 
was economic value. The principal area that had been promoted in the IPAS’s 
implementation was related information about gross provincial product. These 
aspects on the IPAS’s reform reflected the way in which the New Public 
Management approach to public administration implies changes through market, 
contract, and competition. Certainly, there was no evidence that the IPAS’s 
strategic development plans were influenced by various local constituencies and 
local government authorities. This is because policy determination in the IPAS 
reform was simply top-down, the product of elite thinking, not a democratic principle.
Internationalization: Origins and NPM Elements
The international organizations and the donor agencies in general have been 
pushing for institutional reforms for over a quarter of a century. As addressed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, the impact of international organizations on the Thai public sector 
institutions had been clearly evident since the Second World War, particularly when 
Field Marshall Sarit’s authoritative regime (1959-63) modernized administrative 
organizations to cope with communist ideology through centralized socioeconomic 
institutions. The IMF and the World Bank had acquired entrenched authority during 
the cycle of the Thai economic downturn between the 1980s and 1990s. With the 
assistance of these global economic organizations, Thai institutional reforms had
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been propelled by successive administrations, partly in pursuit of a market-based 
macro economic policy agenda, and partly in order to develop institutions with some 
leverage over the private sector.
In fact, the Thai domestic reform movement originated simultaneously in the 
early 1990s as part of the attempt to reposition Thai democracy to cope with its 
increasing vulnerability to global economy. The devastating impact of an 
undemocratic regime had increased popular mobilization and participation in 
government and demanded constitutional reform following the military coup in 1991 
by General Suchinda. The Thai public sector reform measures that were promoted 
after the oust of Suchinda appeared to mirror the efforts of the West in terms of 
reducing the size of the Thai public sector and the guidance principle of donor 
bodies in term of decentralizing central power over the policy-making process. The 
latter measure can be seen through privatization programs, devolution of power, 
and “good governance” following the Anad administration (1991-1992). Thus, while 
international institutions have evolved as a result of the internationalization of global 
economy which can both resolve collective problems and act as a counterweight to 
an undemocratic regime, these institutions have over time acquired a high degree of 
influence over Thai domestic politics. The influence of international institutions was, 
thus, a bilateral relation.
This reform movement led to the 1997 “people’s constitution” in which the 
Thai political process was changed and a variety of new institutions were created. 
Promoted by the IMF and the World Bank, elements of good governance appeared 
in the 1997 constitutional mandates. As described in Chapters 4 and 5, these 
included the creation of new independent bodies, a local government
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decentralization scheme, and other public sector improvement projects such as 
financial management, accountability, and effective reforms. Interestingly, the 
adoption of governance issue was linked to Thai administrative capacity that was 
deemed essential for economic growth. In addition, the increasing 
internationalization of the economy and the desire for economic growth have 
encouraged the change to include businessmen as government leaders, and 
increased the role of organized businessmen as an interest group. In this regard, 
changes from simple demands for privatization of enterprises became more 
complex demands for improved governance institutions. Considering these drives 
as well as the business background of Thaksin, the newly established Thai Rak Thai 
Party was not denied in the 2001 general election.
With the bureaucratic problems so defined, the Thaksin administration and 
reform advisors contemplated the shift from traditional administration to the new 
public management which sought out the private sector for advice on how to effect 
reform change. Also, the NPM approach to public sector reform has been 
introduced through the circulation of ideas from other countries, including Australia, 
New Zealand, and the UK. These Western countries have contributed to the NPM- 
style of reforms in Thailand through a policy learning process and inter­
governmental assistance programs. As analyzed in Chapter 5, there is clear 
evidence that the Thai public sectors were experimenting with a variety of the NPM 
approaches to public administration, including the concept of power devolution to 
provincial governors, the introduction of public service agreements across the Thai 
public sectors, the emphasis on the steering role of central governments, and the 
preference toward private management practices. This does not necessarily mean
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that the Thai public sector reform committed to the NPM. But Thaksin’s reform 
tactics and strategies implied an underlying similarity with the NPM movement.
As noted in Chapter 5, the problem of administrative accountability was 
particularly large in the implementation of IPAS reform. The introduction of 
separation of policy and operation which employed a concept of purchasing and 
providing functions magnified the complex issues of hierarchy already inherent in 
the Thai bureaucratic problems. This policy-operation dichotomy not only 
characterized the IPAS and Thaksin’s public sector reform but also created a shared 
problem of accountability. According to theoretical concepts of the NPM, public 
officials should have high power and responsibility in order that it is possible to hold 
them accountable to the government’s policy. The pronounced management 
orientation of the reform was evident by the emphasis placed on the newly created 
public service agreement between the Thaksin administration and public sector 
chief executives, including CEO-Governors. Together with the service contractual 
agreement, performance measurement and reporting requirements have also been 
characterized by problematic output definitions and negotiations on the part of the 
public agencies. These decisions to draw a sharp distinction between outputs and 
outcomes made a major breakthrough in the Thai public sector because chief 
executives are now held accountable for producing outputs.
Contrary to the NPM approach to public sector reform, the practices of 
provincial reform led by Thaksin were implemented without a coherent perspective 
of NPM-related ideas. As addressed in Chapter 5, the IPAS’s implementation had 
resulted in fundamental changes in the provincial administration’s decision-making 
process in that the emphasis of government economic policies counteracted other
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reform-related considerations such as the devolved power to governors. One major 
implication is that the IPAS reform weakened the established administrative 
hierarchy to a lesser degree than the traditional Thai civil service-based merit 
system. At the same time, the civil services were less subjected to control by clear 
rules and regulations while they exercised more discretion on negotiated output 
indicators and self-assessment reform. This resulted in an increasing complexity 
within the realm of Thai civil service, making political loyalty more important while 
more attention was paid to outputs and results. Evidently, the increased in the 
“central fund” which was allocated solely by the Prime Minister’s discretion (upon 
cabinet endorsement) set a type of budget control over provincial administrative 
plans rather than allowing professionalized decision plans made by technocrats.
Thus, recent provincial administrative reform has had a significant impact on 
the traditional political and bureaucratic roles in Thailand. To some extent, 
analyzing how the IPAS reform has changed the role of politicians is complicated by 
a general shift from proactive dominant civil services in many policy sectors toward 
an NPM model of pubic administration. Arguably, Thai political executives played a 
different and more visible role than they previously had. In formulating a policy 
agenda, the politicians were assumed to create long-term goals for the public 
service and then let the bureaucracy operate as it sees appropriate toward those 
goals. With increasing reliance on complex policy instruments and the emergence 
of a subtler accountability between the politicians and bureaucrats, the role of 
elected politicians has been gradually increased. But there were no indications at 
the time when the IPAS was launched that it was the civil servants or the politicians 
who would ultimately be held accountable for the administrative reform outcomes.
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The concepts associated with the word “public sector reform” are 
increasingly important for public administration scholars. Although public sector 
reform becomes a virtual synonym for improved governance pursued by all 
governmental bodies, the reform implications are not generally agreed upon by a 
number of scholars. Certainly, administrative reorganization and public sector 
reform reflect the need to account for the changing relationship between 
governments and citizens and among the public agencies themselves. Although 
public sector reform has numerous variations across the world, it has several 
universal themes which can be seen in the Thai’s reform experiences. The growth 
and continuity of reform attempts have brought about a fundamental shift in the 
process and nature of Thai public administration, particularly during Thaksin’s 
government, where the New Public Management approach to public sector reform 
followed from the promulgation of new laws that were intended to transform the 
public institution in the late 1990s.
New Public Management (also being referred to as “new managerialism”) 
has become an emerging framework and model for public sector reform since the 
1980s. The discussion on NPM-related literature was presented in Chapter 1 and 
this part will only focus on some specific aspect of the NPM in the context of current 
Thai public administration. Typically, the NPM approach to public sector reform 
runs counter to the bureaucratic tradition in most reformed countries. It rejects the 
idea of a specific culture for public organizations and argues that the public sector 
can be managed like the private sector. In most cases, the reasons for
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implementation of NPM strategies were either from the reactions to political 
challenge or the economic necessity to control costs of public services. In both 
cases, NPM strategies are deliberate political choices. It is these reasons that 
characterize the IPAS reform under the Thaksin administration. Along with the 
analysis of the IPAS reform, it is useful to draw some implications with special 
reference to the NPM approach to public administration.
There had been experimentation on new managerialism for a decade, laying 
some of the foundations for a major shift in the Thai public sector. However, a 
fundamental change only proceeded in the late 1990s. The reform programs of the 
Thaksin administration was susceptible to most Thai elites, as the aftermath of the 
1997 economic crisis made clear the need for continuing transformation in the Thai 
public sector and public administration. This coincided with the strong parliament of 
Thaksin’s majority government in his first term. During this short period, the 
administration reorganized functional ministries, established a public sector reform 
agency, the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), and passed 
a number of reform-related laws dealing with administrative process.
Under the Thaksin government, three aspects in reform programs were 
distinguished. First, the organic model of NPM approach to public administration 
developed by the OPDC and reform-minded bureaucrats was mandated across the 
Thai public sector on a large scale. Essentially, the sub-government devolution 
program and regional reform under the IPAS’s title was evident in these attempts. 
This reform model included “senior executive services,” “performance incentive 
pay,” “balance scored card,” “special service delivery unit,” “performance 
measurement,” “public service agreement,” and the like.
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Several observations follow from the managerial approach to Thaksin's 
administrative reform. The main question concerning how the regional bureaucrats 
react to NPM-style reforms depends on their positions, levels of their hierarchical 
status, and their experienced bureaucratic cultures, to conclude that they are likely 
to serve as important factors for the reform implementation. The most significant 
institutional differences are those in values, norms, and expectations that define the 
success of reform implementation. While the OPDC tends to confirm that the 
course of IPAS tactics was based on working experiences and a theoretical 
foundation, the study found that the provincial bureaucrats saw that the IPAS reform 
measures were not perfectly compatible with the existing Thai bureaucratic context. 
As addressed in Chapter 5, there were some internal variations in the reaction of 
provincial civil services on the effectiveness of IPAS reform measures. This 
suggests the need for increased diversity in respect to government policy measures 
and that uniformed measures based on a set of private management ideal is 
unrealistic.
This also implies that it is important to study the public sector reform from 
below, that is, how management and civil service in practice become changed within 
the various branches of the administrative structures. Administrative reform policy is 
not only a matter of effective implementation of centrally determined solutions but 
also the extent to which the local response to central measures provides feedback 
to the overall administrative policy. Information derived from the filed interviews of 
this study shows that knowledge of the principles and practical initiatives of NPM- 
like reform were not well contemplated before the administration launched the IPAS 
and other reform measures.
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Although Thai senior bureaucrats attended the course of trainings, 
workshops, and seminars on managerial-style reform, the knowledge of the NPM 
and practices did not necessarily translate into real-life applications. It is also 
unclear how deep the discourse of NPM has permeated the Thai public services 
and political elites. One interpretation is that the Thaksin reform elements were 
adapted from the NPM’s menu of choice in which dominant international reform 
doctrines were transformed when they met Thai domestic administrative policy.
Second, Thaksin’s reform aspect stressed the new relationship between 
political executives and civil services, on the one hand, and the relationship between 
the public services and the citizen, on the other hand. These changes given 
attention here can be seen through the mandate of two important administrative 
laws, the Government Administration Act of 2002 and the Good Governance Act of 
2003. These laws provided a legal authority for the OPDC to act as a principal 
advisor for the routine Thai administrative reform. In these laws, the mandate for 
each public agency included strategic plans, performance outputs, and 
effectiveness measures. In a sense, the managerial aspects prescribed in the laws 
did not jeopardize the traditional operation of Thai bureaucracy.
The IPAS reform was eagerly pursued since it seemed to help promote the 
head of provincial ministry and the governor, although the implementation of these 
mandates overwhelmingly forced them to act in compliance with the new rules, to 
develop key indicator outputs, and to be subjected to evaluation for accomplishing 
defined goals. The contrast of the new managerial approach and the traditional 
practice of the Thai bureaucracy is that the former required high bureaucratic
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capacity and professional public managers in the process of public administration. 
However, it does not guarantee that the Thai public sector is improving.
According to a stated goal of the OPDC, the administration's public sector 
reform sought to devolve the power of central authorities and relax political control 
over public service for public managers at lower levels. These measures would 
leave the political executives and central agencies with the responsibility for defining 
the long-term goals and public policy agendas. At the time of the research, this 
emerging relationship among politicians, central agencies, and operational public 
agencies in Thai administration was far from clear in terms of public accountability.
As discussed in Chapter 5 concerning the overall assessment of IPAS 
implementation with respect to national policy frameworks of Thaksin’s policy 
agenda, it was very difficult to ascertain how the political executives and the 
provincial governors would be held accountable for policy outcomes under the 
separation of political accountability and public service operations. The indirect 
model of political control that the OPDC introduced implies accountability avoidance, 
particularly when the administration may reject responsibility whilst provincial 
governors can avoid accountability beyond output results and performance 
measures.
A final aspect which gave the Thaksin administrative reform momentum was 
the overall political status. In fact, important keys to the reform lay in the political 
institution and the character of Thaksin himself. One should not underestimate the 
broad impact of the constitutional amendment in 1997, which sought to reform Thai 
administrative institutions and to stabilize parliamentary democracy following 
successive unstable governments during the 1990s. Partially, the shortfall of the
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Thai parliamentary system was caused by numerous small and situational parties 
that organized internally around powerful factions.
As described in Chapters 3 and 4, the political heritage of the Thai 
parliamentary system had been constrained by party shifting, contested factions, 
and a preference for winning elections over policy platforms. With these recognized 
weaknesses, the reformed political system revised electoral rules and a party 
system to reflect the needed change. Despite the establishment of new laws to 
strengthen the power of the prime minister, many negative elements continued as 
the study showed that the roles of the Prime Minister’s Office increasingly expanded 
to the regional government.
Thaksin and the newly established Thai Rak Thai Party gained control of the 
changing laws by drawing politicians from existing parties in a short period before a 
new election was mandated in 2001. This happened, in part, because the Thai Rak 
Thai Party was free from skepticism in dealing with the unpopular economic 
structural programs prescribed by the IMF. Within the deterioration of economic and 
social programs administered by the Democrat Party, the business groups, middle 
class, and civic groups shifted their support to the Thai Rak Thai Party in the 2001 
general election.
During the election of 2001, the Democrat party countered the Thai Rak Thai 
with a campaign based on the continuation of its economic policies which were 
associated, in the public mind, with the IMF. On the contrary, the Thai Rak Thai 
Party’s policies that stressed the lower classes, particularly in rural Thailand, while 
consolidating the support from many financiers and businessmen proved very 
successful. These policies and a promotion of nationalism in time of crisis made
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Thai Rak Thai a victory, in just a short month, far more than anyone thought 
possible.
The comprehensive public sector reforms of the Thaksin administration had 
been possible because the political institution and the 1997 constitution opened up 
the climate of political and governemnt reform. Despite these opportunities and the 
1997-1998 economic crises, the Thai public sector reform may have become 
different from the current reform scheme. The rise of Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai 
became a challenge to a long general cultural trait of Thai bureaucracy that was 
deemed to be the center of politics and administration.
Thai Rak Thai’s distinguished policies and the assertive style of Thaksin’s 
administration indicated how tactics and forms of administrative reform may vary 
considerably across countries. As mentioned above, the Thaksin administrative 
reform did have the potential to create permanent change in the Thai’s 
administrative system by changing the relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats in some areas. However, the changes implemented thus far were not 
stable enough to ensure permanent transformation in the Thai public administration.
Thaksin was elected to a second five-year term in office in February 2005 
with a parliamentary majority and popular mandate. Instead, his government 
became mired in corruption scandals associated with his family and his ministers, 
culminating in the sale of his family's telecommunications empire to Singaporean 
investors for over $2 billion, a transaction on which the family contrived to pay no 
tax. The concentration of wealth and administrative power in Thaksin's hands 
enabled him to undermine the institutions intended to provide constitutional checks 
to executive power and preserve the integrity of Thai democracy. Thaksin’s
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administration had become increasingly divisive, and destabilization from the 
mounting anger over these matters acted as a catalyst for discontent on a wide 
range of other issues.
On 19 September 2006, the Thai Army executed a bloodless coup d'etat 
against Thaksin while he was preparing to address the opening session of the 
United Nations General Assembly in New York. General Sonthi, with commanders 
of the other armed services and the police beside him, appealed for public support 
and promised they would soon return power to the people. The king's public 
response was emphatic as he announced that "in order to create peace in the 
country" he was appointing General Sonthi to head a new council of administrative 
reform. This coup dragged Thai democracy back to an era many Thais believed the 
country had long since left behind: one where the military usurped constitutional 
authority at will. Otherwise, the technocrats in Thailand still remain powerful 
because of the inherent power of military-bureaucratic regimes from the past 
decades.
Towards a Research Agenda
This chapter concludes and discusses a number of features of the Thaksin’s 
public sector reform, as well as of the emerging patterns of Thai public 
administration in the contemporary period. That having been addressed, there is 
still a great deal of research that needs to be done in order to more completely 
understand administrative reform in different forms and different political settings.
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This study does not claim to be comprehensive. However, some key issues have 
been identified and analyzed by reference to selected literature.
The differences in the Thai public sector reform may also be related to 
experiences in the political and administrative traditions of other countries.
However, this study has tried to avoid presenting that Thai administrative reform is 
similar to reforms being implemented elsewhere. An important principle for this 
research at the outset is that there are no formulas to be applied uncritically under 
all circumstances in all public sector reform. Thus, the Integrated Provincial 
Administrative reform under Thaksin was chosen to interpret a set of policies, 
managements, and political elements.
While there are crucial differences in the interpretations of reform 
implementations in many scholarly works, there are also some remarkably similar 
elements that have already been addressed in this part and preceding chapters. In 
relation to the New Public Management approach’s literatures, Thaksin’s 
government reforms were analyzed by asking whether the reforms had impacts on 
managerial freedom, performance efforts, and effectiveness as stated in the general 
intended goals by the reformers. The answer is undoubtedly yes, especially the 
implementation of performance measurement that became a formal structure of 
Thai public administration.
In the case of the Integrated Provincial Administrative System, the study 
identified that a number of managerial techniques closely associated with the NPM 
had been adopted and applied to the provincial administrations. The introduction of 
the new results-oriented management by the administration partially dismantled 
hierarchical structures of the sub-region government which led to an emerging new
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relationship between political executives and regional technocrats in Thailand. The 
research on the issue of relationship between the two has been increasing, as the 
NPM sought to modify an accountability system in public administration. However, 
the unique context of Thai political and public sector development needs advanced 
study.
As was generally known, Thai central bureaucracy has remained an 
important factor in public policy making and public service providers. In the 
meantime, a growing number of various types of local government authorities have 
started to develop their local institutions and capacities. The transfers of the roles 
and functions from central ministries to local government authorities, which now 
have seen interrupted support from the administration, gave rise to an ambiguous 
situation concerning the overarching principle of Thai political and administrative 
reform specified in the 1997 constitution.
The overall situation can be interpreted that the central bureaucrats had 
seized the opportunities of IPAS reforms to revise control mechanisms over local 
government authorities, although the latter have more autonomy in local policy 
making than the central government agencies. As a consequence, the transition 
can be characterized by a more conflicted relationship between local government 
leaders and national politicians, on the one hand, and local politicians and central 
bureaucrats, on the other hand. This issue needs more study in order to explore the 
pattern of relationships to explain Thai democratic transition in the nexus of 
administration reform.
Thaksin’s government claimed that regional government had been improved. 
Sub-governments and provincial governors also appeared to have led to a greater
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emphasis on strategic goals and management performance, particularly under the 
impetus of IPAS initiatives. However, it is not clear how the improvement had been 
interpreted and it is not always easy to tell to what extent the improvement had 
actually let to the genuine goals of the reform plans.
However, those civil servants who were responsible for reform 
implementation had complained that the goals and output indicators were constantly 
moving. The debate is still in its early days but one must not confuse the issue of 
whether genuine results have been achieved with that of whether those results were 
advanced enough. It was suggested earlier that different local contexts tend to 
display different government styles. There is a need to look at this issue in a 
comparative perspective both domestically and internationally. It could be that 
different government regimes are typical to specific public sector reform measures.
The transitional period also unveiled a discrepancy between the potential of 
the Thai public sector reforms and the readiness and capacity of central technocrats 
to assume a new role when they have to shift from long-standing players in pubic 
policy-making processes to a steering body in accordance with constraints and 
subtleties of the public or semi-pubic sector, which cannot exclude some form of 
political oversight. To the extent that politics entered the reform processes, the 
public servants did not see themselves as mere agents of the politicians or 
guardians of the welfare of the society.
In this regard, they operated as trustees in exchange for high status or 
relatively high rewards. In that sense, Thaksin’s administrative reforms implies a 
larger, but classical issue of the politics-administration relationship. At the heart of 
the debate about Thaksin’s government reform, there is also tension between
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political conceptions of efficiency and managerial conceptions of efficiency. While 
the Thai public sector reform emphasized management techniques, which can be 
important and useful, a more fundamental question is what the pubic sector ought to 
do and where the demarcation between politics and administration exists. Only then 
can one focus realistically on the best way to accomplish the goals of public sector 
reform.
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Prior to interview session, informed consent will be obtained through an oral 
statement made by the researcher. The subjects will be informed of the nature of 
the research, their rights, and asked if audio recorder is allowed during the 
interview.
The complete statement below and the response to this statement by each 
of the interviewee will be part of the interview. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the Integrated Provincial Administrative System (IPAS). Interview 
questions were primarily to investigate the processes and implementations of I PAS 
and to describe the perceptions and experiences of the participant.
The interview will take between 45 and 60 minutes to complete. 
Interviewee’s name and official position will be kept confidential. Any information 
from the interviewee will not be available to anyone other than for the purpose of 
writing this dissertation or other publication related to this research topic in the 
future, in which case pseudonyms will be used. The interviewee is reminded that 
his or her participation is voluntary. During the interview period, the interviewee can 
choose to stop any time.
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You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of this 
study is to examine the reform initiatives and implementation of the “Integrated 
Provincial Administrative System” (IPAS), which has been mandated across Thai 
provincial administrations since 2003. To conduct this dissertation research, I would 
like to invite you for interviews and conversations dealing with the origin and 
implementation processes of IPAS. Specifically, the questions involve IPAS as a 
strategy of Thai reform and its impacts on different groups involved in the process.
According to Northern Illinois University’s policy, I am required to identify and 
prevent risks that might be incurred by the interview subjects. There is some risk 
that the questions could evoke some upsetting thoughts, feelings, or memories for 
you. If you feel upset during the interview for any reason, you may choose not to 
answer those or subsequent questions.
The interview should take between 45 and 60 minutes to complete. Unless 
you prefer to be identified, your name will be kept confidential. Any information from 
the interview will be used for the purpose of writing my dissertation or other 
publication related to this research topic. In the dissertation and articles, I will use 
pseudonyms rather than real names unless you choose to be identified by 
name. As soon as this study is completed, the general findings of this study will be 
presented to you.
You are reminded that your participation in the following interview is 
voluntary. As, such, I would like to ask you if you understand your rights as a 
participant in this study and agree to record this interview on an audiotape. Shall I 
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Q1: What are the most serious problems that provincial administrations have been 
confronting? Who should take the major roles in solving such problems?
Q2: Has there been any major change in the attempts to transform provincial 
administration in the last five years? What are they? What is the heritage from the 
previous reforms? How did they discontinue?
Q3: How does your organization (central governments) involve in provincial reform 
initiatives and implementation? How does particular reform approach come to play 
in the discussion of public sector reform? Why do certain strategies receive 
attention?
Q4: How are members of your organization able to influence reform initiatives and 
strategies? What are the values and philosophies held by the reform initiators?
Q5: What makes “The Integrated Provincial Administrative System” a priority? How 
do the central governments influence the reform approach?
Q6: Can you identify any reform tactics or strategies that are mandated by the 
Thaksin administration? What makes them relevant or not relevant to regional 
government reform?
Q7: Are members of your organization able to involve actively during reform 
processes? How your roles are considered important to the implementation of 
“Integrated Provincial Administrative System”? What are the most important issues 
involving the success of such reform?
Q8: How do you value the “Integrated Provincial Administrative System” and its 
strategies? Could you identify some of the major reform tactics being applied in your 
province? How do they work regarding to communication and collaboration?
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Q9: Has there been much change in the degree of organization collaboration, 
planning, and performance evaluation since the implementation of new reform? 
How do the reform tactics affect local community and civic groups? How do you 
describe the current relationship between central government and provincial 
administration?
Q10: Can you think of any shift in organization norms and values after the 
“Integrated Provincial Administrative System” was mandated? Can you give 
examples of the event or behavior that reflects such the change?
Q11: What is your perspective on the status of current reform implementation? 
What would you want to suggest what should have done to make the reform 
process a success or avoid failure?
Q12: Is there anything else that you think I should know or I missed in our 
conversation?
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Province “A”:
1. January 10, 2005, 16.20-17.40 p.m., A staff of Provincial Strategic Administration, 
Office of the Governor
2. January 12, 2005, 15.20-16.30 p.m., Head of Provincial Commerce Ministry
3. January 13, 2005, 17.00-17.20 p.m., President of Province “A” Chamber of 
Industry
4. January 17, 2005, 13.30-14.10 p.m., A staff of Planning Division, Provincial 
Industrial Ministry
5. January 17, 2005, 16.20-17.40 p.m., Head of Provincial Agriculture and 
Cooperative Ministry
6. January 18, 2005, 15.30-16.20 p.m., Mayor of Province “A” Provincial 
Administrative Organization
7. January 18, 2005, 9.30-10.50 a.m., Mayor of Province “A” City
8. January 19, 2005, 13.30-14.20 p.m., President of Province “A” Chamber of 
Commerce
9. January 19, 2005,11.10-11-50 a.m., Head of Provincial Labor Ministry
10. January 20, 2005,17.10-18.20 p.m., President of Province “A” Tourist Business 
Federation
11. January 20, 2005,10.00-10.40 a.m., Governor of Province “A”
Province “B”:
1. March 1, 2005, 11.00-12.00 a.m., A staff of Provincial Strategic Administration, 
Office of the Governor
2. March 2, 2005, 10.00-11.20 a.m., Head of Provincial Industrial Ministry
3. March 2, 2005,11.30-12.00 a.m., Head of Provincial Finance Ministry
4. March 2, 2005, 13.20-14.50 p.m., Head of Provincial Agriculture and Cooperative
Ministry
5. March 3, 2005, 11.00-12.00 a.m., Head of Provincial Social Development and 
Human Security
6. March 3, 2005, 12.40-13.45 p.m., Deputy Governor of Province “B”
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7. March 4, 2005, 14.40-15.10 p.m., Head of Provincial Planning Department, 
Ministry of Interior
8. March 4, 2005, 15.20-16.30 p.m., President of Province “B” Chamber of 
Commerce
9. March 4, 2005, 15.20-16.30 p.m., President of Province “B” Chamber of Industry
10. March 8, 2005, 14.00-15.00 p.m., Secretary of Provincial Governor
11. March 9, 2005, 9.00-9.45 a.m., Governor of Province “B”
12. March 9, 2005,14.30-15.19 p.m., Head of Provincial Commerce Ministry
Province “C”:
1. March 15, 2005,11.00-11.50 a.m., Deputy Governor of Province “C"
2. March 16, 2005, 11.00-12.12 p.m., Head of Provincial Commerce Ministry
3. March 16, 2005, 13.20-14.10 p.m., President of Province “C” Chamber of
Commerce
4. March 17, 2005, 9.10-10.00 a.m., Head of Provincial Office, Office of the 
Governor
5. March 17, 2005, 13.20-15.00 p.m., Head of Provincial Strategic Administrative 
Unit
6. March 17, 2005,11.40-12.30 p.m., Head of Provincial Social Development and 
Social Security
7. March 17, 2005, 10.10-11.30 a.m., Head of Provincial Agriculture and 
Cooperative Ministry
8. March 18, 2005, 10.00-11.00 a.m., Governor of Province “C”
9. March 19, 2005, 11.00-12.00 a.m., Mayor of Province “C" City
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